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Abstract 
Talents play a central role in the way that we live our lives, and it is widely 
assumed that identifying and developing one’s talents is valuable, both for oneself 
and for others. Despite this, the philosophical literature is seriously lacking in its 
discussion of the nature and value of talent; the objective goodness of talent and 
its development is often assumed without an analysis of what a talent is, and the 
value that we place on it. This dissertation aims to provide such an analysis, 
offering a philosophical account of the nature and value of talent, and an account 
of why we value its development. In doing so, I demonstrate how this can inform 
and help us assess the debates and arguments that are made in the existing 
philosophical literature on talent. I do not aim to provide an exhaustive overview 
of all the philosophical issues that could be raised in relation to the value of talent 
and talent development, but instead I focus on three central issues that arise when 
analysing the nature of talents and the role that they play in our lives. 
The first issue is the nature of talent itself. Here I offer an account of 
talent, understood as a high level of potential for a particular skill which is 
expressed and manifested in the excellent acquisition of that skill. The second 
issue is whether or not we have good prudential reasons or a moral obligation to 
develop our talents. I begin by objecting to Kant’s claim that there is a moral duty 
to develop one’s talents; I will argue that if there is such a duty, it will not be 
generated by the commitments of Kant’s moral theory. I then argue that whether 
or not talent development is morally required, or prudentially good, is conditional 
on one’s endorsement of the commitments that are required to bring about the 
development of one’s talent. 
Finally, I turn my focus to the relationship between talents and equality. 
Given the fact that some people are more talented than others, and the way in 
which this disrupts levels of social equality, I examine how we ought to counteract 
the injustice caused by unequal levels of talent. I argue that we ought to adopt 
the luck egalitarian neutralisation approach, as this most plausibly frames the way 
in which unequal talents disrupt levels of equality, and why any arising inequalities 
count as unjust. 
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Introduction 
Talents play a central role in the way that we live and organise our lives. For those 
who are talented, their talent allows them to more efficiently and uniquely 
develop a particular set of skills, and doing so can often shape their personal 
development, determining the choices that they make and the conception of the 
good life that they endorse. It is a widely accepted assumption that identifying 
and developing one’s talents is valuable, for oneself or for others; talents are 
considered to directly contribute to personal flourishing, as well as contributing 
indirectly to the flourishing of others. Developing one’s talents also has social and 
political implications; the resources produced and consumed by identifying and 
nurturing one’s talents impacts on how goods are distributed in society and how 
social institutions are organised. Most of the time these effects are considered to 
be positive, allowing for a more efficient and productive functioning of society. 
This positive understanding of the value of talents for individuals and 
society is illustrated by the recent increase in talent development programmes 
across educational, governmental and commercial institutions. For example, 
government-funded ‘UK Sport’ has recently launched its “biggest ever” talent 
identification and development programme (UK Sport 2015), whilst the national 
arts bodies of both England and Scotland have recently recognised talent 
development as a strategic priority (see Arts Council England 2017; Creative 
Scotland 2014). In the commercial sector, the discussion of how best to attract 
and manage talented employees has become increasingly fashionable, with 
international consulting firms such as McKinsey & Company and PwC offering 
services that claim to aid their clients in retaining and promoting talented 
employees (McKinsey & Company 2017; PwC 2017). From this it is clear that 
institutionalised talent identification and development programmes are a 
commonplace feature of most contemporary western societies, and that these 
programmes are thought to have positive implications. 
Despite the increasing social interest in the way that talents are managed 
and cultivated, and the positive and central role that talents are considered to 
play in our lives, it is surprising to note that the philosophical literature is seriously 
lacking in its discussion of the nature and value of talents. Some moral theories, 
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particularly Kant’s deontology and Hurka’s moral perfectionism, do make a strong 
connection between the value of talent development and moral agency, but this 
connection is based on an assumption that developing one’s talents is necessarily 
and objectively good. A similar assumption is made in the philosophical literature 
on well-being; most theories of well-being include talent development as an 
element of what makes a person’s life go well. But these claims are made without 
an analysis of what a talent is, the value that we place on talents and their 
development, and the ethical questions that arise from this. In political 
philosophy, talents are central to the egalitarian debate concerning how goods in 
society ought to be organised such that unfair advantages do not emerge from an 
unequal distribution of ability. Again, the debate unfolds without a substantial 
and systematic philosophical account of the nature of talents and why we value 
their development. 
This dissertation aims to provide such an account, offering a philosophical 
analysis of the nature of talent and why we value its development, and 
demonstrating how this account can inform and help us assess the arguments made 
in the existing philosophical literature on talent. In doing so, I do not aim to 
provide an exhaustive overview of all the philosophical issues that could be raised 
in relation to talent and talent development. Instead I focus on three of the 
central issues that arise when analysing the nature of talents and the role that 
they play in our lives. 
The first issue is the nature of talent itself. Here I offer an account of what 
a talent is, engaging with debates raised in philosophy of mind and the philosophy 
of psychology. Evaluating the concept of talent in this way is important because 
it makes clear exactly what is being analysed; this is even more pertinent given 
that in the literature thus far, the word ‘talent’ has been used ambiguously, and 
this ambiguity has given rise to different accounts of the value of talent that seem 
to talk past each other and unintentionally refer to contrasting phenomena. Once 
a unified account of the nature of talents is in place, this equivocation can be 
avoided. This is the task of Chapter One.  
The second issue that I focus on is whether or not we have good prudential 
reasons or a moral obligation to develop our talents. We often react negatively 
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when we hear of cases in which a person has neglected or failed to develop her 
talents, and it is important to understand what values ground this intuitive 
negative reaction. In the existing philosophical literature, the positive value of 
talent development is predominantly merely assumed, and this assumption is 
often used to ground the strong claim that there is a prudential reason or a moral 
obligation to develop one’s talents. For example, most philosophical theories of 
well-being claim, either explicitly or implicitly, that the development of one’s 
talents is prudentially good in some way; in this case, our negative reaction to 
wasted talents is grounded in the claim that by failing to develop one’s talents, 
one is missing out on a prudential good. When it comes to morality, whether or 
not developing one’s talents is considered to be morally good will usually depend 
on whether doing so is either allowed or required by the particular principles of 
the moral theory in question. For example, virtue ethics might claim that 
developing one’s talents is morally required if doing so promotes virtuous action, 
or if failing to do so undermines the expression of virtue. In this way, our negative 
reaction to wasted talents is grounded in the claim that by failing to develop one’s 
talents, one is failing to act morally. 
There are specific theories of well-being and morality, however, that make 
even stronger claims than this, based on the assumption that developing one’s 
talents represents one of the most valuable forms of human flourishing and moral 
development. Welfare perfectionists, for example, claim that not only is the 
development of one’s talents prudentially valuable, but that talent development 
is itself a constitutive part of one’s well-being, such that it is objectively and 
necessarily prudentially good. With regards to moral theory, both Kant and moral 
perfectionists explicitly claim that there is a moral obligation to develop one’s 
talents. The reason for this moral demand is not just that it falls out of the 
particular principles of the moral theory, as was the case with the example of 
virtue ethics above, but rather that there is a necessary and fundamental 
connection between talent development and morality. 
In Chapters Two, Three and Four I argue that we should reject the theories 
that make these stronger claims regarding the connection between talent 
development, well-being and morality. Whilst I do not deny that developing one’s 
talents may have moral and prudential value, my claim is that (a) the prudential 
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reasons and moral obligation to develop one’s talents cannot be generated from 
the various commitments of the theories themselves, and (b) even if such an 
obligation or prudential reason could be generated by those theories, or any 
others, this would give rise to a particular form of the demandingness objection. 
This demandingness objection is grounded in the endorsement constraint, which 
claims that the goodness of developing one’s talents is conditional on one’s 
endorsement of the commitments that are necessary to bring about the 
development of one’s talents. If this endorsement constraint is not met, then I 
argue that any theory of morality or well-being that claims the development of 
one’s talent to be objectively good and universally constitutive of moral agency 
or well-being, is implausible. 
 The third central issue that I focus on in this dissertation is the relationship 
between talent and equality. One of the key debates in political philosophy has 
centred on the worry that institutionalised talent identification and development 
unjustly disrupts levels of social equality. This egalitarian concern gives rise to an 
axiological tension; on the one hand, we recognise the value in identifying and 
developing our talents, but on the other hand, doing so potentially gives rise to 
unjust inequalities. Given the fact of unequal talents and the worry that this poses 
for egalitarian justice, in the final chapter of this dissertation I examine how we 
ought to respond to the fact that there are unequal levels of talent in society. To 
do so I focus on the dominant debate in the literature between luck egalitarianism 
and relational egalitarianism, assessing how successfully these competing theories 
argue that we ought to counteract the disadvantages caused by unequal talents. I 
argue that luck egalitarianism offers the best response, because it most plausibly 
frames why unequal talents disrupt levels of equality, and why any arising 
inequalities count as unjust.  
Before I outline the structure and chapter plan of the dissertation in more 
detail, let me qualify one important terminological point. In the following 
chapters I will often discuss the nature and grounds of the potential moral 
obligation we might have to develop our talents.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I take an ‘obligation’ to be synonymous with a ‘duty’, so that, for 
example, when someone is claimed to have a moral obligation, this simply 
amounts to the fact that they have a moral duty. Furthermore, I assume that a 
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moral obligation (duty) to develop one’s talents arises because it is what an agent 
has most moral reason to do. For example, if consequentialism claims that I have 
a moral obligation to X, this is because doing X is morally required – it is what that 
particular theory of morality tells me I have most moral reason to do. And the 
same goes for theories of well-being; for the purposes of this dissertation I take it 
that the claim that X is prudentially good for an agent equates to the claim that 
the agent has good prudential reasons to do X. 
 
* * * 
 
I begin, in Chapter One, by noting that in everyday language and in the 
philosophical literature, there is some ambiguity about what is meant by the 
notion of a talent and how it differs from the closely related notions of ‘ability’, 
‘endowment’, and ‘capacity’. In fact, most authors use these words 
interchangeably. I argue that this conflation is mistaken and propose that a talent 
should be understood as a high level of potential for a particular skill that is 
manifested in the excellent acquisition and development of that particular skill. I 
conclude the chapter by outlining how this account of talent makes sense of some 
of the reasons why we value talents and their development. 
 In Chapter Two I focus on Kant’s explicit claim that there is a moral duty 
to develop one’s talents; I explain the arguments that ground this claim and 
discuss three objections that can be raised against Kant’s account. First, it could 
be objected that Kant is mistaken when he claims that the duty to develop one’s 
talents is an ‘imperfect’ duty rather than a ‘perfect’ one. I argue that in fact the 
duty to develop one’s talents need not be thought of as imperfect or perfect, but 
as part of a continuum of stringency that can be applied to any moral duty. 
Second, Kant argues that the moral duty we have to develop one’s talents is one 
that is owed specifically to oneself. However, it could be objected that the duty 
should only be thought of as a duty that we owe to others, and not to oneself. I 
argue that Kant can respond successfully to this objection. Finally, I object to 
Kant’s claim due to the fact that he cannot generate the moral priority to develop 
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specifically our talents, as opposed to any other ability or competency that we 
may have. In other words, there is no reason for Kant to claim that talents are 
more morally significant than mere competencies when it comes to developing 
and perfecting one’s moral agency. As a result, from the commitments of his own 
theory, Kant cannot successfully conclude that there is a moral obligation to 
develop one’s talents.  
In Chapter Three I argue that both moral perfectionism and welfare 
perfectionism are equally unable to generate the claim that there is a moral 
obligation or prudential reason to develop one’s talents. This is for two reasons. 
First, I object to the shared perfectionist claim that developing one’s talents 
necessarily counts as constitutive of one’s excellent human flourishing. Second, I 
argue that welfare perfectionism violates the ‘endorsement constraint’; 
developing one’s talent is only prudentially good for an agent if the agent 
endorses, or would endorse if under optimal decision-making conditions, the 
normative commitments that are necessarily required to bring about the 
development of her talent. If there is no such endorsement, then developing one’s 
talents cannot be considered as constitutive of one’s well-being or human 
flourishing. As a result, the commitments of both moral perfectionism and welfare 
perfectionism cannot successfully generate the claim that one has good prudential 
reasons or a moral obligation to develop one’s talents. 
 In Chapter Four I argue that irrespective of a particular moral theory’s 
commitments, if that theory claims there is a moral obligation to develop one’s 
talents, then it is potentially subject to a particular form of the demandingness 
objection. This objection claims that if a moral obligation requires one to 
unreasonably sacrifice one’s non-moral commitments, then it is implausibly 
demanding. I argue that this demandingness objection should not be formulated 
in terms of morality’s overridingness, but instead should be based on the 
substantive values and commitments that come with the particular content of the 
moral obligation itself. I propose that when it comes to the moral obligation to 
develop one’s talents, what counts as an unreasonable sacrifice of one’s non-
moral concerns is grounded in a failure to meet the endorsement constraint, such 
that an agent does not endorse the normative commitments that are necessary to 
bring about the development of her talent. 
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 This means that the endorsement constraint I introduced in Chapter Three 
does not only place a condition on welfare perfectionism or any account of well-
being that claims we have prudential reasons to develop our talents. The 
endorsement constraint also places a condition on any theory of morality that 
claims there is a moral obligation to develop one’s talents. Therefore, if one does 
have a moral obligation to develop one’s talents, it will be conditional on one’s 
endorsement of that development, as specified by the endorsement constraint. 
 Even if there is a moral obligation, or there are good prudential reasons to 
develop one’s talents, egalitarianism tells us that we ought to be sensitive to the 
brute fact that some people are more talented than others. Given the fact of 
unequal talents and the way in which this disrupts levels of social equality, in 
Chapter Five I examine how we ought to respond to the injustice caused by 
inequalities in levels of talent. I argue that we ought to adopt the luck egalitarian 
neutralisation approach, which aims to eradicate unjust inequalities in levels of 
talent, to the extent that these inequalities are a matter of bad brute luck – luck 
that arises due to a person’s circumstances and for which she has no control.   
In the conclusion I summarise, drawing together the various arguments of 
the previous chapters, and consider some important questions that have had to 
be left unanswered. In doing so, I will highlight interesting avenues for further 
research.  
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Chapter One 
The Nature of Talent 
 
1.1. Introduction 
It is commonly assumed that developing one’s talents is valuable and that there 
are good prudential and moral reasons to do so. In order to determine what 
reasons we may have for valuing talents and their development, and what might 
ground the claim that we have an obligation to develop our talents, it should be 
clear what we mean when we claim that someone is ‘talented’. If we do have an 
obligation to develop our talents, or if we have reasons to find doing so valuable, 
then we ought to know what exactly we are to be developing, or what we claim 
to be valuable. 
In both everyday language and in the philosophical literature, however, it 
is not clear what is meant by the concept of a talent, and how it differs from the 
closely related notions of ‘ability’, ‘endowment’, and ‘capacity’. For example, 
Kant uses the word ‘talent’ as synonymous with the terms ‘natural gifts’ and 
‘capacities’ (Kant GW 4:423), whilst Thomas Hurka interchangeably uses the words 
‘talent’ and ‘ability’ (Hurka 1993: 15, 96). Furthermore, in the literature on 
distributive justice, Gerry Cohen claims that a talent is an ‘inherent capacity’ 
(Cohen 2011: 19, 30), Elizabeth Anderson refers to it as a ‘native endowment’ 
(Anderson: 302), whilst both Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls use the words 
‘talent’, ‘ability’ and ‘skill’ as synonymous (Dworkin 2000: 92, 97; Rawls 1999: 63, 
73). 
Although this confusion could be dismissed as a mere terminological 
oversight, there is a substantive difference at stake. On the one hand, these terms 
could be thought of as competencies that have already been expressed and 
developed to some extent, and on the other hand, they could suggestive of raw 
potential that has yet to be expressed or cultivated. Often, the subtle difference 
between these concepts that are apparently synonymous with talent is also 
highlighted by the inclusion of the terms ‘natural’ or ‘innate’; if something is 
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termed as natural then it is often assumed to be an aspect of one’s genetic 
potential, rather than something that has been shaped by one’s development and 
environment. 
The definitional ambiguity that is apparent in the literature is also echoed 
in the way that we seem to use the word ‘talent’ in everyday language. In differing 
circumstances we will either use the word to mean someone’s innate potential, 
or the level of their already expressed and developed ability. For example, when 
we claim that the ten year-old Usain Bolt was a talented sprinter, we might be 
referring to his ‘natural’ promise or potential, such that if he developed this 
potential then we would predict him to be an exceptionally skilled sprinter.1 In 
doing so we might pay attention to Bolt’s physical and cognitive attributes; his 
particular body shape, determination and willingness to practice, his efficiency in 
picking up new techniques, and how he listens to and acts upon instruction. By 
calling Bolt ‘talented’ in this way, we have referred to his levels of potential and 
the capacity he has to become an excellent sprinter. By contrast, however, when 
labelling the young Bolt as talented we might also be referring to the fact that he 
is already highly skilled and displays an ability that is above average. He may have, 
for example, already won important competitions, broken records, or be able to 
run comparatively faster than his peers. 
The two uses of the word ‘talent’ are separable; the first definition 
describes a talent as the potential for excellence if developed, whilst the second 
definition understands talent as a capacity that has already been expressed to 
some extent, already allowing an agent to demonstrate excellence for a particular 
skill. For instance, someone might possess a high level of sprinting potential, 
displaying the right kind of physical and mental traits to make an excellent 
sprinter, but have not yet received the formal training to turn that potential into 
excellent performance on the track. Or, a particular sprinter might have won 
sprinting competitions, broken records, and run faster than his peers, but at the 
same time have had to face considerable physical and mental challenges in doing 
                                                          
1 For example, Ronay’s recent article in The Guardian has described the talent of a 
professional footballer as a “natural gift” (Ronay 2014). 
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so because he is not ‘naturally’ disposed to be an excellent sprinter, perhaps 
having the wrong kind of body shape or lack of competitive spirit. 
Although these two definitions can come apart, they both capture salient 
aspects that are apparent in our descriptions of what counts as a talent. As such, 
in this chapter I propose a working definition of talent that aims to incorporate 
and make sense of both the everyday uses of the word. A talent, I suggest, should 
be understood as both potential and excellence. If someone is talented, they will 
have a high level of potential for a particular skill which is manifested and 
expressed in the excellent acquisition and development of that skill. This means 
that a talent is not merely the raw potential or capacity from which we nurture 
certain abilities and skills, but rather it is that potential manifested in the 
efficient and productive acquisition of those abilities and skills. Talent is therefore 
the excellent expression of skill acquisition that is grounded in one’s high level of 
potential for that skill. This means that talent is the expression of a particular 
skill, and the potential with which that skill is acquired.  
In what follows I elucidate and make a case for this account of the nature 
of talent. Section Two will outline the reasons why we ought to consider talent as 
constituted by potential, understood as a dispositional quality. Section Three 
rejects the environmentalist account of talent, which claims that high levels of 
skill are not to be understood in terms of natural potential, but instead constituted 
by environmental stimuli and social variables. In Section Four I argue that 
potential ought not to be understood as merely ‘natural’, but that which 
incorporates the dynamic interaction between genetic and social factors. In 
Section Five I outline the reasons why potential is not enough for an account of 
talent; talents ought to be understood as the excellent manifestation and 
expression of this potential. One of the reasons for this is that what counts as a 
talent is determined by already-held normative judgements based on what society 
values as worthwhile, concerning both the level of someone’s skill and the domain 
of that skill. This means that the positive judgement involved in evaluating 
someone as talented is contextual; comparative and relative to cultural norms and 
values. I conclude in Section Six by outlining how my account of talent initially 
allows us to make sense of why we value talents and their development. 
20 
 
 
 
 Before continuing to the next section, I would like to be clear about the 
reason for focusing on forming an account of the nature of talent. It could be 
argued that for the purpose of engaging with the substantive normative questions 
I raise in later chapters, I only need to identify and use as a point of departure 
the definition of talent that is most commonly used, or most relevant to, the 
existing moral and political literature. In that case I would only need to stipulate 
a definition of talent that works specifically for the moral and political issues that 
will arise in the proceeding chapters. After all, if Kant means ‘natural potential’ 
when he uses the word ‘talent’, then his claim that we have a moral obligation to 
develop our talents simply means that we have a moral obligation to develop our 
natural potential. In order to analyse the substantive philosophical points, it may 
be sufficient to merely accept and understand what each author means by their 
use of the word. 
However, as I have already highlighted, it is unclear by referring to the 
literature and our everyday use of the word, what a talent actually is and what 
authors mean by their use of the word. By stipulating one interpretation over 
another, I would be neglecting an aspect of talent that some authors have deemed 
to be significant. Furthermore, my aim in this dissertation is not merely to 
internally critique various philosophers’ arguments, but to unearth whether their 
claims about the moral and political implications that arise from talents and their 
development are plausible. To answer the question whether we have an obligation 
to develop our talents, or whether there are good prudential reasons to do so, it 
is vitally important to understand what a talent is. And in order for the answer to 
have any significant wider import, the understanding of talent that I use has to 
ring true and pick out essential features of the phenomenon. 
As such, the definition of talent cannot simply be stipulated, but argued 
for, by putting up for scrutiny the ways in which we use the term in everyday 
language and in the philosophical literature, so as to arrive at and prescribe a less 
ambiguous and more useful definition of talent than the relatively confused one 
that is currently on offer. In doing so, I propose an account of talent that 
psychologists Sternberg and Davidson call ‘implicit’, attempting to theorise the 
conceptual question about the nature of talent, rather than analysing the 
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cognitive or physical capacities that are present in a person who is already labelled 
as ‘talented’ (Sternberg & Davidson 1986: 10).2 
 
1.2. Potential as a Dispositional Quality 
The account of talent that I propose in this chapter is one that incorporates both 
the notions of potential and excellence. A talent is, I claim, a high level of 
potential for a skill that is excellently manifested in the ease and speed with which 
that particular skill is acquired and developed. In this section I discuss why 
‘potential’ must feature as a necessary condition when defining the nature of 
talent. 
 Potential is not only a necessary pre-requisite for being talented, but is also 
necessary for being able to develop any skill, no matter how trivial we might deem 
it to be. It seems impossible, not just unlikely, that someone or something will be 
able to achieve X, or be X, without having the potential to achieve or be X. This 
potential can be understood as a dispositional quality, which as Gilbert Ryle has 
argued, does not require an agent or object “to be in a particular state, or to 
undergo a particular change, [but…] to be bound or liable to be in a particular 
state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular change is realized” 
(Ryle: 31). For example, in terms of inanimate objects, a piece of wood has the 
potential to become furniture in virtue of its disposition to be carved in a 
particular way, and a glass can be broken in virtue of the disposition of fragility, 
which results in it shattering when hit under the right circumstances. When it 
comes to the potential for humans to behave or act in a certain way, it is clear 
that without the relevant dispositions, such actions or behaviours would be 
impossible. For example, in order to play tennis a person has to have the relevant 
dispositions to be able to hold the racket, throw and hit the ball, and to move 
                                                          
2 This latter type of theory is what is called an “explicit” theory of talent, focussing on 
the “internal” and “cognitive” processes that are involved in understanding how talented 
people function in their specific skill domains (Sternberg & Davidson 1986: 10). Renzulli’s 
(2005) “three-ring” conception of talent is an example of an explicit theory, claiming that 
talented individuals show a higher level of ability, task commitment and creativity.  
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around the court. In order to sing there is an initial dispositional requirement to 
be able to move one’s vocal chords and to control the sound or vibrations that are 
emitted from them.3 
 When we refer to someone as having the kind of potential that counts as a 
talent, however, we are not merely referring to the basic dispositions that are 
needed for any of our behaviours and actions to arise. For example, we consider 
a glass to be more fragile, more disposed to break, if it is structured in a particular 
way. We can even compare the fragility of different glasses – one glass is more 
fragile than another if it displays the relevant dispositional qualities more than 
the other glass. By analogy, we consider an agent as being disposed to play tennis 
better than others, the more she displays the relevant dispositional qualities; for 
example, that she is more disposed to have the right kind of body shape, quick 
reflexes, good co-ordination, and is able to move with agility around the court. 
And so, the high level of potential in those who are talented are qualities that 
dispose them, upon development of a particular skill, to acquire and develop that 
skill with more ease and speed (Gagné 1998: 416). This does not imply that those 
who do not have high levels of potential are precluded from attaining expert 
performance, but rather that someone who has a high level of potential for a 
particular skill will find the development of that skill to come with more ease and 
precociousness. 
Take for example a comparative case of two sprinters: sprinter A and 
sprinter B. Both sprinters have reached the same level of success, running the 
same exceptionally fast time for the 100m race. However, A has found sprinting 
more of a challenge – he has had to practice longer hours, adapt his diet, receive 
more guidance from his teachers, and spend more time in the gym to change his 
                                                          
3 In order to avoid certain objections that can be raised against dispositional accounts of 
ability, such as the ‘finkish’ objection raised by Martin (1994) and the ‘masking’ objection 
raised by Choi (2012), I suggest that for sake of argument we assume Michael Fara’s 
account of dispositions, specifying that a disposition will be manifested only under the 
relevant conditions: “An agent has the ability to A in circumstances C if and only if she 
has the disposition to A when, in circumstances C, she tries to A” (Fara 2008: 848). As 
such, an agent’s or object’s external environment may mask a disposition’s 
manifestation, but not remove the disposition altogether. For a discussion on the 
relationship between dispositions and manifestation conditions, see Stephen Mumford’s 
(1998) realist account of dispositions. 
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body shape. Sprinter B, on the other hand, has found that the sport comes quite 
easily to him – he has had to practice much less than A, hardly spends any time 
training with his coach, and spends half the time in the gym compared to A. On 
my account of talent, it is sprinter B who has higher levels of potential, 
determined by the amount of effort that needs to be invested in the development 
of his skill. Given the same level of skill, a person who needs to invest more effort 
in developing that skill is considered to have less potential than the person who 
invests less effort. 
According to the account of talent I have been sketching so far, a talent is 
a high level of potential, understood as a dispositional quality manifested in a 
particular way; if someone is talented then they will be disposed to develop a skill 
with more ease and speed than someone who is not talented.4 There is widespread 
assumption in the literature that these high levels of potential indexed to those 
who are talented are something ‘natural’ or ‘innate’, such that one’s level of 
potential is determined genetically in some way. This is not merely assumed in 
the philosophical literature, but also in the field of psychology, where Howe et al. 
note the traditional picture of talent rests on an assumption of “inborn attributes” 
and “natural aptitudes” that are explanatory and predictive of future success 
(Howe et al. 1998: 399). 
However, the scientific evidence that would be needed to determine 
whether a person’s dispositions are ‘innate’ in this way is inconclusive. Some 
psychologists worry that it might be ethically problematic to empirically assess 
whether talents stem from purely genetic potential. Trehub and Schellenburg, for 
instance, have concerns that the experiments needed to determine this would be 
invasive and inappropriate, requiring the researcher to programme “the lives of 
                                                          
4 It is important to note that even though a talent is expressed in the ease and speed with 
which a skill is developed, this does not mean that the skill itself will have anything to do 
with ease or speed. For example, it might be that someone has a disposition to be a good 
chess player or memorise poetry, and these skills are characterised not by speed or 
efficiency, but by one’s level of potential for reflection and patience. My claim is just 
that the acquisition of the skill will come more naturally to the talented person, such 
that she finds that the reflective capacities and patience required to become a good chess 
player, for instance, will come more easily and require less effort than someone who is 
not talented. 
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talented children so that all potentially relevant environmental factors could be 
controlled” (Trehub & Schellenburg 1998: 428). Because these experiments would 
be ethically problematic, it is highly unlikely that they could ever be 
comprehensively or successfully carried out. 
From the experiments that have been conducted, what has been shown is 
that when it comes to human development there is no such thing as a genetic 
disposition that is unmediated by one’s social environment (Fishkin: 94). Due to 
the fact one’s development is so influenced and mediated by one’s social and 
physical environments, some psychologists have gone so far as to claim that what 
we usually think of as a talent does not exist, and instead our high levels of 
achievement are not determined by dispositional qualities but the manifestation 
of advantageous environmental stimuli, such as good teaching, parenting and 
hard-work. For ease of reference, this position can be called ‘environmentalism’. 
If the environmentalist position is correct, and talents are not considered to be 
levels of personal dispositional qualities, then this directly refutes the account of 
talent I propose in this chapter. As such, before I go on to argue that potential is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for a definition of talent, in the next 
section I will outline the environmentalist position in greater detail and offer 
arguments to reject it. 
 
1.3. Against Environmentalism 
The environmentalist position with regards to talents and their development has 
been most explicitly argued for by two groups of experimental psychologists, one 
headed by Michael J. Howe in the United Kingdom, and the other by K. Anders 
Ericsson in the United States of America. The experiments conducted by both 
groups have provided similar results, allowing Howe and Ericsson to conclude that 
talents, understood as a person’s innate or natural potential, do not exist. Instead, 
what we originally considered to be a person’s talent is instead the level of ability 
and skill that one accumulates as a result of advantageous environmental and 
social factors. In this section I will focus my discussion of the environmentalist 
25 
 
 
 
position on Howe et al.’s (1998) feature article in Behavioural and Brain Sciences,5 
which analyses evidence collected from two of their previous empirical studies, 
and has subsequently stimulated much of the debate regarding environmentalism 
about talents. 
Although Howe’s article and the studies supporting it were published 
around twenty years ago, the findings and conclusions are still relevant for two 
reasons. First, developmental psychologist Françoys Gagné has recently published 
an article accusing environmentalists of “scholarly misconduct”, claiming that 
they adhere to questionable research ethics and ignore evidence in their studies 
that seems to refute their own position (Gagné 2013: 216). Although this might 
seem like an ad hominem attack, Gagné’s objection legitimately questions the 
integrity of the conclusions that are reached from the environmentalists’ 
experiments, and the contemporaneity of the objection shows that the results of 
the relevant experiments are still up for scrutiny. 
Second, the conclusions that the environmentalists reach from their 
experiments have recently influenced the mainstream, everyday understanding of 
talent. For example, in the build-up to the 2014 Commonwealth Games in 
Glasgow, Sport Scotland produced media explaining that being talented is a 
matter of enjoyment, belief and hard work; it was claimed that talent involves 
mostly choice and effort rather than a disposition for a specific skill (Sport 
Scotland 2013). There is also an increasing acceptance in the pop-science 
literature claiming that talents are not a matter of natural potential, but rather 
emerge as a result of the correct methods of practice and teaching (see Coyle 
209; Colvin 2008). But, as I will now go on to show, the evidence behind these 
claims is inconclusive, and at most only demonstrate that we cannot ignore 
environmental stimuli when it comes to the development of talent. The evidence 
cannot be interpreted as proving that natural potential does not exist or has no 
part in constituting what a talent is. 
Howe argues that talents, understood as emerging from natural potential, 
do not exist, and that the ease and speed with which people acquire different 
                                                          
5 From hereon I will omit the ‘et al.’ from this reference. 
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skills is not explained by natural potential, but is rather the product of 
environmental factors (Howe et al. 1998: 401). There are four main arguments 
offered for this environmentalist account: (i) the environmentalist account is more 
socially acceptable, (ii) anti-environmentalist reasoning about talent is circular, 
(iii) the anthropological evidence counts in favour of environmentalism, and (iv) 
the evidence from empirical studies counts in favour of environmentalism. I will 
now outline and respond to each of these arguments in turn. 
(i) Howe argues that the environmentalist position has more desirable, 
positive social implications than an account of talent that emphasises dispositional 
qualities. Howe’s claim is that categorising people as having natural potential is 
“unfair”, “discriminatory” and “wasteful”; those who are not deemed as having 
natural potential are often refused resources and denied the educational 
encouragement that is needed to succeed (ibid., 399, 407). To pump our 
intuitions, Howe asks us to imagine the unfairness of limiting resources and 
encouragement for key school subjects such as mathematics and language skills, 
to those who are labelled by their schools as having natural potential. Surely, 
those who are not naturally disposed to be highly skilled in those subjects require 
the same amount of, if not more, resources and encouragement in order to 
progress and succeed. By admitting that natural potential does not exist, Howe 
claims that fairer and more equal allocations of resources and opportunities can 
be made (ibid., 436). 
However, this argument from negative social implications is misguided 
because it does not show that there are no natural differences in levels of 
potential. Just because it might be unfair to distribute resources according to 
levels of potential, this does not mean that no such difference exists. We might 
think, for example, that allocating resources on the basis of skin colour is unfair 
and morally wrong, but this does not demonstrate that there is no such difference 
in skin colour. Just because there might be a tension between talent identification 
and discrimination, this does not mean that we have good reasons to reject the 
understanding of a talent as emerging from a person’s own level of potential 
(Winner 1998: 431). Howe’s intuition pump only serves to make explicit the 
importance of further philosophical consideration into the social, moral and 
political implications that arise with regards to talents and their development. I 
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go on to discuss these moral and political implications throughout the proceeding 
chapters of this dissertation.  
(ii) Howe argues that appealing to the notion of natural potential to explain 
high levels of skill acquisition and achievement results in circular reasoning. The 
circularity can be stated as follows: we claim that someone’s high level of 
achievement for playing a musical instrument, for example, stems from their 
talent understood as natural potential, yet when asking how we know that they 
are talented (that they have natural potential) we appeal to their high level of 
achievement in playing their instrument. In so doing we assume natural potential 
as explanatory for why a person excels at a particular skill, but the only way that 
we know someone has natural potential for that skill is to acknowledge the 
demonstration of their high achievement (Howe et al. 1998: 405). In other words, 
we are using a person’s level of natural potential to explain their demonstrated 
ability, and using their demonstrated ability to explain their level of natural 
potential. 
There are four reasons why the explanatory circle that Howe presents does 
not refute the non-environmentalist position. First, Howe over simplifies the non-
environmentalist account, which does not claim that all instances of above-
average levels of skill are a result of natural potential; in some cases it might be 
that hard-work and good teaching explains why someone has reached a high level 
of skill. We do not always need to use natural potential to explain the emergence 
of achievement. Second, we do not necessarily have to appeal to the 
demonstration of high achievement to know whether someone has natural 
potential for that skill; it is often the case that experts in a field are able to 
observe a person engaging in sometimes unrelated tasks to determine whether 
they have high levels of natural potential for the relevant skill. Third, even if 
Howe was correct about the apparent circularity in reasoning, it would similarly 
cause problems for his own environmentalist account. As an environmentalist we 
could claim that someone’s high level of achievement was a result of their 
advantageous social and environmental stimuli, yet at the same time we would 
only know if that person was subject to advantageous social and environmental 
stimuli if they demonstrated high levels of achievement. 
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Finally, the environmentalist’s charge of circularity confuses metaphysical 
and epistemic claims about talent identification. One ‘horn’ of the dilemma seems 
to be a claim about how we can know that someone has a high level of potential, 
and the other ‘horn’ of the dilemma is a claim about what it is for someone to 
actually have high levels of potential, irrespective of whether we identify them 
as such. But there is no need to answer one horn of the dilemma in terms of the 
other, as Howe seems to do. In so doing, Howe confuses the epistemological 
question about how we can identify high levels of potential with the metaphysical 
question of what it is for someone to have that potential in the first place. 
Take as an analogous example the virtue of kindness: I might identify and 
subsequently come to know that you are kind-hearted because I see you 
demonstrating your kindness by helping the homeless on Christmas morning. But 
what it is to be kind is not explained by this epistemic claim, but rather by the 
metaphysical claim that kindness is just the manifested disposition to help those 
who are in need. What it is to be kind is explained, at least in part, in terms of 
one’s dispositional qualities, and identifying kindness is explained in terms of how 
we assess the manifestation of these dispositional qualities. There is no 
problematic tension between these metaphysical and epistemic claims. The same 
goes for talents: I might identify that you are talented because I witness and assess 
your demonstration of high levels of musical potential, but what it is to have high 
levels of musical potential is explained metaphysically, at least partly, in terms 
of your dispositional qualities. There is no explanatory circle lurking in this 
account. 
 (iii) In support of the environmentalist position Howe cites the evidence of 
anthropological studies suggesting that there are some cultures in which high 
achievement in certain skills is relatively common, whilst in other cultures 
achievement in those same skills is comparatively rare. For example, certain non-
Western cultures are more likely to be musically accomplished than other 
cultures, some tribal cultures show high levels of ability in land and maritime 
navigation, whilst Australian Aborigines have been shown to perform more 
effectively at visual memory tasks. Howe claims that these cross-cultural 
differences and propensities in ability are a result of social learning habits and 
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“traditional training customs”, rather than individual genetic potential (ibid., 404-
5). 
It may be that some cultures are more likely than others to produce 
individuals who succeed in certain skills – the evidence of the cited 
anthropological studies seems to point in favour of this conclusion. However, these 
cultural differences do not rule out the contribution of natural potential to skill 
acquisition; it may be that children in certain cultures are born with a similar 
genetic constitution that gives rise to high levels of potential for a particular skill. 
The anthropological evidence is inconclusive on this matter; the prolific skills in 
question might be the result of dispositional qualities that are shared by the 
culture, rather than merely a result of the learning habits that are determined by 
the particular cultural environment. 
(iv) Howe further offers the results of his own empirical research, 
purporting to demonstrate that high levels of skill acquisition are not a result of a 
person’s dispositional qualities, but rather their environmental stimuli. I argue, 
however, that Howe is unjustified in drawing these environmentalist conclusions 
from the experiments. For the purposes of the discussion in this chapter, I will 
focus on one of the largest and most recent of the experiments conducted, the 
results of which were published in two articles, ‘Are There Early Childhood Signs 
of Musical Ability?’ (Howe et al. 1995), and ‘The Role of Practice in the 
Development of Performing Musicians’ (Sloboda et al. 1996).6 First I will explain 
the experiment, and then go on to critically analyse the conclusions drawn from 
the findings as published in both the 1995 and 1996 articles.  
The experiment conducted by Howe studied a large group of 257 music 
students and their parents, with regards to how environmental factors such as 
practice habits, quality of teaching and early musical experiences affected the 
students’ musical development. The students were interviewed, and a sub-set of 
the students were also asked to complete a diary in which they documented how 
much practice they completed over the course of forty-two weeks. The authors 
                                                          
6 Again, for ease of reference, I will from hereon omit the ‘et al.’ from the citations of 
both of these articles. 
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divided the students into five groups depending on their musical ability; Group 
One consisted of children who attended Chetham’s School of Music, a prestigious 
private music school in Manchester, Group Two consisted of children who had 
applied but failed to gain a place at Chetham’s, Group Three’s students had 
enquired about attending Chetham’s but had not yet applied, Group Four 
consisted of children who attended a state school and were receiving lessons on 
their musical instrument, and finally, Group Five consisted of children who had 
previously learnt a musical instrument but had dropped out of music lessons before 
the study took place. The musical ability of these groups was assumed to descend 
with the group numbers, with Group One considered to be the most musically 
accomplished, as they had gained a place at a specialist music school, and Group 
Five considered to be the least musically accomplished.  
For the sake of argument it will be useful to allow Howe his assumption 
about the levels of musical ability correlating with the various group numbers. 
However, it could be argued that the students in Groups Three and Four (those 
who had not yet applied to Chetham’s, or who attended a non-specialist music 
school) were more musically able than those in Group Two, who applied to 
Chetham’s but did not get in. It may be that those in Groups Three and Four were 
good enough to be accepted into Chetham’s even though they had not yet or would 
not apply. 
The results published in Howe’s 1995 article focus on the relation between 
musical achievement and early signs of musical potential in the participants; Howe 
concludes that there is “little or no support for the view that very early signs of 
unusual musicality are at all common in individuals who eventually become 
accomplished musicians” (Howe et al. 1995: 163). Instead, Howe claims that early 
signs of musical achievement are in fact a result of environmental factors and 
early childhood exposure to musical activity. To demonstrate this, the parents of 
the students were each asked whether they had noticed any early musical 
behaviours in their children with regards to five different categories: singing, 
rhythmic movement, the liking of musical sounds, attentiveness to musical sounds, 
and spontaneous requests to be involved in musical activities (Ibid., 166). 
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With four out of the five categories, there was no difference between the 
groups in the age or propensity at which the children demonstrated musical 
behaviours. However, with regards to singing, Group One was found to be forty 
percent more likely to demonstrate this behaviour at an earlier age than the other 
groups, being almost six months ahead in development compared to the other 
children. Despite initially entertaining the idea that Group One’s early singing 
propensity could be a result of differences in natural potential, Howe suggests 
that the age at which the child first sang is correlated to the age at which parents 
first began initiating musical activities. As such, the early sign of musical activity 
demonstrated by the child’s singing ability is not due to natural potential but 
rather early musical experiences initiated by the child’s environment (ibid., 172-
3). 
If this conclusion is to hold, Howe needs to prove that Group One showed a 
higher level of parent-initiated musical activity before the child begins to 
demonstrate early singing propensity. However, when parents were asked the age 
of the child at which they first initiated musical activity, Group One were not the 
youngest: Groups One, Two and Four were sung to by their parents at the same 
age, Group Two had parents who first moved and listened to music with them, 
and the parents of Groups Two and Five began musical play with their children at 
the youngest age. Howe acknowledges these results, claiming that “there initially 
appears to be little evidence that the most competent group experienced specific 
individual parent-initiated behaviours at an earlier age than the other groups” 
(ibid., 174). It is therefore hard to see why Howe concludes without reservation 
that the early signs of singing ability are a result of early musical exposure. The 
results could equally have been caused by the fact that the children who showed 
earlier signs of singing ability had higher levels of musical potential, understood 
as an innate dispositional quality. 
Sloboda’s analysis of the experimental data in his 1996 article focusses on 
the tight relationship between practice and the development of musical ability, 
concluding that formal practice is “a fundamental causal agent in skill acquisition 
rather than merely a covariate of it” (Sloboda et al. 1996: 289-290). The data of 
the study seems to demonstrate that high amounts of practice result in high levels 
of musical achievement, even before increases in parental and teacher 
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involvement in the child’s musical development. This correlation was claimed by 
Sloboda to be direct, such that “[h]igh achievers practice the most, moderate 
achievers practice a moderate amount, and low achievers practice hardly at all” 
(ibid., 306). In the first year of playing their instrument, all the groups reported 
that they engaged in roughly fifteen to twenty minutes of practice each day, but 
by the time the students had been playing for four years, Group One increased to 
forty-five minutes of practice per day, Groups Two and Three increased to twenty-
five minutes per day, and Groups Four and Five showed no change over time (ibid., 
296-7). The evidence was taken to demonstrate that as the students continued to 
progress throughout the years of their musical development, Group One ended up 
doing significantly more practice than the other groups, and as such, this resulted 
in higher musical achievement. This means that the level of student practice time 
appears directly correlative to their level and demonstration of musical ability. 
The study further emphasises this connection by deciding upon a child’s 
level of musical achievement based on which ‘grade’ the students managed to 
achieve in the Associated Board of Music and Drama exams, of which there are 
eight possible grades, with eight denoting the highest achievement. The study 
found that Group One progressed to grades three or four by the fourth year of 
their instrumental training, whilst Groups Two to Five had only progressed, at the 
most, to grade two. The mean hours of practice between the passing of grade 
exams was calculated, and Sloboda found that there was no significant difference 
between the groups: “[i]t took the same number of hours of practice to achieve a 
given grade level, regardless of which group participants belonged to” (ibid., 300). 
Therefore, Sloboda concludes that practice is shown to correlate directly and 
explain musical achievement; Group One achieved a higher grade due to their 
practicing almost twice as much as the other groups, whilst the other groups 
achieved a lower grade level due to their practicing almost less than half as Group 
One. 
However, the conclusions that Sloboda reaches in the 1996 article are 
mistaken for two reasons. First, Sloboda does not convincingly give evidence for 
the claim that practice is a fundamental causal factor in the explanation of 
musical development. This is particularly evident when asking why the students 
practiced the amounts that they did; seeing as each group initially started 
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practicing for the same amount of time, it might have been the case that Group 
One – the ‘excellent’ group – were motivated to engage in more practice time due 
to a realisation that they had natural potential. This natural potential might have 
allowed them to see quicker and more efficient results from their practice, or 
allowed them to enjoy their playing more, thus motivating them to engage in more 
practice time. 
Furthermore, Group One attended a specialist music school that sets 
dedicated practice time as part of the school day; the amount of practice time 
for Group One occurred as a result of the student being accepted to the school in 
the first place. The hours of practice for each student who attended Chetham’s 
was therefore dictated and determined by the fact that they demonstrated a high 
enough level of ability to be accepted to the school. Acceptance into a specialist 
music school depends on the teachers of the school recognising musical ability in 
the student, and this ability may arise as a result of environmental factors and 
social circumstances, but the evidence does not rule out this ability could also 
have been a result of the student’s own natural potential. As such, Sloboda still 
has a burden of proof to demonstrate that the correlation between practice and 
musical achievement is not caused by natural potential.  
The second reason why Sloboda’s conclusion is mistaken is that the 
experiment itself was not designed to highlight differences in the quality but only 
the quantity of the practice and achievement. Assessing achievement based on 
the passing of an Associated Board exam does not distinguish carefully enough 
between the quality of a performance; passing the exam with a ‘distinction’ – the 
highest mark – is very different to passing it with the lowest mark of a ‘pass’.  With 
this in mind, it could be the case that with the same level and amount of practice, 
the students in Group One were receiving much higher marks in their exams, which 
can only be shown if we look to the quality of the pass marks and the quality of 
the time spent practicing. There is nothing in the experimental evidence, 
therefore, to rule out that this difference in quality may be a result of a difference 
in natural potential, understood as a dispositional quality. Without taking into 
consideration the quality of the musicianship, the findings of the study are unable 
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to discount natural potential as a causal factor for musical excellence, let alone 
prove that practice and encouragement are direct determining causal factors.7 
Therefore, the experimental evidence for environmentalism is 
inconclusive; the evidence does not provide the data to rule out that high levels 
of achievement could be caused by natural potential. In the next section, I argue 
that there is a reason for this inconclusiveness: the experimental evidence cannot 
rule out natural potential over environmentalism because one’s dispositional 
qualities arise as a dynamic interaction between both genetic constitution and 
environmental stimuli. As a result, we do not need to forgo the claim that talents 
are constituted by levels of potential. Instead, when we claim that a talent is a 
high level of potential for a particular skill, that potential is not solely genetically 
determined nor solely determined by environmental factors, but is constituted by 
the interaction between both one’s genes and one’s environment. In this respect, 
we have to reject environmentalism; it is not the case that talents, understood as 
potential for a particular skill, do not exist. 
 
1.4. Not just Natural Potential 
The support for environmentalism stems from the attractive claim that 
environmental and social stimuli play an important causal role in the development 
of ability. However, this intuition and the evidence that is cited to support it, 
does not rule out the equally important contribution of a person’s genetic 
constitution. The claim that both genetic and environmental factors contribute to 
a person’s development is not new; it has long been the norm in the field of 
                                                          
7 In a later article, Howe admits that the results of this experiment cannot rule out natural 
potential as being a causal factor for musical excellence; he states that “there exist no 
findings which conclusively rule out genetic contributions to individual differences in 
musical achievement. We have never asserted otherwise. On the other hand, we are 
aware of no findings which make it necessary or inevitable to accept that specific 
observed differences are caused by genetic factors” (Sloboda et al. 1999: 53). This 
concession is still rather uncharitable, however, seeing as some of the evidence in the 
experiment does point to significant differences in musical achievement as being caused 
by what might be thought of as natural potential. 
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epigenetics to accept that one’s genetic make-up and one’s environment are 
dynamically interconnected, such that they cannot be said to play two distinctly 
separate causal roles in one’s development. Whilst one’s environment allows 
genes to express themselves in various ways, it is also the case that one’s 
environmental stimuli play a definitive role in how genes are formed and 
transformed (Fishkin: 86-89; Beck et al. 1999; Eckhardt et al. 2004; Weinhold 
2006).8 
To demonstrate this, scientific studies have shown that genetic formation 
in foetal development is in part causally determined in relation to the mother’s 
behaviour and environmental circumstances. For example, extra stress levels in 
the mother can affect the formation of the genes that control brain function, and 
children born during a famine are more likely to store sugars more readily than 
others, thus resulting in a higher propensity to develop obesity and diabetes in 
later years of life (Fishkin: 115). 
Genetic modification due to environmental factors does not only occur 
during foetal development, but also throughout a person’s life into adulthood. For 
example, prolonged periods of stress in adults has been shown to reduce to the 
size of the hippocampus which affects levels of memory retention, and people 
experiencing poverty have been shown to be more likely to form a smaller 
prefrontal cortex, which can affect executive functioning and the capacity to 
make long-term decisions (ibid.). In these cases, genetic code is not merely 
expressed, but is adapted and formed in response to one’s surrounding 
environment; one’s environment directly constitutes one’s genetic dispositions 
and the way these dispositions are expressed. 
Because development occurs as an interaction between genetic make-up 
and environmental stimuli, the dispositional qualities that are exhibited when 
                                                          
8 Just because it is inaccurate or epistemically challenging to decipher which part of one’s 
development is caused by one’s genetic constitution or one’s environment due to the 
close interaction between both these elements, it is not necessarily the case that these 
two elements are metaphysically indistinct. In this chapter I make no such claim, and 
leave aside the question of whether the dynamic interaction between genetic and 
environmental factors render the metaphysical distinction between them less robust than 
originally thought. 
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someone is talented should not be understood as merely ‘natural’ or ‘innate’ 
potential, as is so often assumed in the literature. This is because we cannot 
merely accept that a person is born with a determined level of genetic potential 
and that the structure of society merely allows that talent to express itself. 
Instead, the disposition of the talented individual to acquire a skill with ease and 
speed is generated by a dynamic and constant interaction between her genetic 
constitution and her environmental inputs, both before and after birth. This means 
that by the time we initially identify and assess one’s level of potential for a 
particular skill, there will have already been normatively significant social and 
environmental interactions that affect one’s genetic dispositions and one’s 
subsequent level of potential for the skill in question. As such, the fact that there 
are different levels of talent amongst individuals in society also points to the fact 
that people have experienced different levels of formative developmental 
experiences in their social environment. 
Given the importance of environmental and social factors for the formation 
of talents, in Chapter Five I discuss in more detail the implications that arise due 
to unequal levels of talent and how we ought to provide equal social opportunities 
for talent identification and development. In the next section of this chapter, 
however, I will argue that potential by itself is not sufficient for a plausible 
account of what a talent is. In doing so I refute Howe’s rejection of natural 
potential but at the same time accommodate his claim that environmental stimuli 
are vital for the development of one’s capacities. I argue that in fact 
environmental stimuli plays a necessary and constituent role in the development 
of one’s capacities.  
 
1.5. Talents as Potential and Excellence 
Understanding talent as a high level of potential for a particular skill is not 
sufficient for a plausible and comprehensive account of the nature of talent. A 
talent cannot just be a certain amount of potential for a skill, or a certain kind of 
dispositional quality. Instead, a talent is the expression of one’s level of potential, 
manifested in the way that one excellently develops a particular skill with 
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efficiency and precociousness. This means that a talent is performative and 
domain-specific, in the way that psychologist Feldman proposes (Feldman 1986: 
302). 
 The way in which talents are performative is analogous to the way that we 
understand the nature of virtue. In virtue theory, it is not merely the disposition 
for virtuous action that determines whether an agent is virtuous, but that she also 
needs to express and demonstrate this disposition as virtuous action. A person is 
not deemed virtuous, then, until her disposition is manifested and expressed; 
being virtuous is just acting in such a way that is appropriate to the specific 
situation that one finds oneself in – virtue requires action in a particular context 
(Zagzebski 1996: 113-116, 130-135). For example, the virtue of courage does not 
only require that one is disposed to act courageously, but that this disposition is 
acted upon in the appropriate way that is required by the situation. Without this 
actualisation, an agent is merely disposed to be virtuous, rather than being 
virtuous itself. 
I do not claim that talents are to be considered as virtues, but only that an 
analogy can be made: similarly to the virtues, talents are only talents insofar as 
they are the actualisation and expression of high levels of potential, realised 
through the acquisition of a particular skill. It is only when actually acquiring a 
skill that one’s level of potential can be manifested as particularly indexed to that 
skill. Without the manifestation of one’s high level of potential for a particular 
skill, one is merely disposed to be talented, rather than talented itself.9 
Take the example of the talented British tennis player, Andy Murray. At the 
age of five, Murray may have had a high level of potential for playing tennis; he 
may have had the right height and body shape, the ability to move his body with 
more accurate coordination, or show higher levels of competitive spirit. However, 
it is only when he expresses and directs this potential to playing tennis itself, by 
                                                          
9 Note that my claim regarding talents as constituted by one’s level of potential and that 
potential as it is manifested, only refers specifically to talents. I am not making the wider 
claim that all instances of ability are necessarily indexed to the actual manifestations of 
dispositional qualities. I merely argue that talents must at some point be exercised in 
terms of skill acquisition. 
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holding a racket, running on the court, throwing and hitting balls accurately 
according to the rules of the game, that Murray can be said to have a talent for 
tennis. His potential is only realised as a talent for tennis once he begins to express 
and convert his potential in a particular way, indexed to the particular skill of 
playing tennis. It is the combination of Murray’s high level of potential and the 
realisation of this potential through excellent skill acquisition that renders him a 
talented tennis player. Even though Murray may have already begun to develop 
his skill, when we claim that he has a talent, we are describing the quality of what 
he is able to achieve through the expression of his potential, and the ease with 
which he has already begun to actualise his skill. In this way, we acknowledge that 
Murray’s tennis-playing ability can continuously be enhanced and developed in 
ways that are above-average and to an exceptionally high level. 
If this were not the case, and a talent was merely a disposition, then we 
could claim that Murry has a talent for playing tennis even though he had never 
touched a tennis racket or played a game of tennis. This would be implausible for 
both epistemological and metaphysical reasons; not only would we be unable to 
know that Murray was talented, but there would be no fact of the matter about 
the way in which Murray’s disposition is expressed in the acquisition of a particular 
skill for playing tennis. If a talent wasn’t partly a performative concept in the way 
that I have just described, then this would have strange implications for what 
would count as a talent. For example, we don’t think that beauty, height or body 
shape are talents, but rather the way in which a person uses their height, body 
shape, and maybe even beauty, for the excellent acquisition of a particular skill, 
such as basketball or tennis. As such, a talent cannot just be a dispositional 
quality, as this would render certain dispositional qualities as talents, when it 
would be implausible for this to be the case.  
The case for talent to be understood as an expressive phenomenon is made 
even stronger by the fact that talents are comparative; to label someone as 
talented is to make a judgement about their skill acquisition as being of an 
exceptionally high level, or ‘above average’. In order to assess the merits of 
someone’s level of skill acquisition, it is therefore necessary to contrast and 
compare these levels to that of others. Determining what counts as a talent 
therefore involves acknowledging a threshold which includes within it those who 
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have the highest levels of skill acquisition in a particular skill domain. Often that 
threshold will only allow for a small percentage of the comparison class to be 
included (Seel 2012: 3262), and the way in which we make these comparisons and 
determine the relevant thresholds is relative to already existing social and cultural 
values. 
For example, when it comes to determining the level of talent attributed 
to children with high intelligence, the threshold is determined according to the 
society’s or school’s specific educational policy; in the United Kingdom, Terman 
originally suggested in 1925 that being academically talented should designate 
being in the first percentile of intellectual ability (Winner 2000: 153), whilst in 
Korea and Taiwan, by contrast, a child is determined as talented if they are two 
standard deviations above the average level for the age group, which is roughly 
equal to being in the fifth percentile (Csikszentmihalyi 1998: 411). Being talented, 
therefore, is determined based on where your level of skill acquisition sits within 
the relevant group of your peers, and the country or institution in which you are 
developing your skill. 
Talents are not only socially determined with regards to the comparative 
judgements of what counts as excellent or an above average level of skill 
acquisition, but also with regards to the value that is placed upon particular skills. 
Because a talent is potential that is manifested and expressed in the acquisition 
of a particular skill, it requires there to be an appropriate and available way in 
which to express that potential. Andy Murray, for example, could not be classed 
as a talented tennis player if tennis was not valued in such a way as to be available 
in the culture or society in which he was developing his initial level of high 
potential. 
Csikszentmihalyi provides an example that elucidates this point further. He 
imagines the invention of a new game called ‘Mo’. In order to be able to play Mo 
well, one needs to be able to “recognize fine spatial and color distinctions, one 
must be very agile, and one must have a high tolerance for alcohol” 
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(Csikszentmihalyi 2015: 32).10 Over time, Mo becomes an extremely popular game, 
so much so that players of Mo are revered for their abilities and paid handsome 
salaries. In this case, Csikszentmihalyi claims that we need to accept talent in Mo 
as both naturally and culturally determined: “[s]hould we concede that talent in 
mo was caused by physiological factors? Certainly, because all the component 
skills depend on demonstrably neurological processes. Or should we say that talent 
in mo is culturally constituted? Certainly, because the combination of 
physiological skills was meaningless before the game was invented” (ibid., 32). 
Without the value placed on Mo such that it is on offer in our society and the 
talented person could develop their skills accordingly, the potential needed in 
order to excel in Mo could not be expressed or manifested, and is consequently 
unable to be compared to other levels of potential and skill acquisition. 
Talent is therefore both a metaphysical and epistemological phenomenon; 
it describes the fact that someone has, indexed to them, a personal dispositional 
quality that is manifested and expressed in the acquisition of a particular skill or 
domain. But what counts as ‘excellent’ is relatively derived. A good example of 
this is how we are able to make sense of the difference between talented Olympic 
swimmers and talented Paralympic swimmers: if swimming talent was defined by 
a set of rigid and fixed metaphysical dispositional qualities, then Paralympic 
swimmers might not be classed as talented, irrespective of how quickly and easily 
they acquire the relevant skills. However, even though Paralympic swimmers 
possess different dispositional qualities, and may compete with slower race times 
than Olympic swimmers, we can still judge certain Paralympic swimmers as 
‘talented’, because we differently determine the comparison class and 
thresholds, and consequently regard the achievements of those within these 
different thresholds as equally valuable in our culture.  
The definition of talent that I propose incorporates both of the everyday 
understandings of the word as potential and excellence. A talent is defined as the 
excellent acquisition of a particular skill, but this excellence is grounded in a 
person’s high level of potential, understood as a dispositional quality. This 
                                                          
10 Although Csikszentmihalyi does not state this explicitly, the game he describes basically 
sounds a lot like General Pool.   
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disposition is formed through a dynamic interaction between one’s genetic 
constitution and one’s environment. As a result, being talented does not merely 
consist in having a disposition to excellently acquire a particular skill, but also 
requires the manifestation of that disposition; a talent is the expression of one’s 
dispositional qualities.11 
Before concluding, it is important to reply to two objections that could be 
raised against the understanding of the nature of talent that I have just proposed. 
First of all, it could be objected that considering a talent as comparative and 
relative to the culture in which one’s potential is being expressed is implausible, 
due to the fact that it places too much emphasis on talent as a performative and 
epistemological phenomenon. Surely, it could be claimed, a talent ought to be a 
metaphysical, dispositional quality, independent of how others’ normative 
judgements sit in comparison. 
In order to respond to this worry, consider an example of a world in which 
there exists only one human being, and this world is without society, culture and 
community. Despite this, the one person that does exist in this world finds that 
she has, for whatever reason, high levels of musical potential. Consequently, 
throughout her life she fashions make-shift musical instruments and expresses her 
musical potential in an excellent way. The question is whether we should consider 
this person as musically talented. Someone who thinks a talent ought to be 
something that is solely metaphysical, defined in terms of one’s dispositional 
qualities, would claim that the person in this world is indeed musically talented. 
However, we would only be able to judge this person as musically talented 
if we were able to judge that her dispositional qualities, and the way she manifests 
them, are of an exceptionally high level; a talent after all denotes not just any 
                                                          
11 Defining a talent as a disposition that is necessarily manifested in some way means that 
my account is not subject to the worry that dispositions are exhaustibly characterised in 
terms of their manifestation conditions, yet may never actually be manifested. In this 
way, we would worry that what we thought was a disposition would have to in fact be 
something else that is not defined solely in terms of how it is manifested, like a ‘power’, 
or an arrangement of structural properties (see Handfield 2010). My account gets around 
this worry, however, because talents are defined in terms of how they are manifested 
but also claims that those dispositions are necessarily manifested.  
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level of ability, but a high level of ability. It is only possible to compare someone’s 
level of potential for a skill if we are able to make comparative judgements as to 
the level of her performance compared to others. In the case of the one-person 
world, we would only be able to label the musician as talented because we have 
someone or something to compare her to – we would have to refer to the existing 
comparison class of the talents of people we have experienced in our own world. 
Within the one-person world itself, there is no comparison class, and there 
is no way to judge the comparative level of the person’s musical potential. We 
may be able to judge that her musical potential allows her to express her ability 
in some way that is enjoyable or compelling; we might even be able to make an 
aesthetic judgement that the sounds she makes with her musical instruments are 
pleasing. We are not, however, able to make the necessary comparisons to judge 
whether her musical potential is expressed as a talent. This is both for epistemic 
and metaphysical reasons; not only are we epistemologically unable to make 
comparisons or judge the level of the person’s skill acquisition, but there is no 
fact of the matter whether or not she is musically talented, because there are no 
other people that she could be compared with. Take the analogy of height: even 
if the person in the one-person world is tall by our standards, she is by herself 
unable to make any comparative judgements regarding her height because there 
is no comparison class. That is, there is no truth of the matter regarding her level 
of talent or height, because there is no such distinction of degree.  
Second, it could also be objected that by understanding talent as 
determined by relative evaluative judgements about where certain comparative 
thresholds lie, I am conflating the metaphysical properties of what a talent is with 
what talents are merely considered to be. This might be a problem, for example, 
in a society that deems intelligence as belonging only to men, due to the fact that 
women are not valued enough to be classed as ‘intelligent’. If a society sets its 
threshold for what counts as a talent in an arbitrary way like this, it will mean 
that whether or not someone is talented depends on that arbitrary threshold, 
irrespective of whether they actually do express high levels of potential. The 
problem is, therefore, that what counts as a talent is too epistemologically 
relative, and underplays the metaphysical facts about what counts as a talent. 
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It might be that we disagree about the right way to prescribe the evaluative 
judgements attached to the comparative levels of potential and skill acquisition. 
We may want to, and feel it is right for example, to condemn societies that 
prescribe different values to women as they do men, and consequently judge that 
the evaluative judgements underpinning their definition of what counts as a talent 
are mistaken. Nevertheless, even though there may be potential for normative 
disagreement and the fact that some societies might be mistaken regarding the 
calculation of their thresholds, this does not mean that talents are not 
comparative judgements and that these judgements are not socially relative. The 
fact that some societies’ comparative thresholds may be morally inappropriate or 
wrong just means that we need to be careful about how we determine where the 
relevant thresholds should lie, and be able to give justifiable reasons for reaching 
our judgements. As such, it is perfectly permissible, on the account that I have 
been sketching, that we can retrospectively assess someone as talented in light of 
new information or more sophisticated value judgements. Nevertheless, it is still 
the case that talent is not merely a metaphysical phenomenon, describing only 
dispositional qualities in an individual, but is also an epistemological phenomenon 
that relies on comparative evaluative judgements that are socially relative 
regarding the way in which one’s dispositional qualities are expressed. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented an account of talent understood as a high level of 
potential that is manifested and expressed in the excellent acquisition of a 
particular skill, demonstrated by the ease and speed with which that skill is 
acquired. In Section Two I made the case for understanding potential as a 
dispositional quality, and in Section Three I argued against the environmentalist 
position put forward by Howe et al., which rejects the notion of natural potential 
being a causal factor in one’s development. In Section Four, I argued that 
potential need not be understood purely as ‘natural’, but as resulting from a 
dynamic interaction between one’s genetic code and one’s environment. In 
Section Five, I argued that talents are not just high levels of potential, but one’s 
potential as it is manifested and expressed in an above-average or excellent level 
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of skill acquisition. This means that a talent is the expression of one’s high level 
of potential, not merely the potential itself. I also argued that a definition of 
talent depends on evaluative judgements regarding the value of the skill itself and 
the various thresholds of comparison classes. 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I highlighted the terminological ambiguity 
surrounding the concept of a talent, both in the philosophical literature and in its 
everyday usage. This ambiguity seemed to conflate someone’s potential for being 
excellent at a particular skill, with an already developed excellence in that skill. 
My sketch of the nature of talents has aimed to make sense of and incorporate 
both of these seemingly distinct notions of what a talents is. On the one hand, my 
account of talent acknowledges that a talent is a dispositional quality, a high level 
of potential for excellent skill acquisition. On the other hand, the account also 
acknowledges that if this potential is to be regarded as a talent, it has to be 
expressed or manifested in the excellent development of a particular skill. This 
explains why in everyday language we confuse a talent as being potential for 
excellence and an excellence – it is only once one’s potential has been manifested 
in an excellent display of skill acquisition that it becomes a ‘talent’.  
 As well as making sense of this apparent terminological confusion, my 
account of talent helps to make sense of three of the ways in which we value the 
development of our talents. First, by claiming that talents are the expression of a 
high level of potential for a particular skill, our talents are indexed to particular 
skills. In order for a talented person to develop a particular skill, her environment 
has to have within it the possibility for her to express and develop that skill; in 
other words, the opportunity to develop the skill has to be on offer in one’s 
society. The skills that are on offer in society are ones that are valuable in some 
way. As a result, we value the development of talents in part because the skills 
they enable us to acquire are themselves valuable. 
 There may be many reasons why a particular skill is valued by one’s society; 
we might appeal to the skill’s instrumental value or claim that it is valuable for 
its own sake. We may even disagree about the type and level of value afforded to 
certain skills by others and different societies; these value judgements will most 
likely be made on a case by case basis, depending on the context in which one’s 
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talents are being developed. It may be the case, however, that a particular skill 
is considered to be immoral or has a negative value attached to it in a particular 
society. For example, we might often refer to someone’s talent to upset people 
around her, or a talent for manipulating others, and these are not skills that we 
automatically or intuitively consider to be positively valued. In these cases it 
might seem that it is not the case that a talent must be valued in the way I have 
been arguing throughout this chapter. If these skills really are to be classed as 
talents, then it is important to note that even if a skill is not positively valued in 
some parts of society or in one particular culture, it may be valued in others. The 
skill of manipulating others (if this is to be classed as a talent as opposed to 
something that a person is merely good at) may have beneficial instrumental value 
in some cases, for example, when trying to win a political election. In this way, 
irrespective of how the value judgements are made, and whether or not we deem 
them to be plausible judgements to make, it is still the case that talents are valued 
in part due to the particular skill that is being developed and the way in which 
that skill is valued in itself.  
 Second, we also value talents because of the way in which they are 
comparatively assessed. In this chapter I claimed that what counts as a talent is 
dependent on comparison thresholds, and these thresholds are usually set to pick 
out only a limited number of people who are considered to be ‘excellent’ (insofar 
as their level of skill is above a comparative threshold). As a result, we value 
talents because they pick out people with a rare ability for acquiring a particular 
skill. Because talents are rare, this means that they are in short supply, and we 
value resources that are in short supply because we have to look after the amount 
that we do have for fear of them being exhausted. We cherish talents because 
they pick out an excellence that is uncommon, and when we fail to develop our 
talents we are consequently wasting something that is rare and in short supply. 
 Third, the fact that a talent is a dispositional quality indexed to a particular 
person means that it is unique – it manifests differently in each person according 
to the various dispositional qualities of that person and the environment in which 
she finds herself. And so, when a person fails to develop their talent we may think 
that something of value has been wasted; a person’s talent cannot be exchanged, 
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and it belongs uniquely to them. If the talent is not developed then this value of 
individuality may be lost (see for example Mill: 39-68; Cottingham: 72). 
 The account of talent that I have argued for in this chapter has elucidated 
three of the reasons why we place value on talents and their development: talents 
are rare, they are unique, and they are indexed to skill domains that are valued 
in some way by society. In the proceeding chapters, I examine whether the value 
that we place on talents and their development gives rise to the claim that one 
has good prudential reasons or a moral obligation develop one’s talents. I continue 
this task in the next chapter by critically assessing whether Kant’s claim that we 
have a moral duty to develop our talents. 
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Chapter Two 
The Kantian Duty to Develop One’s Talents 
 
2.1. Introduction 
We often express disappointment or regret when we hear of cases in which talents 
have been wasted or neglected. This common negative reaction can be explained, 
in part, by the assumption that developing one’s talents is valuable in some way 
for those who are talented, or for others around them. For instance, we might 
think that the artist Paul Gauguin made the right choice by leaving his family and 
moving to Paris in order to develop and make a success of his talent for painting; 
if instead he stayed at home with his family, then we might have judged that he 
did something wrong. We make these evaluative judgements because we consider 
the development of Gauguin’s talent to be valuable for himself, and perhaps also 
valuable for those around him and society at large. In order to understand this 
value more fully, we can ask what grounds these evaluative judgements when it 
comes to talents and their development: what constitutes the apparent wrongness 
of Gauguin, or any other talented person, failing to develop their talents? 
One answer to this question is to understand the person who fails to develop 
her talents as doing something morally wrong. This wrongness could be grounded 
in straightforward consequentialist reasons. For example, developing one’s talent 
may result in the maximisation of beneficial consequences for society, with the 
talented person becoming a more productive and efficient producer of resources, 
and so contributing to the more productive and efficient organisation of society. 
Failing to develop one’s talents would withhold these positive effects from 
benefiting others in this way. In other words, the wrongness would be grounded 
in the failure to act in a way that maximises utility. 
However, the consequentialist account does not capture the only reasons 
we might want to give when we claim that failing to develop one’s talents is 
morally wrong. We could also base our evaluative judgement on the fact that the 
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talented person herself has done something wrong, irrespective of whether utility 
is maximised. Kant, for example, explicitly claims that we have an imperfect, 
positive moral duty to ourselves to develop our talents. This duty is not grounded 
in virtue of what we owe to others or what will produce the best consequences, 
but in the respect that we owe to ourselves as moral agents. According to Kant, a 
rational moral agent could not will the neglect of her talents without violating the 
Categorical Imperative, and as such, failing to develop one’s talents is immoral. 
In this chapter, I will analyse the two arguments in support of Kant’s claim 
that we have a moral duty to develop our talents, and demonstrate why both of 
these are unsuccessful. The first of Kant’s arguments appeals to his Formula of 
Universal Law, which provides justification for the claim that the duty to develop 
one’s talents is an ‘imperfect’ duty; I discuss this argument in Section Two. In 
Section Three I discuss Kant’s second argument, which appeals to the Formula of 
Humanity, offering an explanation for why the duty ought to be considered 
specifically as one that we owe to ourselves rather than to others. 
Kant’s arguments are subject to three objections, and in Section Four I deal 
with each in turn. The first objection deals with Kant’s distinction between 
imperfect and perfect duties. I argue that if there is a moral duty to develop one’s 
talents, then it is not necessarily imperfect as Kant claims, but also has the 
potential to be a perfect duty. Second, it could be objected that the duty is not 
one that is owed to oneself, but instead must always be other-directed. In 
response to this, I argue that Kant can overcome this objection, and that the moral 
duty to develop one’s talents can plausibly be understood in Kantian terms as a 
duty that is owed to oneself rather than to others. Finally, I argue that if Kant is 
to succeed in claiming that one has a moral duty to develop one’s talents, then 
he needs to be able to explain why developing talents is morally superior to 
developing any other competencies that one may have. I conclude that Kant 
cannot successfully argue for this moral superiority of talents over competencies, 
and as a result, Kant cannot successfully derive a moral duty to develop one’s 
talents from the Categorical Imperative. He may be able to justify a wider duty 
of self-development or self-perfection, but if there is such a duty, it does not 
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necessarily include as part of it a requirement to develop one’s talents. As such, 
if there is a moral obligation to develop one’s talents, it cannot be a Kantian one.12  
Before I begin discussing Kant’s Formula of Universal Law in Section Two, 
it is important to note two things. First, Kant understands a talent as a “natural 
gift” and “excellence”, which is constituted by “the subject’s natural 
predisposition” (Anthropology: 115). This emphasis on talent as distinctly ‘natural’ 
seems to contrast with the account of talents I proposed in Chapter One, which 
claims that the dispositional qualities of a talent are not natural, but emerge from 
a dynamic interaction between genetic and environmental stimuli. However, as I 
will demonstrate in Section Four of this chapter, Kant’s understanding of the 
nature of talents is compatible with the account I offer in Chapter One, 
understood as an advantageous level of potential that is manifested in the 
excellent acquisition of a particular skill.  
Second, the success of Kant’s claims regarding talent development rest on 
his underlying deontological account of morality, which emphasises the value of 
intentions and motivations behind an action, rather than the potential or actual 
consequences of that action. For Kant, moral worth comes from having a good will 
that acts only from duty to the moral law, acting in such a way merely because it 
is one’s duty to do so.13 For morality to be normatively binding on us all, Kant 
claims that the moral law must consist of categorical imperatives rather than 
hypothetical ones, so that morality is objective and unconditional, without 
reference to any other contingent end or subjective desires. Kant considers the 
moral law to be constituted by only one Categorical Imperative that can be 
iterated by different formulations. It is when elucidating and exemplifying these 
formulations that Kant considers the development of one’s talents to be a moral 
                                                          
12 Even though I argue that Kant cannot plausibly claim we have a moral duty to develop 
our talents, it might be the case that we have other moral reasons for developing our 
talents, and that failing to do so is morally wrong, and so morally required, for those 
reasons. For example, in the next chapter I entertain the reasons given by the theory of 
Moral Perfectionism, and I have already mentioned briefly the reasons that could be given 
by consequentialism. 
13 Note that there is a distinction between a person lacking moral worth due to their 
actions not being generated from adherence to the moral law, and an action being morally 
wrong because it contradicts a duty generated from the moral law. See Derek Parfit on 
this point (Parfit 2011: 275-300), and thanks to Campbell Brown for highlighting this. 
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duty, insofar as failure to do so would contradict and violate the Categorical 
Imperative. 
For the purposes of this chapter, I will assume that Kant’s account of 
morality is plausible, such that morality is grounded in the duties that are 
generated from the Categorical Imperative and that moral worth is derived from 
acting in accordance with these duties. Given this concession, my claim is that 
even if we accept Kant’s account of morality, we can still object to the way that 
he characterises and grounds the potential duty that one may have to develop 
one’s talents. Although the focus of this chapter is directed specifically towards 
the Kantian duty to develop one’s talents, analysing this duty also has implications 
for how we ought to interpret Kant’s overall moral project, questioning the 
ambiguous nature of his distinction between imperfect and perfect duties, and 
the plausibility of moral duties that are owed to oneself. 
 
2.2. The Formula of Universal Law 
In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant initially claims that we 
have a moral duty to develop our talents when he articulates the first formulation 
of the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Universal Law: “act only in 
accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law” (GW 4:421).14 A maxim is explained by Kant as a 
“subjective principle of volition”, which specifies the reason for which a particular 
agent has acted or acts in a particular circumstance (GW 4:401). And so, according 
to the Formula of Universal Law, an action is morally permissible only if one can 
will that the maxim by which one is acting can be universalised, such that anyone 
                                                          
14 Kant goes on to reiterate this formula as the imperative to “act as if the maxim of your 
action were to become by your will a universal law of nature” (GW 4:421, emphasis 
added). Although in this second iteration the universal law is one of ‘nature’, the 
difference is subtle and does not substantially alter the plausibility of the arguments that 
will be offered in this chapter. As a result, I take both iterations of the first formula of 
the Categorical Imperative to be equivalent in meaning. Christine Korsgaard, for example, 
does the same (Korsgaard 1983).  
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else can, without contradiction, will and act on the basis of that same maxim in 
the same circumstances. 
There are two ways in which this universalisation test could fail. First of 
all, when universalising one’s specific maxim for an action, an inconsistency could 
occur at the level of ‘conception’, which occurs if the “maxim cannot even be 
thought without contradiction” (GW 4:424). Kant gives the example of making a 
false promise, deliberately making a promise to someone without the intention of 
keeping it. When running that particular maxim through the universalisation test, 
it becomes apparent, so Kant claims, that if everyone were to will the same maxim 
then the institution of promising would break down. This is because promising 
depends on trusting that those who make promises do actually intend to keep 
them; if no-one intended to keep their promises then this assumption of trust 
would be lost. Consequently, it is impossible to simultaneously will the maxim to 
make a false promise, and also will that it be universalised without an inherent 
contradiction; that is, we cannot conceive of a world in which everyone 
(successfully) acts on the maxim to make a false promise.  Kant therefore 
concludes that we have a moral duty not to make false promises, because making 
false promises would violate the Categorical Imperative. 
The duty that results from violating the Formula of Universal Law in this 
way, with a contradiction in conception, is what Kant classifies as a perfect duty. 
This type of duty is a “strict or narrower (unremitting) duty” (GW 4:424) and 
“admits no exception in favour of inclination” (GW 4:421fn). A perfect duty 
specifically forbids a particular maxim, with no room for interpretation or choice 
from the agent herself as to the way in which, and the extent to which, the duty 
must be followed. 
However, failing to develop one’s talents does not violate the Categorical 
Imperative in the same way that making a false promise does: it does not amount 
to a contradiction in conception. There is no inconsistency in conceiving of a world 
in which we all (successfully) act upon the maxim to neglect our talents; it might 
not be a particularly productive or exciting world, but nevertheless, such a world 
could be consistently imagined. Instead, the duty to develop one’s talents occurs 
as a result of a contradiction in willing, which is the second way in which the 
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universalisation test could fail. Kant explains how the maxim of neglecting one’s 
talents contradicts the Formula of Universal Law as follows: 
A [person] finds in himself a talent that by means of some cultivation could 
make him a human being useful for all sorts of purposes. However, he finds 
himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to give himself up to 
pleasure than to trouble himself with enlarging and improving his fortunate 
natural predispositions. But he still asks himself whether his maxim of 
neglecting his natural gifts, besides being consistent with his propensity to 
amusement, is also consistent with what one calls duty. He now sees that 
a nature could indeed always subsist with such a universal law, although 
[…] the human being should let his talents rust and be concerned with 
devoting his life merely to idleness, amusement, procreation – in a word, 
to enjoyment; only he cannot possibly will that this become a universal law 
or be put in us as such by means of natural instinct. For, as a rational being 
he necessarily wills that all the capacities in him be developed, since they 
serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes (GW 4:423). 
In this passage, Kant suggests that if the maxim of neglecting to develop one’s 
talents was universalised and acted upon, then we would find ourselves in a world 
in which no talents are developed at all. Willing such a maxim, however, would 
be irrational because the cultivation of talents is necessary for achieving all sorts 
of ends that are useful for a person, and for society to function efficiently and 
productively (O’Neill: 123-5). In order to rationally will that I neglect the 
development of my own talents, I would have to rely on others sufficiently 
developing their talents to provide the goods that are necessary and valuable for 
a decent life. This, Kant argues, results in a contradiction: due to the 
universalisation of my maxim to neglect my talents, I would have to will at the 
same time that others develop their talents to provide me with the goods I need, 
and also will that no talents are to be developed at all. Such a contradiction 
violates the Formula of Universal Law, and as such, Kant concludes that we have 
a duty not to neglect the development of our talents. 
The duty that results from violating the Categorical Imperative in this way, 
through a contradiction in willing, is what Kant calls an imperfect duty. Unlike a 
perfect duty, this type of duty allows for some degree of inclination and choice in 
how, and the extent to which, the duty is to be fulfilled by a particular agent (GW 
4:424). As such, an imperfect duty is indeterminate, specifying only the end that 
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ought to be brought about, rather than stipulating the limitations and constraints 
on how we are allowed to bring about that end and fulfil our duty. Kant claims 
that because the duty to develop one’s talents is imperfect, this means that “no 
rational principle prescribes specifically how far one should go in cultivating one’s 
capacities [...] the different situations in which a human being may find 
themselves make a man’s choice of the occupation for which he should cultivate 
his talents very much a matter for him to decide as he chooses” (MM 6:391-3). 
This means that the Formula of Universal Law merely tells us that we must not 
neglect talents that could be cultivated for the good of ourselves and society. It 
does not tell us, however, how best to achieve this requirement by indicating, for 
example, which talents we should develop and to what extent; such a decision is 
up to the agent herself. 
Initially it seems as if Kant characterises the imperfect duty one has to 
develop one’s talents as relying on the beneficial consequences that one can 
achieve for oneself and society; in the passage above he writes that cultivating 
one’s talents could make one “useful for all sorts of purposes” (see again GW 
4:423). It could be the case that the only reason one would want to develop one’s 
talent is because of the valuable consequences that may arise from doing so. 
However, for Kant, appealing to the beneficial consequences of an action does 
not in turn justify why that action is a moral duty. Even though imperfect duties 
only specify ends rather than particular actions, this does not mean that the duty 
is contingent on the advantageous consequences that may arise from acting in 
accordance with that duty. What grounds the moral unworthiness of failing to 
develop one’s talents is not the useful purposes that we would be missing out on, 
or the fact that society might fail to flourish. Rather, the duty is grounded in the 
rational inconsistency that arises when universalising one’s maxim results in a 
contradiction in willing, and thus violates the Formula of Universal Law (MM 6:391; 
see also Paton 1971: 155; Sedgwick 2008: 120; Timmerman 2007: 97).15 
                                                          
15 Initially it seems as if there may be examples of ‘talent-neglecting’ maxims that could 
be morally permissible for Kant, for instance, the maxim that I neglect my talents in order 
to raise my children who are dependent upon me. This seems permissible, presumably 
because the reason for neglecting talents in this instance is the fostering and respect of 
my duty to my children, and this is an instantiation of the duty to respect humanity (which 
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It could initially be objected against Kant’s account that if everyone willed 
and acted upon the maxim to develop their talents, then this would also result in 
an inconsistency of willing and thus violate the Formula of Universal Law. This 
would mean that people’s skills were so far developed that they consequently had 
no desire to fulfil the menial everyday tasks that are necessary for the efficient 
running of society. The optimal situation might be one in which only some people 
develop their talents, and as a result, the maxim to neglect one’s talents would 
not result in a problematic contradiction in willing, as Kant claims. 
However, this objection is not successful. It fails to recognise that abilities 
come in different shapes and sizes, based on the dispositional qualities of each 
individual and the way that these qualities are expressed through various skills. 
As such, given that each person will have different levels of potential for a 
particular skill, some peoples’ levels of ability will be suited to and appropriate 
for the everyday menial tasks that are referred to in the objection as necessary 
for the efficient running of society. In which case, it would not be irrational for 
everyone to develop their talents, as different levels of ability in society would 
cover the whole spectrum of necessary skills needed for society to function.16 This 
means that it could still plausibly be the case that a contradiction in willing arises 
when I universalise my maxim to neglect the development of my talents.17 
                                                          
I will go on to discuss in Section 2.4.3). However, passing this maxim through the 
universalisation test would still arise in a contradiction in willing; if everyone acted 
according to such a maxim, or a maxim that neglected talent development in favour of 
other duties, then hardly any talents would be developed. This results in a contradiction 
because I would at the same time be willing that others develop their talents to provide 
me with the goods that I need, but also that talents should not be developed when they 
conflict with other duties. Importantly, this issue points to a wider problem with Kant’s 
account of morality: it is unclear what we should do when duties conflict, especially 
considering that different iterations of the Categorical Imperative may specify different 
duties. The fact that one may neglect one’s talents for other morally permissible reasons 
does not by itself negate Kant’s justification for the duty to develop one’s talents. Thanks 
to Robert Cowan for his comments on this point. 
16 It could be argued that these more modest or ‘menial’ abilities would not be considered 
as talents, at least on the account of talents that I propose in Chapter One. I will deal 
with this point later in the present chapter, specifically in Section 4.3. 
17 This does not mean to say that the Kantian moral duty to develop one’s talents is 
dependent upon or grounded on contingent facts about the level of each person’s 
disposition for acquiring particular skills. Instead, the moral requirement is grounded in 
55 
 
 
 
In Section Four I will discuss further objections to Kant’s justification that 
we have a duty to develop one’s talents as it arises from the Formula of Universal 
Law, specifically with regards to whether the duty is plausibly to be considered as 
imperfect rather than perfect. Before doing so, however, in the next section I 
discuss Kant’s second argument, arising from his explanation of the second 
iteration of the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Humanity.  
 
2.3. The Formula of Humanity 
The Formula of Humanity states that one must “act in such a way that you always 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never 
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end”, and as such, one’s 
maxim should always be “consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself” 
(GW 4:429). According to Kant, it is our rationality that characterises human 
nature, and our rational nature ought to be valued as an end in itself, as 
unconditionally valuable. Kant characterises this rational nature as the ability to 
set ends and “rule over” ourselves, bringing all our “capacities and inclination 
under [our] control” (MM 6:408; see also Paton 1971: 151). As such, to treat an 
agent as an end rather than a mere means amounts to respecting and valuing her 
humanity, which is for Kant to respect and value her rational nature – the capacity 
to set ends for herself and adopt the means to produce those ends. 
 For example, making false promises is not only immoral for Kant because it 
violates the Formula of Universal Law through a contradiction in conception, but 
also because it violates the Formula of Humanity. This violation occurs because 
making a false promise results in making use of another person merely for one’s 
own gain; instead, we need to recognise and respect the other person as someone 
with the unconditionally valuable capacity for rationality, as someone who is able 
                                                          
our rational nature, but given that the duty is imperfect, the way in which each agent 
fulfils this requirement is subject to an element of latitude and choice. One consideration 
that could play a role in how an agent chooses to fulfil her duty may be based on her 
levels of potential for acquiring particular skills. These contingent facts merely inform an 
agent when deciding how to fulfil her duty, and do not ground the duty itself. 
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to will and act upon the ends that she sets for herself. Breaking our promise to 
that person is a sign of disrespect for her rational capacities, due to the fact that 
we are treating her in a way that she would not consent to, and as such, 
disrespecting her capacity to ‘rule over’ herself, by setting ends and adopting the 
means for those ends.  
According to Kant, however, we do not only have a duty to respect the 
humanity in others; we also have a duty to recognise and respect the humanity in 
ourselves. Kant claims that the duty to develop one’s talents is such a duty that 
one owes to oneself rather than to others, because neglecting one’s talents 
amounts to neglecting and disrespecting one’s own rational nature. The duty that 
one has to develop one’s talents as grounded in the Formula of Humanity is 
explained by Kant as follows: 
A human being has a duty to himself to cultivate his natural powers (powers 
of spirit, mind, and body), as means to all sorts of possible ends. He owes 
it to himself (as a rational being) not to leave idle and, as it were, rusting 
away the natural predispositions and capacities that his reason can someday 
use [...] as a being capable of ends (of making objects his ends), he must 
owe the use of his powers not merely to natural instinct but rather to the 
freedom by which he determines their scope. Hence the basis on which he 
should develop his capacities (for all sorts of ends) is not regard for the 
advantages that their cultivation can provide; for the advantage might [...] 
turn out on the side of his crude natural needs. Instead, it is a command of 
morally practical reason and a duty of a human being to himself to cultivate 
his capacities (some among them more than others, insofar as people have 
different ends), and to be in a pragmatic respect a human being equal to 
the end of his existence (MM 6:444-5). 
As with the example of talent development explained in the Formula of Universal 
Law, Kant could be interpreted as relying on teleological and prudential 
justification for claiming that we ought to develop our capacities. He claims in 
the passage just cited that we owe it to ourselves to nurture our capacities 
because they are ‘useful’ to us, as a means to all sorts of ‘possible ends’. In 
another passage Kant further suggests this teleological interpretation: he claims 
that “a human being has a duty to himself to be a useful member of the world” 
(MM 6:445). 
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However, it is not the usefulness or consequences of developing one’s 
talents that grounds this moral duty. Rather, being a worthy and useful member 
of society just is to respect humanity’s rational nature as an end in itself, and 
amounts to a moral agent respecting “the worth of humanity in his own person, 
which he ought not to degrade” (MM 6:445; see also Denis: 330). It is because 
developing one’s talents is in the service of this rational capacity that it is not 
merely valued because of some contingent end or advantage. Kant claims that 
talents should be developed because they promote the excellent development of 
capacities that can be used in the service of one’s rationality. We therefore have 
a moral duty to develop our talents insofar as failing to do so means that we fail 
to respect and promote the value of our own rational capacities. As such, the duty 
to develop one’s talents is part of the duty to develop our capacities more 
generally; to perfect them fully and nurture their development as part of the 
respect for our humanity. Practical reason works through the development of our 
capacities, enabling us to set ends and adopt the means to achieve those ends. By 
developing our talents, we are working to develop our capacities, or at least a 
certain sub-set of those capacities. 
Kant distinguishes the duty to respect one’s own humanity (rationality) as 
having a negative and positive aspect. The negative aspect states the command 
to preserve one’s rational nature, to “live in conformity with nature”, whilst the 
positive aspect states the command to perfect and further one’s rational nature, 
to “make yourself more perfect than mere nature has made you” (MM 6:419). This 
positive demand for self-perfection is grounded in the understanding that our 
rational natures have an inclination towards excellence – “furtherance” and 
“greater perfection” (GW 4:430). Failing to act on the duty to develop one’s 
talents means that one would neglect and fail to further one’s own worth as a 
rational, moral agent. Again, it is important to note that it is respect for one’s 
rationality, as generated by the Categorical Imperative, that grounds this duty for 
self-perfection, and not the consequential positive benefits of prudential 
flourishing that may emerge from fulfilling the duty. The duty itself is not 
conditional or instrumental, but generated from the unconditional Categorical 
Imperative as a duty for self-perfection, and so necessarily including the 
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development of one’s talents which is according to Kant considered to be the 
epitome of perfect and excellent capacity development. 
Even though the duty of self-perfection is generated from the respect one 
ought to give one’s rational capacities, developing one’s talents need not be 
limited to those talents that are indexed to skills that only promote one’s rational 
powers or intellect. Kant considers the development of all kinds of talents to be 
necessary for the perfection of one’s humanity; he claims that perfecting 
humanity involves cultivating “your powers of mind and body so that they are fit 
to realize any ends you might encounter”, and that we ought to develop “any 
capacities whatever for furthering ends set forth by reason” (MM 6:391-3, 
emphasis added). This means that perfecting one’s rationality also involves the 
nurturing of one’s intellectual and physical capacities (Denis: 327). Developing 
one’s talents, therefore, gives an agent the ability to set all kinds of ends (not 
just intellectual ends) and provide oneself with the means to attain these ends. 
Failing to develop one’s talents would result in the prevention of one’s own ability 
to pursue the means to the ends that one sets for oneself. As such, the duty that 
we have to ourselves to develop our talents is a positive, imperfect duty, that 
rests on the justification that self-perfection is necessary for treating one’s 
humanity as an end in itself. 
Furthermore, for Kant, the duty of self-perfection has to be understood 
specifically as a moral requirement, and not a prudential one. This is because, for 
Kant, moral worth is grounded in acting from duty to the Categorical Imperative; 
this can only be achieved through the exercising of one’s rational capacities, so 
that one can autonomously bind oneself to and formulate maxims that are 
accountable to the different formulations of the Categorical Imperative. As such, 
it is one’s rational nature that makes one’s moral agency possible. As Nelson 
Potter claims, for Kant “[a]ll duties to oneself have to  do with the self as a moral 
agent, and as a self having the ability to impose duties on itself, that is, with 
maintaining and developing the self’s specifically moral capacities” (Potter 2002: 
375). Because failing to develop one’s talents is to neglect and disvalue one’s 
ability to set and act upon ends for oneself, for Kant this is necessarily a moral 
failing, as neglecting one’s rationality is to neglect the capacity that enables one 
to participate as a moral agent, insofar as you are neglecting in an important way 
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the development, preservation and expression of practical reason. In this way, the 
duty that one has to oneself to develop one’s talents has to be understood as part 
of the duty to enable oneself to respect and perfect one’s moral capacity to act 
in accordance with duty (Potter 1998: 44). 
Given that the duty to develop one’s talents is a duty that one owes to 
oneself, this makes the duty central to Kant’s overall moral project. Not only are 
duties to oneself moral duties because they express the requirement to value and 
perfect one’s moral agency, but according to Kant, they take priority over all 
other types of moral duties; he claims that without duties to oneself there “would 
be no [moral] duties whatsoever” (MM 6:417). This is because as a moral agent I 
“recognize that I am under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time 
put myself under obligation, since by the law by virtue of which I regard myself as 
being under obligation proceeds in every case from my practical reason; and in 
being constrained by my own reasons, I am also the one constraining myself” (MM 
6:417). Being able to act in accordance with the moral law thus requires an agent 
to express and utilise one’s practical rationality, and as such, the duty that one 
has to oneself to respect and perfect one’s rational capacities is necessary to make 
this kind of moral action possible. 
By claiming that duties to oneself take priority over duties to others, Kant 
is making a transcendental claim, that duties to oneself are the condition of 
possibility for duties to others. This is because, according to Kant, the moral law 
is necessarily one that we give to ourselves through the formulation of maxims in 
accordance with the Categorical Imperative. More specifically, it is due to one’s 
own acceptance that the moral law is grounded in one’s own rationality and 
volitional consistency that one understands oneself as bound to that law: I am the 
one that recognises the binding nature of the Categorical Imperative, and I am the 
one that formulates maxims for myself, judging that they are consistent with the 
moral law. Consequently, my moral action is constrained and limited by my own 
reason, which means that without attending to, realising and perfecting my 
capacity for reason, I cannot act as a moral agent in the first place. Duties to 
oneself are therefore fundamental to morality as providing morality’s condition of 
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possibility, and as a result, their priority is transcendental; duties to oneself make 
possible our rational and moral agency.18 
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret Kant’s transcendental claim 
regarding the priority of duties to oneself as also being a ‘formal’ claim, asserting 
that just because duties to oneself are self-legislated then they are necessarily 
owed to that same legislating self. This would mean that all duties are duties to 
oneself, in virtue of the fact that Kant considers all duties to be grounded in one’s 
own practical rationality. Timmerman suggests that Kant may have this formal 
argument in mind (Timmerman 2007: 88), and Potter too, claiming that “all duties 
are partially [duties to oneself] because the agent must use the powers of self-
constraint that are presupposed by any duty to recognize and undertake any duty 
at all” (Potter 2002: 376). 
However, as Andrews Reath has argued, interpreting Kant in this way 
confuses the legislator of the duty (the one who determines that I have a duty), 
with the person to whom the duty is owed. Just because each of us is our own 
moral legislators, this does not mean that all of our moral obligations are owed to 
ourselves. The person to whom one has the duty is not always in the legislative 
position but is the “individual whose condition, interests, circumstance, or 
relationship or past dealing with oneself, and so on, give reasons for action that 
make a special claim on one’s conduct” (Reath: 361). This means that the person 
to whom one’s moral duty is owed provides one with the reasons for why one is 
obligated to act in a particular way, in accordance with the moral law, and 
irrespective of who legislates over the formulation of the relevant maxim (ibid., 
362). 
Even though duties owed to oneself are grounded in the recognition that it 
is one’s own self that makes a claim on one’s moral activity, this does not mean 
that the priority of duties to oneself arises as a result of the formal autonomous 
                                                          
18 Paton also seems to make such a claim, albeit implicitly, about the priority of the moral 
duties we owe to ourselves as being transcendental in this way. He writes that “in some 
sense [duties to oneself] are to be regarded as having greater importance in our 
endeavour to make sense of morality”, because they lay “the very foundations of morality 
by realizing a value without which morality could not exist” (Paton 1971: 229). 
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nature of moral legislation (ibid., 367). Instead, the fundamentality of duties to 
oneself arises due to the fact that the preservation and perfection of one’s own 
rational nature is a precondition for the binding nature of morality. Duties to 
oneself consequently take priority over duties to others because they provide the 
condition of possibility for all and any moral duty to be generated in the first 
place, through a moral agent’s preservation and perfection of her rational nature. 
The Formula of Humanity therefore initially seems to provide Kant with the 
justification for the moral duty to develop one’s talents as being one that we owe 
to ourselves: respect for our own humanity requires that we preserve and perfect 
our rational capacities. As a result, failing to develop one’s talents would be to 
act contrary to the Formula of Humanity, in that one would fail to respect and 
promote the development of the capacities that can be used in the service of 
one’s practical rationality. Not only would this violate the respect that one ought 
to have for one’s own human nature, but due to the fact that duties to oneself 
are the condition of possibility for all other duties, it would also undermine the 
possibility of morality altogether.19 
 
2.4. Objections 
Having outlined the arguments that Kant gives for his claim that there is a positive, 
imperfect duty to oneself to develop one’s talents, I will now turn to three 
objections that can be levelled against his account. First, I argue that if there is 
a duty to develop one’s talents, then it is not necessarily imperfect as Kant claims, 
but also has the potential to be a perfect duty. This re-classification of the duty, 
however, does not negate the more substantial claim that there is a moral duty 
to develop one’s talents, but merely highlights that the duty could in some 
                                                          
19 Undermining the possibility of morality in this way is only a problem if one is a Kantian 
about morality and believes that moral worth necessarily stems from our worth as rational 
agents. If, on the other hand, rationality is not the ground of moral worth, then failing to 
respect or perfect practical rationality is not a problem intrinsic to the nature of morality. 
In other words, morality could still be possible if we neglect our rational natures, but we 
might deem, for other moral reasons, that developing our rationality is morally beneficial 
(such as, for example, the value of the relevant consequences). 
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circumstances be a ‘narrow’ one that does not allow any interpretation or choice 
from the agent as to how, and the extent to which, the duty must be fulfilled. 
Second, I will discuss the objection that the duty is not one that is necessarily 
owed to oneself, but is instead a duty that one owes to others. I argue that Kant 
can overcome this objection, and the duty to develop one’s talents should indeed 
be one that is owed to oneself. Finally, I object to Kant’s argument by 
demonstrating that he cannot generate the moral priority of developing 
specifically one’s talents, rather than any other capacities or non-talent abilities 
that one may have. I argue that this objection successfully undermines Kant’s 
justification for the moral duty to develop one’s talents. 
2.4.1. Imperfect and Perfect Duties 
Kant claims that the duty to develop one’s talents is imperfect; the duty arises 
from a contradiction in willing when it is tested against the Formula of Universal 
Law, and as such, allows for some latitude in how to fulfil the action that is 
demanded by the duty. If the difference between perfect and imperfect duties 
was explained by Kant simply as the difference between violating the Categorical 
Imperative through either a contradiction in conception or willing, then the 
distinction would simply be a term of art. However, Kant goes on to claim that 
perfect and imperfect duties are differently characterised with regards to how 
much latitude an agent has at her discretion to choose how she goes about 
fulfilling her duty. On the one hand, perfect duties are ‘strict’ and ‘narrow’, 
allowing no latitude for the agent’s own inclination as to how best to fulfil the 
duty. On the other hand, imperfect duties are ‘wide’ and ‘latitudinous’, allowing 
for an agent’s judgement and inclination when fulfilling the duty. 
 It has been objected that Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect 
duties is implausible; it seems as if both perfect and imperfect duties can be 
fulfilled with a certain amount of an agent’s free choice and latitude. For 
example, when I promise to pay my friend the £500 that I owe her, I consequently 
have a duty to keep that promise. According to the Formula of Universal Law, this 
duty is perfect and as such does not allow any latitude in how the duty should be 
fulfilled. However, this is not the case. I can go about keeping that promise, and 
thus fulfilling my duty, in a number of different ways – paying my friend by cheque, 
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in £10 notes, meeting her in person, sending the money by post, or handing the 
money over with my left or right hand. As a result, it is not clear that perfect 
duties really do specify a fully comprehensive was of implementing one’s maxim. 
Given the fact that even perfect duties can give rise to an agent’s 
discretion, it is argued that the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties 
cannot be based on how much latitude the duty gives an agent. As Schroeder 
claims, “all duties turn out to be imperfect” because “virtually all duties will be 
infinitely disjunctive” (Schroeder: 7, referencing Stocker 1967). It even seems as 
if Kant too considers all duties derived from the Categorical Imperative to be 
partly imperfect, allowing for some latitude of choice; he claims that “if the 
[moral law] can prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions themselves, this 
is a sign that it leaves a playroom for free choice in following (complying with) 
the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act 
and how much one is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty” (MM 6:390). 
If it were the case that all duties are actually imperfect, allowing an agent 
latitude of choice with regards to how to fulfil her duty, this would mean there is 
no substantial reason for Kant to classify duties as either imperfect or perfect. As 
a result, the way in which an agent fulfils her imperfect duty to develop her 
talents and the perfect duty to keep her promise would no longer be considered 
as allowing different levels of an agent’s discretion. However, there are ways in 
which we could attempt to specify a substantial distinction between perfect and 
imperfect duties on Kant’s behalf. I will reject three of these attempts and finally 
argue that the distinction between the two types of duties should be one of degree 
and not kind. 
First, we could argue that perfect duties are specified negatively, whilst 
imperfect duties are positive; the perfect duty to refrain from making a false 
promise is explained in terms of the fact that we are not allowed to make a false 
promise, whilst the duty to develop one’s talents is explained in terms of the fact 
that we ought to nurture our talents. However, this distinction does not hold, as 
both types of duties can be spelled out either negatively or positively. With 
regards to refraining from making false promises, one’s perfect duty is just as 
much to keep one’s promise as it is to not make a false one. With regards to 
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developing talents, one’s imperfect duty is just as much to develop one’s talents 
as it is to not neglect their development.  
Second, Rainbolt has suggested that the distinction might be explained in 
terms of the metaphysical difference between an ‘act-type’ and an ‘act-token’. 
An act-type is a general or universal property that an action has, such as the 
generic action of ‘drinking wine’, ‘writing a paper’ or ‘playing tennis’. An act-
token, by contrast, is a particular action that instantiates a general act-type at 
any given moment. For example, the universal act-type of ‘writing a paper’ can 
be made into a particular act-token by taking into consideration how that act-
type is instantiated (Rainbolt: 234-5). Rainbolt suggests that we could understand 
a perfect duty as one that specifies an agent’s particular act-token, with an 
imperfect duty specifying only a general act-type (ibid., 239). Stocker suggests a 
similar distinction, claiming that perfect duties are meant to “individuate” the 
acts that an agent must carry out to fulfil the duty, whilst an imperfect duty only 
“characterises” those acts (Stocker: 510). 
It is not clear, however, whether perfect duties really do specify 
individuated acts or act-tokens, rather than characteristic general act-types. The 
duty to refrain from suicide, for example, is a perfect duty according to Kant, but 
this duty does not necessarily specify an act-token that must be used to 
successfully instantiate the act-type of ‘not committing suicide’. Furthermore, it 
seems as if the duty to develop one’s talents could specify a particular act-token 
that instantiates the act-type of ‘developing a talent’, perhaps by considering who 
is developing their talent and under what particular circumstances. In this way, 
both perfect and imperfect duties can either be metaphysically underdetermined, 
such that they are considered to be act-types, or particularly determined, such 
that they are considered to be act-tokens (Stocker: 509). Therefore, the 
distinction doesn’t hold, and both Rainbolt and Stocker ultimately reject this 
interpretation. 
A third option to specify the distinction between perfect and imperfect 
duties is to highlight the difference in moral relevancy of the choice that is given 
to agents; a perfect duty does not allow latitude of choice with regards to morally 
relevant properties, whilst an imperfect duty does (Stocker: 509-512; Rainbolt: 
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245). For example, in some cultures it might be morally relevant to specify how I 
give the money I borrowed back to my friend – doing so with my left hand could 
be classified as offensive. In this way, the perfect duty would specify that I should 
not pay back the money I owe to my friend by using my left hand. 
However, if this distinction was to hold, it would mean that an imperfect 
duty allows free choice with respect to morally relevant features of an action; this 
could potentially allow for morally impermissible consequences. For instance, 
even though the duty to develop one’s talents is imperfect, it should not be the 
case that an agent is allowed to fulfil that duty in any way, by offending or harming 
people, or engaging in activities that are considered to be morally impermissible. 
As a result, it should be the case that even an imperfect duty, and not just a 
perfect one, will have to specify and constrain an agent’s actions with regards to 
what is morally relevant or permissible.20 
The three previous suggestions for specifying the difference between 
perfect and imperfect duties have distinguished ways in which the duties are 
different in kind. Conversely, I suggest that the difference is best thought of as 
one of degree or scale. Rainbolt argues along these lines, claiming that all duties 
have the potential to allow for an agent’s discretion, by referring to five main 
categories: the time, place and manner in which the duty is fulfilled, the object 
that the duty is directed towards, and the number of act-tokens used to 
successfully fulfil the duty (Rainbolt: 234). A duty is completely perfect when it 
specifies exactly only one particular action with respect to all of these five 
categories, and a completely imperfect duty will give an agent free choice with 
                                                          
20 Schroeder thinks that the way to solve the problem of the distinction between 
imperfect and perfect duties is to consider imperfect duties as duties held primarily by a 
group, with each individual assigned part of the obligation to discharge (Schroeder: 19). 
However, it is not certain that this distinction is any more clear-cut than the previous 
ones that I have already rejected in this section. Depending on how an agent formulates 
her maxim based on the particular circumstances, all her duties could be said to be held 
by a group, insofar as she is a member of a social community, with her actions indirectly 
and directly affecting others. Her duty to refrain from suicide, to refrain from making a 
false promise, or to develop her talents, could all be part of a larger duty that is held by 
a group, in place to secure the prosperity of society. Therefore, Schroeder’s suggestion 
does not plausibly differentiate between the two types of duties, nor does it account for 
the ways in which latitude plays a part in fulfilling each obligation. 
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regards to how each of these categories is to be met. Most duties, however, will 
not be completely perfect or imperfect, but be somewhere in-between. Kant also 
seems to imply that the distinction should be thought of in these terms, claiming 
that “[t]he wider the duty, therefore, the more imperfect is a man’s obligation to 
actions [...] the more leeway that a duty gives to how you could go about fulfilling 
it, the wider or imperfect that duty can be said to be” (MM 6:390; see also 
Schroeder: 3). 
If the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is one of degree, 
then each duty will be as narrow or particular as it needs to be in order to 
accurately specify what is required of an agent to successfully fulfil the duty. This 
means that the duty to develop one’s talents is not necessarily imperfect as Kant 
claims, but rather the amount of choice an agent has when fulfilling the duty 
depends on the particular circumstances in which she finds herself. For example, 
the duty will be more particular if there is only one talent available for 
development, and if that talent can only be developed at a particular time, place 
and under certain constrained conditions. The choice one has when fulfilling one’s 
duty to develop a particular talent for playing the violin, for instance, will be 
restricted by the conventions and requirements necessary for developing the skills 
for playing the violin. Therefore, the Kantian moral duty to develop one’s talents 
has the potential to be imperfect or perfect, depending on how particular the 
duty ought to be characterised in order for it to be successfully fulfilled.21 
 
2.4.2. Duties to Oneself 
                                                          
21 Accepting that the duty to develop one’s talents could be classed as perfect, might 
result in a worry that the duty is personally over-demanding for an agent. It has been 
argued that Kant mitigates the worry of moral over-demandingness by allowing an agent 
some discretion in how to fulfil imperfect duties. If these duties are in fact classified as 
perfect, then there is no such discretion on behalf of the agent, and as a result, Kant’s 
account of morality could be seen as prescribing duties that are too narrowly specified 
and count as over-demanding (see Fairbanks: 123-126). For now I leave this issue aside, 
and in Chapter Four I will discuss in more detail the over-demandingness objection with 
regards to the moral obligation to develop one’s talents.  
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Kant claims that the moral duty to develop one’s talents is a duty that one owes 
to oneself, because the expression and perfection of one’s practical rationality 
that comes with developing a talent is a necessary part of respecting one’s own 
humanity. However, it could be objected that duties to oneself are not possible, 
and even if they are, that the duty to develop one’s talents is not a duty to oneself 
but rather a duty that we owe to others. I will now respond to each of these two 
objections in turn.  
First, we might think that duties to oneself are logically impossible due to 
the relationship that one has with oneself as being insufficient to generate such a 
duty. Kant seems to recognise the apparent worry here, acknowledging that 
having a duty to oneself means “we would have to think of ourselves as both being 
bound by the duty and the one who is doing the binding”; as a result, we might 
never be truly bound because “the one imposing the obligation could always 
release the one put under the obligation from the obligation” (MM 6:417-8). To 
explain, if there is such a thing as a duty to oneself, one would have to both 
impose the obligation and be constrained by the obligation at the same time, 
which seems impossible. If I impose a duty on someone by making a claim on them, 
then I have the right to release that person from their duty. However, if I am doing 
both the imposing and constraining, then I would always have the opportunity to 
release myself from the duty as and when I desire; this makes having a duty to 
myself impossible, as a duty is something one should not be able to release oneself 
from (Singer 1959; Paton 1990: 225).  
This objection can be responded to by recognising that it misconstrues what 
it means to be able to ‘release’ someone from their duty. The reason why a duty 
is imposed on us is because it is what the Categorical Imperative demands, a 
demand which is generated and realised by one’s own reason. The only ways in 
which one could possibly be released from a duty is if one (a) realises that one has 
actually been mistaken, and what one thought was a duty is not in fact a duty 
after all, such that the Categorical Imperative in fact demands one to act in a 
different way altogether, or (b) if one performs an action contrary to the duty and 
violates it, which is not to release oneself from a duty but rather to disregard the 
duty altogether. Duties aren’t generated from the claims of others, but the 
Categorical Imperative itself (Korsgaard 1998: 68). It is therefore not possible to 
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release oneself from a duty in the way that the objection suggests, and as a result, 
duties to oneself are logically possible. 
Even if duties to oneself are possible in the way just described, we might 
further object that the duty to develop one’s talents need not be a duty that one 
owes to oneself, but one that we owe to others. On this view, developing one’s 
talents would only be required if doing so would be for the benefit of one’s 
treatment towards others, and would only be morally valuable in terms of one’s 
respect of the moral claims that others make on us. Those who argue along these 
lines have to demonstrate why the duty to develop one’s talents cannot be one 
that one owes to oneself, and it is not clear why we need to accept such a claim. 
Kant claims that the moral worth of developing one’s talents is grounded 
in the respect for humanity, and this requires treating all moral agents as equally 
valuable. Failing to treat ourselves as equally valuable in this way would be to 
disrespect ourselves as less morally worthy than any other moral agent (Eisenberg: 
144; Denis: 326, 334; Paton: 224). It seems right that we should value and treat 
ourselves with the same respect that we would give to others. However, one 
consequence of this would be that even if there is only one person in existence, 
Kant would still claim that this person is a moral agent and have duties that are 
deemed as moral duties. Take the example used in the previous chapter, of the 
one-person world in which an agent has high levels of potential for musical ability. 
If we could assess that this person has a talent for music, then Kant would be able 
to claim that she has a duty to develop her talent, and that this duty is a moral 
one because it is indexed to the respect that she has for her own humanity. 
It could be objected that morality is just a social phenomenon, such that 
morality merely concerns the sphere of one’s behaviours and actions that affect 
others (Eisenberg: 129). Kurt Baier, for example, claims that morality results from 
the connections, relationships and interactions that we have with other people, 
and that morality has no relevance in situations where there is no ‘other’ to 
interact with: a “world of Robinson Crusoes has no need for a morality and no use 
for one” (Baier: 215; Denis: 321-323). However, Kant has no reason to accept this 
claim; he can also be interpreted as claiming that morality is inherently social, 
especially as expressed in his final formulation of the Categorical Imperative 
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where he states that morality involves the deliberation of rational agents. Even 
though morality is social and grounded in social claims in this way, this does not 
necessarily mean that the way we treat ourselves cannot count as a moral 
interaction, because we ought to value and respect ourselves in the same way 
that we respect others, as moral agents. 
It is irrelevant whether we call this kind of respect for oneself as ‘moral’ 
respect or ‘ethical’ respect, or some other kind of respect altogether; what is 
important is the idea that the name points to, which is the claim that we ought 
to respect our own humanity, even if doing so does not affect the claims that 
others make on us. As such, the duty to develop one’s talents can be thought of 
as a duty that is owed to oneself, and in Kant’s account of morality, this duty, 
grounded in respect for our humanity, is termed as a moral duty because it is 
generated by the Categorical Imperative. This is not just because the duty that 
we have to respect our humanity acts as the condition of possibility for moral 
agency more generally, but also because it is a duty that demands of us to treat 
ourselves as moral agents with equal moral worth. In order to reject Kant’s claim, 
the burden of proof thus lies on those who assume that morality necessarily has 
to be defined solely as a social phenomenon and consequently that this means 
morality cannot involve requirements about how individuals treat themselves are 
moral agents.  
2.4.3. The Moral Priority of Talent Development 
I have so far proposed that the duty to develop one’s talents should be thought of 
as a duty to oneself that is neither perfect nor imperfect exclusively, but is to be 
fulfilled by each agent with the right amount of choice as the situation requires. 
Even with these qualifications in place, I argue that Kant cannot plausibly claim 
that there is a moral duty to develop one’s talents. This is because Kant does not 
successfully demonstrate that there is a moral priority attached to developing 
specifically one’s talents, as opposed to any other competencies or non-talent 
abilities that one may have. 
Kant claims that a talent is an advantageous “natural gift”, “excellence” 
and “fortunate natural predisposition” (Anthropology: 115). From this we can 
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assume that Kant considers a talent to be more than a general capacity for any 
kind of competency or behaviour. For example, I may have the capacity to run, 
but this does not mean that I have a talent for running; in Chapter One I argued 
that for someone to be talented, their capacity or mere ability ought to be 
something that is expressed in the above-average or excellent acquisition of that 
particular skill. Kant seems to offer a similar account of talents, or at least one 
that is compatible with my account, which understands talents as attributed to 
those who exhibit some excellence in their skill acquisition which is beyond the 
norm. This is made clear when Kant claims that talents are fortunate and 
advantageous dispositions. 
With this understanding of the nature of talents in mind, the Formula of 
Universal Law looks like it can’t generate a moral duty to develop specifically 
one’s talents, but rather it generates the weaker claim that one ought to develop 
any capacity that will contribute to one being able to fulfil one’s goals, whatever 
they happen to be. Universalising the maxim that I neglect to develop the skills in 
which I demonstrate an excellent level of acquisition and development does not 
necessarily contradict the Categorical Imperative in conception or in willing. In 
order to be provided with the goods I need for a flourishing life, I do not need 
others to be talented pizza makers or beer crafters, or artists, or healthcare 
professionals; I only require that they have developed their skills to a level of 
adequate competency so that they can provide me with the relevant and 
necessary goods. 
The universalisation test does not justify the claim that we ought to perfect 
the useful capacities that we need in order to promote the good life or a 
flourishing society, but only that we develop our skills to the required competency 
that is necessary for society to function productively. This means that there is no 
irrationality involved in failing to develop one’s talents, but only one’s 
competencies. And so, according to the Formula of Universal Law, there is no duty 
to develop or perfect one’s talents, but only one’s capacities more generally; 
there would be nothing morally wrong about choosing to develop a skill in which 
one is merely competent. 
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The Formula of Humanity is similarly unable to provide the reasons for why 
there is moral duty to develop specifically one’s talents. Kant prescribes that we 
ought to develop our talents because they allow one to excellently express and 
perfect one’s own humanity – one’s rational capacity to set ends and adopt the 
means necessary for those ends. But it is not clear why it is the perfection 
specifically of one’s talents, rather than any other competencies that one might 
have, that necessarily expresses and perfects these rational capacities. 
For example, it might be that I have a talent for playing the violin, but 
despite this I really enjoy studying mathematics even though I’m not considered 
to be a talented mathematician according to the relevant comparative thresholds 
set by society. Nonetheless, I work extremely hard in my mathematical studies, 
working to perfect all the capacities in me that will allow me to become a 
successful mathematician, but in doing so I have to neglect my talent for playing 
the violin. The Formula of Humanity gives us no reason to believe that I have a 
moral duty to develop my talent for playing the violin rather than my capacity to 
be a mathematician. As long as I am expressing and respecting my humanity by 
exercising my practical reason and improving upon it, then for Kant there can be 
no moral differentiation made between talents and mere competencies. As a 
result, we cannot conclude from Kant’s Categorical Imperative, that it would be 
a moral failing to neglect the development of our talents as long as we are 
nurturing our humanity in other ways. 
This argument depends on the assumption that we would always be able to 
choose between developing our talents and developing some other competency 
that similarly expresses and develops the perfection of our humanity. It might be 
the case, however, that you choose to neglect your talent for playing the violin, 
and this results in neglecting the development of your rational capacities 
altogether – such a maxim would not work to promote and respect your humanity. 
In this situation Kant would prescribe that you ought to promote and respect your 
humanity; if developing your talent for playing the violin was the only way to do 
this, then you ought to develop that talent. This only means that we would be 
required by morality to develop our talents if it was found that developing all of 
our other competencies would not result in the perfection of our rational 
capacities. 
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It is also important to remember that Kant does not just state that we 
should perfect only a few of our capacities, but “all the capacities” in us and to 
the highest possible standard that we can (GW 4:423). This means that if I only 
had one capacity, and this happened to be a talent for playing the violin, then I 
would have a moral duty to develop that talent insofar as it is the only way for me 
to fulfil my duty to respect my humanity. This is an extremely strong claim, 
however, and it is almost impossible to imagine a situation in which this binary 
tension would arise, between developing my one talent, or not being able to fulfil 
my moral duty; functioning properly as a rational moral agent requires many 
different and often mundane capacities that we take for granted in everyday life, 
such as talking, writing, and listening. Although everyone does not have all and 
the same capacities, it would be strange to imagine someone without any of these 
general capacities yet still exhibiting a talent for, say, playing the violin, sprinting 
or painting. As a result, developing one’s talents does not seem like the only way 
in which to respect and perfect one’s humanity.22  
In response to this objection, it could be suggested that Kant’s duty of 
respect for humanity actually does entail that developing one’s talents is morally 
superior to developing one’s mere competencies. The requirement that we 
respect our humanity necessitates that we respect what is valuable about 
ourselves and what is excellent in us. Considering that Kant understands that we 
ought to respect the parts of us that are central to our humanity, then as part of 
our duty to perfect humanity we necessarily ought to develop those capacities in 
us which most excellently develops and perfects our rationality. Talents seem to 
be the most likely candidate for this, as they are dispositional qualities that 
manifest in the excellent acquisition of a particular skill, and are also the 
                                                          
22 Against my objection it could be argued that Kant does not claim that we have a general 
duty to develop our talents above all other alternatives, but merely that we have a duty 
not to sit idly by rather than develop our talents. However, even if this is the case, (the 
textual evidence I have given in this Chapter seems to suggest otherwise), and Kant is 
merely claiming that we should not be lazy and waste our lives in idleness, it is not clear 
why Kant then argues that to remedy this we ought to develop our talents. My claim is 
that competencies will do just fine to secure the requirement that arises from the 
Formula of Humanity, to preserve and perfect our rational capacities. The duty of self-
perfection that stems from the requirement not to be lazy or idle, does not necessarily 
involve the requirement to develop our talents. Developing mere competencies will 
suffice.  
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expression of multiple capacities. For example, if someone has a talent for playing 
tennis, this means that they will excellently acquire the skill, and in doing so 
develop various capacities, such as moving one’s body quickly and efficiently, 
having good coordination, competitive spirit, and mental endurance. Because 
developing one’s talent exhibits many capacities at once, and these capacities are 
ones that are manifested in excellent skill acquisition, it could be argued that 
one’s talent best fulfils the requirement to respect and perfect one’s rationality. 
It is not clear, however, or at least we should not take it for granted, that 
developing one’s talents does count as an excellence in this way. To begin with, 
it is not obvious that developing one’s talents is a moral excellence, partly 
because a person could have a talent for a skill that we determine to be morally 
wrong if exhibited in certain ways, for example, a skill for lock-picking or utilising 
a gun in order to cause harm. It might be that the development of those skills is 
useful for promoting practical reason, and thus respecting humanity, but it is not 
the case that expressing that talent is in fact morally worthy, insofar as it fails to 
respect the humanity of others, and may even result in their harm. If this is the 
case, then it is hard to see why there would be a moral duty to develop these 
morally impermissible skills, just because they excellently perfect one’s rational 
capacities.  
Furthermore, it is not clear why it is specifically our talents, as opposed to 
our mere competencies, that excellently promote and perfect one’s rationality. 
It could be the case that given the particulars of a situation, it is actually the 
development of one’s mere competencies that perfects one’s rationality, rather 
than one’s talents. If someone begins to develop a skill at a lower level of 
competency, then they will need to work hard and overcome challenges in order 
to develop that skill to a high standard. This will require a person to consistently 
set ends and adopt the means to pursue those ends, and as such, constantly work 
to preserve and perfect their rational capacities throughout the development of 
the skill. Someone who is talented, by contrast, will find the acquisition of the 
particular skill comes more easily and quickly, without the need to challenge and 
develop their rational capacities. In some situations at least, it will therefore be 
the development of our mere capacities rather than our talents that will most 
likely work to respect and perfect our rational capacities. As a result, Kant cannot 
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take for granted the moral priority of talents over other abilities or competencies 
when explicating why we have a moral duty to develop our talents. In fact, there 
is good reason to suggest that talents, understood as excellences, are not more 
valuable or desirable when it comes to respecting our rationality and humanity. 
Therefore, the duty that we have to perfect our humanity does not require that 
we ought to develop specifically our talents, but rather that we ought to develop 
any competencies we may have that will serve to enhance and develop our rational 
capacities. Even if moral agency is generated by the development of practical 
rationality, I argue that this does not rely on the development of our talents. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued against Kant’s claim that there is a moral duty to 
develop one’s talents. This means that if we do have a moral obligation to develop 
our talents, then it cannot be justified in terms of Kant’s account of morality. I 
began by analysing the two arguments that Kant gives in support of his claim, as 
found in his Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity. I then 
discussed three objections that could be raised against Kant’s account. First, I 
argued that the duty to develop one’s talents is not necessarily imperfect, as Kant 
claims, but also has the potential to be a perfect duty. This is because the 
difference between an imperfect and perfect duty is not one of kind but of degree. 
I noted that because the duty to develop one’s talents may be perfect, this would 
mean that the duty does not allow for any free choice from the agent as to how 
she will fulfil her duty. Second, I responded to the objection that the duty to 
develop one’s talents should not be thought of as a duty to oneself, but rather as 
a duty that we owe to others. I argued that duties to oneself are indeed logically 
possible, and furthermore, that there is no good reason why the duty to develop 
ones’ talents should not be thought of as a moral duty that is owed to oneself; 
this duty is generated by the Categorical Imperative and the requirement that we 
ought to respect our own humanity and moral worth. 
Finally, I argued that Kant does not succeed in explaining why developing 
talents is morally superior to developing any other competencies that we may 
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have. The Formula of Universal Law only provides justification for the claim that 
we ought to develop our skills to the required level of competency so as to avoid 
a contradiction in willing. Similarly, it is not clear why the Formula of Humanity 
requires the development specifically of our talents; this is because developing 
one’s competencies is often more likely to more fully and consistently perfect 
one’s rational capacities, and furthermore, we would always be able to choose 
between developing our talents and developing some other competency that 
would express and perfect our rational capacities. 
Kant cannot successfully claim that developing one’s talents is morally 
superior to developing one’s competencies when it comes to adhering either to 
the Formula of Universal Law or the Formula of Humanity. As a result, Kant does 
not succeed in arguing that one has an imperfect moral duty to oneself to develop 
one’s talents. In the next chapter I will go on to discuss two further theories that 
make explicit claims regarding the obligations and reasons we have to develop our 
talents. I will argue that moral perfectionism is equally unable to generate the 
claim that we have a moral obligation to develop our talents, and that welfare 
perfectionism cannot successfully claim that we have good prudential reasons to 
do so. 
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Chapter Three 
Perfectionism, Excellence and Endorsement 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I concluded that given the commitments of Kant’s moral 
theory, he cannot successfully claim that there is a moral obligation to develop 
one’s talents. Kant considered talent development as necessary for the perfection 
of one’s human rationality and moral agency, however, I argued that Kant fails to 
generate the moral priority of talents over mere competencies. As a result, we 
have no reason to consider the development of our talents to be morally required 
of us, at least by appealing to Kant. 
 The reason for focussing on Kant’s moral philosophy was guided by the fact 
that unlike many other moral theories, Kant makes an explicit claim about the 
necessary connection between talent development and moral agency. It is not 
only Kant’s moral theory, however, that makes an explicit claim about the 
relationship between talent development and morality. Moral perfectionism 
makes a similar claim, that talent development expresses and promotes the 
perfection of human flourishing and moral development, and as a result, there is 
a self-regarding moral obligation to develop one’s talents (Hurka: 17-18, 56, 194).   
In this chapter, I argue that moral perfectionists cannot plausibly generate 
the moral obligation to develop one’s talents from the commitments of their 
theory. This is because developing one’s talents is not objectively morally good in 
the way that perfectionists claim, as there is no support for understanding the 
development of one’s talents as an ‘excellence’. I call this the ‘excellence’ 
objection. If this objection holds, then it means that we cannot plausibly claim 
there is a pro tanto moral obligation to develop one’s talent by appealing to moral 
perfectionism. 
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Perfectionism, however, has another aspect to it. Some perfectionists do 
not consider their account of human flourishing to be a moral theory, but rather 
an account of the nature of well-being and prudential goods. This type of 
perfectionist, the ‘welfare’ perfectionist, does not claim that there is a moral 
obligation to develop one’s talents, but rather that developing one’s talents is 
objectively prudentially good for an agent (Kraut: 45-47). This means that 
according to welfare perfectionism, developing one’s talent is considered to be a 
constitutive part of an agent’s well-being, insofar as it manifests and promotes 
excellent human flourishing. 
In this chapter, I also argue that welfare perfectionism is similarly subject 
to the excellence objection; the theory does not successfully prove that there is 
a pro tanto prudential reason to develop one’s talents. Furthermore, given that 
the theory is an account of well-being, I argue that it is also subject to another 
objection that is specifically targeted against the claim that talent development 
counts as an objective prudential good. I propose that if the development of one’s 
talents is to be regarded as a constitutive part of an agent’s well-being, it is 
conditional on the agent’s endorsement of that development. I will go on to 
explain this endorsement in terms of a ‘constraint’ on all theories of well-being, 
and argue that if this endorsement constraint is not met, then developing one’s 
talents is not prudentially good. From this I finally conclude that both the moral 
and welfare varieties of perfectionism fail to successfully support their claims 
regarding the necessary connection between talent development and human 
flourishing. 
In Section Two I begin by outlining the commitments held by both moral 
and welfare perfectionism, focussing on the arguments they offer for considering 
talent development to be objectively good and a constitutive part of one’s human 
flourishing. In section Three I introduce the ‘excellence objection’, arguing 
against the perfectionist’s claim that talent development most excellently 
constitutes the flourishing of our essential human capacities. As a result, talent 
development cannot be considered as an objective perfectionist good. In Section 
Four I turn specifically to welfare perfectionism, and present two examples in 
which it seems as if the development of one’s talent is not an objective prudential 
good. In Section Five I explain that these examples rely on the intuition that talent 
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development can only be prudentially good for an agent if it fits with the agent’s 
deeply held normative commitments. Without this fit, what is deemed to be 
prudentially good for an agent will in fact be alienating. After discussing how 
hybrid versions of perfectionism have attempted to avoid this worry of alienation, 
in Section Six I argue that if talent development is to ‘fit’ with an agent’s deep 
normative commitments, then it must be endorsed by the agent – this is what I 
call the ‘endorsement constraint’. Before concluding in Section Seven, I respond 
to objections that can be raised against my formulation of the endorsement 
constraint, and claim that endorsement is indeed necessary when determining 
whether an agent has a pro tanto prudential reason to develop her talents. 
 
3.2. Perfectionism and Talent Development 
3.2.1. The Fundamental Claim 
Both moral and welfare perfectionists share the same core claim, that human 
flourishing is a fundamental objective good, and that this flourishing consists in 
the excellent development, exercise and realisation of one’s essential human 
capacities. What counts as a person’s essential human capacities is defined in 
terms of what it means to be human – that which identifies humans as humans as 
opposed to any other species. As Dorsey concisely puts it, “[t]he good for an x is 
determined by the core account of what it means to be an x” (Dorsey 2012: 62). 
 The exact details of what counts as an essential human capacity varies 
according to the particular type of perfectionism. Thomas Hurka, for example, 
claims that human nature consists in the three Aristotelian essential properties of 
physicality, theoretical rationality and practical rationality (Hurka: 37). Robert 
Kraut, by contrast, advocates one’s cognitive, affective, sensory and social powers 
as being among the intuitive list of natural human capacities (Kraut: 137), whilst 
T. H. Green claims that our human nature is necessarily grounded in our moral 
agency, such that what defines us as humans is that which makes moral agency 
possible – our deliberative capacity for practical rationality (Green: 183-200; 
Dorsey 2012: 63). 
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Whatever is decided upon as being a human’s essential capacities, the 
perfectionist will claim that the excellent development of those capacities is what 
constitutes human flourishing, and that nurturing these capacities is objectively 
good.23 Given this fundamental claim, perfectionism comes in two main varieties. 
First, moral perfectionism states that human flourishing is not just objectively 
good, but that it is the objective moral good. This means that we have 
fundamental and unconditional moral reasons to perfect our central human 
capacities (Hurka: 3). Second, welfare perfectionism does not claim that human 
flourishing is a moral good, but instead it considers the perfection of one’s 
essential human capacities to be an unconditional and objective prudential good, 
constitutive of one’s well-being (Kraut: 74-5). As such, both moral and welfare 
perfectionism are objective theories. They claim that the value of human 
flourishing is objective, in the sense that what makes human flourishing good and 
confers goodness onto the development of human nature, does not rely on an 
agent’s own attitude towards that flourishing and development (Dorsey 2012: 61; 
Ferkany: 472-3). For the moral perfectionist this objective goodness is a moral 
good, and for the welfare perfectionist this objective goodness is a prudential 
good.  
Not only do different types of moral and welfare perfectionism vary 
according to how they define what counts as an essential human capacity, but 
they also differ in how they deem the perfection and development of these 
capacities to be fulfilled. Both Hurka and Kraut, for example, initially seem to 
propose a maximising view, which claims that one’s essential capacities should be 
                                                          
23 There are some versions of perfectionism that do not rely specifically on an account of 
essential human capacities, but rather claim that the excellent life is one in which we 
maximise or achieve excellence in certain areas of life, objectively specified and without 
reference to what makes us essentially human. For example, Rawls claims that these 
perfectionist goods are “art, science and culture” (Rawls 1999: 286), and Humboldt claims 
that the objective good in question is ‘individuality’, such that an agent ought to aim for 
“the integration and development of the various talents they possess” (Humboldt 1986, 
cited in Colburn 2010: 15). Griffin (1988) and Arneson (2000), for example, both specify 
their own objective lists describing what counts as an excellent objective good. Although 
I do not deal with these accounts of perfectionism specifically, much of what I say in this 
chapter against perfectionism will be relevant to these other accounts; noticeably, my 
claim that developing one’s talents does not necessarily result in the excellent 
demonstration of these objective perfectionist goods, whatever they may be and 
irrespective of whether they are defined in terms of human nature. 
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developed maximally and to the full. Hurka states that “the best perfectionism is 
a maximising consequentialism”, advocating that our human capacities “are 
pursued to the highest degree” and aim at “full human development” (Hurka: 55-
6, 63). Kraut claims that we are truly flourishing when we are “developing properly 
and fully […] making full use of [our] potentialities, capacities and faculties” 
(Kraut: 131). On this reading, it is the full and maximal development of our central 
human capacities that is constitutive of our human flourishing. However, both 
Hurka and Kraut qualify that this maximisation ought to be expressed 
appropriately across one’s set of capacities; we ought to aim for a balanced, well-
rounded life that does not emphasise the development of one capacity over 
another. As such, human flourishing consists in the appropriate realisation and 
balanced development of all of our essential human capacities (Kraut: 170-172; 
Hurka: 91; Kaupinnen: 3). 
For the purposes of this chapter I am going to leave aside any objections 
that might be associated with these maximising and balancing versions of 
perfectionism, as well as any objections that can be raised against perfectionism’s 
understanding of what counts as an essential part of human nature – there have 
been numerous criticisms of perfectionism for these reasons (Dorsey 2010; Kitcher 
1999; Haybron 2007). In what follows I grant the perfectionist her account of well-
being or morality as consisting in the excellent development of human nature, 
however this may be described, and I focus on the perfectionist’s assertion that 
developing specifically one’s talents is objectively good. I will now go on to 
explain why perfectionists consider talent development to be a constitutive part 
of the excellent development of one’s human nature. 
 
 
3.2.2. Talents and Human Flourishing 
According to perfectionism, talent development is objectively good because it is 
a constitutive part of the excellent development of one’s human nature, and is 
necessary for the perfection of one’s essential human capacities. In Chapter One 
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I proposed an account of the nature of talents that initially seems to explain the 
perfectionist’s consideration of talents as an excellence in this way. I claimed that 
talents are a high level of potential for a skill that is excellently manifested in the 
ease and speed with which that skill is acquired. This proficiency will allow the 
talented person to reach a higher standard of skill than someone who is not 
talented, if that talent is properly developed. For example, William may have the 
capacity to sing, but this does not mean that he has a talent for singing; for 
someone to be talented, they not only need the initial capacity or ability, but that 
capacity ought to be expressed in the above-average, or ‘excellent’ development 
of that skill. This makes sense of the way in which we consider the relevant skills 
as coming ‘naturally’ to those who are talented. 
It therefore seems as if talents are the best candidate for the realisation of 
the requirement to perfect one’s central human capacities. Those who are 
talented are more likely to achieve ‘excellent’ human development, as their 
talents enable their capacities to be developed more efficiently and productively. 
In this way, developing one’s talent is to engage in the excellent development and 
perfection of one’s human flourishing – the more you develop your talents, the 
more you will promote the expression and development needed to achieve this 
flourishing. 
 To illustrate this point, Hurka gives the example of a talented scientist, 
claiming that the scientist’s talent “is what is best in her and what she should 
most strive to develop” (Hurka: 27). Hurka claims not only that one’s talent is 
worth developing, but also that one has a moral obligation to develop one’s 
talents. He writes that, “the duty to develop one’s talents is more pressing for 
those with greater talents. […] We could not say of someone who was content with 
a reasonable development of his talents that he aimed at “excellence” or was 
dedicated to “perfecting” himself” (Hurka: 56). From this it is clear that Hurka 
considers only the full development of one’s talents to be indicative of excellence 
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and the perfection of one’s human nature, whilst the failure to develop one’s 
talents or the mere adequate development of a talent lacks this excellence.24 
 When it comes to welfare perfectionism, Kraut similarly claims that 
developing one’s talents is a constitutive part of one’s human flourishing. Although 
this does not amount to giving one a moral reason to develop one’s talents, Kraut 
does claim that one has an objective prudential reason to do so. Kraut gives the 
example of a young person who has the “talents that would make a medical career 
the best career for him”, and that developing those talents “is something he 
should want and should pursue because it would be good for him that he do so” 
(Kraut: 112-3). Kraut considers the development of the young person’s medical 
talents to be in his best interest and a constitutive part of his well-being, 
irrespective of the young person’s own attitudes and evaluative perspective. 
Initially it might seem that Kraut’s formulation gives some weight to one’s wants 
and desires – Kraut writes that the development of the person’s talents is 
something that he should want. However, the person’s pro-attitudes are not what 
makes the development of his talents good for him, but rather, as Kraut makes 
explicit, the agent should desire such development because it is good for him, and 
would be good for him even if he had no such desire. 
 Therefore, perfectionists make a strong claim, that what makes something 
morally or prudentially good is that it promotes the perfection of our human 
nature. Talent development is objectively good in this way, due to the fact that 
it not only promotes, but is a constitutive part of, the excellent development of 
our essential human capacities. It is the perfectionist’s emphasis on the objective 
                                                          
24 It is important to note that for Hurka, merely aiming for the full and excellent 
development of one’s talents would suffice. It might be, for whatever reason, that the 
scientist in Hurka’s example does not achieve her goal for the full development of her 
scientific talents, but it is the fact that she aims for this goal and adopts the means to 
achieve it that counts as an instance of perfect development. The emphasis for the 
perfectionist is the active process of development, rather than the finished end of a 
certain capacity being developed. This is highlighted by the fact that Hurka laments the 
person who is content with the average development of her talents, suggesting that the 
perfectionist good is compromised when one fails to adopt the appropriate means and 
attitudes necessary for bringing about one’s excellent development. It is another question 
altogether whether or not Hurka’s claim here is compatible with his assertion that moral 
perfectionism is a version of maximising consequentialism. 
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moral and prudential goodness of talent development that I put pressure on in the 
rest of this chapter. In what follows I object to the perfectionist claim that talent 
development necessarily and objectively contributes to the excellent 
development of one’s central human capacities. I argue that there is in fact no 
support for considering talent development to be objectively ‘excellent’ in this 
way.  
 
3.3. The Excellence Objection 
Perfectionists claim that the development of one’s talents is constitutive of the 
excellent and perfect development of one’s essential human capacities. However, 
given the commitments of perfectionism, I argue that the theory is unable to 
generate the evaluative priority of talent development over the development of 
one’s other abilities and competencies; talent development is not ‘excellent’ in 
the way that perfectionists prescribe. This is for two reasons: (i) talents do not 
necessarily realise the perfection of one’s essential human capacities, and (ii) 
talents are not necessary morally good. I will deal with each in turn.  
3.3.1. Talents and Essential Human Capacities  
It is not always true that the development of one’s talents will necessarily realise 
the perfection of one’s central human capacities. In which case, there is no reason 
for the perfectionist to favour or give priority to the development of one’s talents 
over one’s competencies and non-talents. To explain, refer back to the account 
of talents raised in Chapter One. The nature of a talent is such that it manifests 
itself in the excellent acquisition of a particular skill; for someone who is talented, 
their development will come more naturally to them, allowing them to more easily 
reach a higher standard of skill than those who are not talented. But this ease of 
development may entail that the talented person does not in fact excellently 
develop their essential human capacities in the way that the perfectionist 
requires. In fact, it may be that the talented person actually uses and develops 
fewer of her central human capacities, simply because she does not need to 
develop them in order to achieve a high level of success for a particular skill. 
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This can be illustrated by an example. Two friends, Freya and Claire, are 
both developing their violin-playing abilities. It turns out that Freya is a talented 
violinist and finds that developing the necessary skills comes naturally to her, but 
Claire on the other hand is not a talented violinist, and finds developing her 
abilities rather challenging. In order to reach the same level of skill, Freya, for 
instance, will only have to practice for half an hour a day and finds this practice 
easy, whereas Claire has to practice intensely and with difficulty for two hours 
per day. 
I suggest that it is in fact Claire, not Freya, who is developing and perfecting 
her essential human capacities more fully, because in order to develop her skill, 
Claire perseveres through challenging, hard work. In most perfectionist accounts, 
practical rationality is claimed to be an essential human capacity, allowing a 
person to set coherent goals and adopt the effective means in order to achieve 
these goals. In order to develop and perfect this capacity, a person will, amongst 
other things, have to cultivate and exhibit virtues such as perseverance, patience, 
understanding and focus, as well as developing an understanding of who one is, 
how one learns, and what one’s limits are. These epistemic virtues are often only 
nurtured if a person encounters and has to overcome challenges and hard work, 
and this is not often the case if a skill comes easily and does not require 
perseverance, patience and reflection. Therefore, it is often the development of 
our mere competencies rather than the development of our talents that will work 
to perfect the capacity for practical rationality, allowing for the opportunity to 
overcome difficulty.25 Because Claire has had to develop her violinist skills from a 
lower level of competency, and as a result will have had to work hard, persevere 
and be challenged further as she develops that skill, she will as a consequence 
nurture more fully her essential human capacity for practical rationality.26 
                                                          
25 Gwen Bradford has recently offered an account of the value of achievement, stating 
that part of the value of developing our skills and talents can be found in the fact that 
doing so is difficult (Bradford 2013). 
26 In fact, Hurka himself claims that the perfection of human flourishing ought to include 
“challenging activities that are also valued for themselves” (Hurka: 128). If my argument 
holds, and talents do not embody this notion of a challenging activity, then Hurka’s claims 
regarding the perfectionist value of challenging activity and the necessary perfectionist 
good of talent development will be inconsistent.  
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The perfectionist might object to this point, and claim that if we are 
concerned about how the ease of one’s development may hinder the perfection 
of one’s human capacities, all we need to ensure is that those who are talented 
challenge themselves to a greater extent, set difficult goals and expend more 
effort in their development. Talents may still be the best candidate for perfecting 
one’s human nature because they allow a person to more efficiently and 
productively reach a higher level of skill development, especially if we ensure that 
those who are talented are given challenges fitting for their level of ability.  
 However, perfectionists do not merely claim that a person ought to develop 
her talents because they allow her to achieve high levels of skill acquisition. Their 
claim is rather that a person ought to develop her talents because doing so allows 
her to promote the excellent development of her essential human capacities, in 
order to achieve human flourishing. There is nothing in this claim that points to 
the quantity of one’s achieved skills, indicating that one has to reach the highest 
possible level of skill. Merely claiming that the development ought to be more 
difficult seems to be an ad hoc move on the part of the perfectionist. The 
perfection of one’s essential human capacities, such as practical rationality, may 
be excellently developed without achieving the highest level of skill. For example, 
if Freya has a talent for playing the violin, but a mere competency in mathematics, 
it is not necessarily the development of her violin-playing skills that will work to 
perfect her human capacity of practical rationality. As outlined above, the 
challenge and hard-work that she perseveres through in order to develop her 
competency in mathematics may in fact nurture more fully her practical 
rationality, and thus her human flourishing.  
 Furthermore, because talent is a socially relative and comparative 
phenomenon, as I discussed in Chapter One, there is nothing to say that cultivating 
one’s talents necessarily promotes the excellent development of one’s essential 
human capacities. In Chapter One, I argued for a definition of talents that depends 
on how one’s  level of ability and skill acquisition compares to others, and whether 
or not the skill that is exhibited by the development of one’s talent is valued by 
society. Just because one’s ability is valued by society, and one’s skill acquisition 
is determined to be comparatively above average, this does not mean that the 
development of that ability will necessarily promote the excellent development 
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of one’s essential human capacities. For example, it might be that Freya lives in 
a society that considers her ability for precisely identifying scents to be a talent – 
the skill is valued by society and her acquisition of the skill is considered to be 
comparatively excellent. However, just because Freya’s scent-identifying ability 
is labelled as a ‘talent’, this does not necessarily mean that its development will 
perfect her essential human capacities of practical and theoretical rationality in 
a way that is more ‘excellent’ than the development of her competency for 
mathematics. 
 Therefore, just because a particular ability or skill is determined to be a 
‘talent’, this does not mean that it will objectively and necessarily be constitutive 
of the excellent development of one’s essential human capacities. This is because 
the ease that comes with the development of one’s talents might in fact hinder 
the perfection of one’s essential human capacities. Furthermore, the fact that the 
acquisition of one’s skill is comparatively above average and is valued favourably 
by society does not entail that its development will necessarily and objectively 
promote the perfection of one’s human flourishing. As such, there is no reason for 
perfectionism to give significance to the development of one’s talent over the 
development of other competencies that one might have. 
3.3.2. Talents and Moral Value 
The second reason to doubt the perfectionist’s claim that developing one’s talents 
is necessarily constitutive of excellent human flourishing, is that a person may 
have a talent for a skill that we deem to be morally impermissible in some way. 
It might be that when a skill is developed in certain ways, the skill will give rise 
to morally blameworthy behaviour – for example, the skill to burgle or lock-pick, 
or to wield a knife or a gun with the intention to cause harm. The development of 
such talents may in fact promote one’s practical and theoretical reason, or 
whatever capacity you consider to count as an essential human capacity, but the 
development of that talent will not be unconditionally and objectively good. In 
fact, expressing such a talent may seem to lack moral worth and goodness 
altogether. The perfectionist cannot, as a result, claim that developing any talent 
is good, but only the development of those talents that are considered to be 
morally permissible. Therefore, developing one’s talent is not unconditionally and 
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objectively good or excellent in the way that perfectionism claims, but is 
conditional on other factors that determine the appropriateness and permissibility 
of the expression of one’s talents.27  
  This objection is more of a problem for moral perfectionism than it is for 
the welfare perfectionist, because moral perfectionism makes claims about what 
is unconditionally morally good. The fact that developing one’s talents can be 
shown to be only conditionally good, based on other moral considerations that are 
not derived from the principles of moral perfectionism itself, highlights that the 
moral perfectionist’s claims about the unconditional moral value of talent 
development are implausible, and that in fact talent development is not always 
morally good. The welfare perfectionist, by contrast, does not need to make such 
a claim about the moral good, but instead specifies that developing one’s talent 
is prudentially good. In this way, welfare perfectionism is not affected by the 
objection that developing one’s talents may actually be morally wrong.28 
 However, I argue that welfare perfectionism is vulnerable to another 
objection that has a similar structure to the one just raised against moral 
perfectionism, that developing one’s talents is not always morally good because 
there are cases in which developing one’s talent may be morally wrong. I reject 
the welfare perfectionist’s claim that developing one’s talents is prudentially good 
because there are cases in which developing one’s talents may not be prudentially 
                                                          
27 Hurka states that perfectionism is in fact a version of consequentialism, such that we 
ought to maximise perfection for all agents and to promote “the greatest development 
of human nature by all humans everywhere” (Hurka: 55). This might mean that Hurka has 
a response to the objection just raised, claiming that if the development of one’s talents 
hinders the promotion of others developing their essential human capacities, then this 
would not be considered as morally good. However, there still may be circumstances in 
which developing one’s talents does not result in the hindrance of another’s flourishing, 
yet still be thought of as immoral due to the harm it may cause. There is nothing to say 
that all instances of harm to others necessarily results in a lack of their human flourishing, 
for example, lying to someone need not harm the development of their central human 
capacities; at least, the burden of proof is on Hurka to prove that we ought to accept this 
claim. 
28 It might be that what is prudentially good for us does incorporate to some extent the 
concerns of morality. However, this is far from uncontroversial, and for the purposes of 
the discussion in this chapter all that one needs to admit is that it is not necessarily the 
case that our prudential concerns ought to reflect what is morally permissible or required. 
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good. We have good reason to doubt the unconditional and objective prudential 
value of talent development insofar as it may be implausibly alienating for an 
agent, as I will now discuss. 
 
3.4. Two Intuitive Cases against Perfectionism 
Welfare perfectionism claims that developing one’s talents is an objective 
prudential good because doing so most excellently perfects our human nature, 
and this perfection is constitutive of one’s well-being. So, one has a pro tanto 
prudential reason to develop one’s talents, and the prudential goodness attached 
to the development of one’s talents is objective – that is, it does not depend on 
one’s attitudes towards doing so. In the remainder of this chapter I argue that this 
claim is implausible, and that developing one’s talents is not necessary and 
objectively prudentially good. This is because developing one’s talents may clash 
with other normative commitments and fail to constitute part of a person’s well-
being. I begin to present this objection by exploring two intuitive examples in 
which it seems that the development of one’s talent neither objectively nor 
necessarily constitutes, or contributes to, an agent’s well-being. 
3.4.1. The Miserable Philosopher 
The first example case is presented by Wayne Sumner, describing a talented 
philosopher who has up until now pursued a life as a professional philosopher. 
However, after some consideration, the philosopher realises that he is miserable, 
and the thought of further pursuing a philosophical career fills him with dread. 
The philosopher considers himself to be much better-off leading an intellectually 
unstimulating and laid-back life that fails to exhibit the full development of his 
talents (Sumner: 24, also cited in Haybron: 7). For sake of argument, let’s assume 
that the philosopher has led an all-things-considered balanced life, with each of 
his essential human capacities being developed to the amount as deemed 
appropriate for the perfectionist. Let’s also assume that the reason behind the 
philosopher’s negative feelings towards his talent is not motivated by laziness or 
weakness of will. Instead, what motivates the philosopher’s misery is that the 
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further development of his philosophical talent does not engage him in any 
meaningful way that positively corresponds or contributes to the things that he 
values in his life. The philosopher’s negative attitude towards the development of 
his talents does not occur as a result of a distorted self-image or an instance of 
self-sabotage, but due to his considered reflection about who he is, what he 
values, and the kind of life that he wants for himself. 
The perfectionist29 would claim that what is in fact prudentially good for 
the philosopher is the full development of his philosophical talent. Failing to 
further develop his talent will mean that the philosopher’s life has less prudential 
value, and as a result reduces his level of well-being. The example, however, aims 
to nudge our intuitions by suggesting that the philosopher’s misery when 
continuing to develop his talent casts doubt on whether we would really want to 
accept that doing so is prudentially good for him. Of course, whether one’s misery 
affects the claim that developing one’s talents is prudentially valuable depends 
on what type of reasons one has for being miserable; I will go on to argue that it 
is one’s lack of endorsement that provides the best reason for thinking that one’s 
misery can refute the claim that talent development is prudentially valuable. 
Before arguing for this claim, however, I present a second example, which aims 
to demonstrate the divergence between talent development and well-being 
without relying on negative emotional reactions like misery, as in this first 
example. 
3.4.2. Multi-talented Mandy 
Mandy is lucky to have more than one talent; not only is she a talented creative 
writer, but she is also a talented tennis player and has a talent for memorising 
sequences of numbers. Let’s also assume that Mandy has so far led a well-balanced 
life, but unfortunately circumstances are such that now she can only choose to 
fully develop one of her talents, perhaps due to financial or time constraints. 
                                                          
29 For ease of reference, in this and the proceeding sections of this chapter, I will now 
use the generic term ‘perfectionism’ when discussing welfare perfectionism, unless 
otherwise specified. 
90 
 
 
 
Mandy now needs to consider which talent she should develop for her life to go 
better. 
The perfectionist would claim that Mandy should develop the talent that 
will most excellently promote and perfect her human nature. Depending on the 
account of human nature offered, different versions of perfectionism will offer 
different suggestions. For example, Hurka and Green think that the development 
of one’s practical and theoretical rationality constitutes one’s human flourishing, 
in which case Mandy should to develop the talent which is considered to best 
promote her practical or theoretical rationality. Given that Mandy can only choose 
one talent, the perfectionist’s decision might be based on the skill for which she 
has the most talent and thus displays most excellence; Mandy might be slightly 
more talented at playing tennis and so be able to achieve more perfection and 
excellence from its development than if she developed her creative writing skills. 
It might also be that Mandy’s ability to memorise sequences of numbers is deemed 
to be less expressive of human development; for example, it may utilise fewer 
processes of complex ability, or have less chance of being excellently developed 
and improved. In this case, the perfectionist would recommend that Mandy only 
develop her number-memory skills if no other option were available to her. This, 
however, is speculative; the right answer for the perfectionist would depend on 
the empirical facts about Mandy’s talents and what they can offer for the full and 
excellent development of her essential human capacities.  
The crucial point is that perfectionism fails to ask the question that most 
of us would ask, I think, when trying to decide which talent Mandy should develop. 
Instead of merely determining what would exhibit the most perfection of her 
human nature, we would ask which talent Mandy wants to develop, or, which 
talent would be most fitting for Mandy’s personality and what she considers to be 
of value in her own life. The perfectionist, however, considers the development 
of a talent as good for Mandy simpliciter, without giving enough or any importance 
to how that development fits with Mandy’s own conception of the good life. This 
ignores Mandy’s own capacity to assess her set of talents in relation to her own 
values and what she determines to be good. As a result, perfectionism has the 
potential to prescribe the development of a talent as being prudentially good for 
Mandy, even though it may conflict with her desires or wishes, her conception of 
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the good life, and her fundamental values and commitments. In the next section 
I argue that for any theory of well-being, this conflict should be avoided due to 
the fact that it gives rise to the worry of alienation. I conclude that perfectionism, 
as it stands, is unsuccessful in its attempts to avoid this worry. 
 
3.5. Alienation and Talent Development 
3.5.1. Deep Normative Commitments 
The two example cases described above highlight the intuition that developing a 
talent cannot be constitutive of, or contribute to one’s well-being if it does not 
fit with one’s sense of self and conception of the good life. As a result, the claim 
made by perfectionists, that talent development is objectively and necessarily 
prudentially good for an agent, initially seems to be counter-intuitive. In this 
section, I argue that the lack of fit between talent development and one’s own 
personal commitments is indeed worrying for perfectionism, because without this 
fit, the development of one’s talent will in fact turn out to be ‘alienating’ (Rosati 
1996: 289-9; Railton 2003: 47). This worry of alienation poses a serious challenge 
for objectivist theories of well-being, and I argue that in order to avoid the 
challenge that alienation poses, a theory of well-being must only prescribe 
prudential goods that fit with an agent’s sense of self and conception of the good 
life and insofar, not alienating. In what follows I will explain in more detail what 
constitutes this worry of alienation when it comes to talent development, but 
before I do there are two initial qualifications to make. 
 First, when it is claimed that an agent’s good must fit with their ‘sense of 
self’, this is not a reference to a metaphysical notion of selfhood or personal 
identity. Instead, we are referring to a person’s normative conception of 
themselves and the values that they hold. This is why it is often claimed that the 
fit in question is between an agent’s good and their conception of the good life – 
that is, what one values and what one deems to be normatively significant in one’s 
life. For example, Korsgaard claims that this normative self should be understood 
“as a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions 
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to be worth undertaking” (Korsgaard 1996: 83), and Carbonell simply explains it 
as one’s “personality” (Carbonell: 5). As such, one’s sense of self is that which 
dictates the values that one adopts as part of the good life, and provides one with 
reasons for action as a result of these values. 
 The second qualification to make is to tighten the notion of what counts as 
the kind of value with which one’s good should fit in order for it not to be 
alienating. It might be, for example, that one’s good often conflicts with trivial 
desires and commitments. For example, the good that comes with being a caring 
and attentive parent may sometimes conflict with one’s passing desire to be 
unburdened by children, so that one can go out with friends or take a quiet holiday 
retreat. However, this type of desire is not the kind of thing that a plausible 
version of well-being would require to fit with an agent’s prudential good (Yelle: 
372). If it was, then this would mean that what constitutes one’s well-being ought 
to fit with and satisfy all kinds of trivial and fleeting desires, such as a spur of the 
moment whim for ice-cream, a spontaneous and uncharacteristic aggressive 
reaction, or a fleeting desire to be child-free just for one night in order to get 
some sleep. This result would make for a highly unattractive account of the nature 
of well-being, because it would mean that one’s trivial desires could legitimately 
trump goods that are considered to have significant prudential value.  
 Instead, I propose that the kind of values that we should refer to as 
constituting one’s sense of self are those that determine an agent’s deep 
normative commitments and shape her conception of the good life, giving 
significance to objects and states of affairs that are deeply meaningful in her life. 
These deep commitments are not mere preferences or interests, the satisfaction 
of which is convenient and good for an agent at the time (Moseley: 60). Instead, 
they are commitments “around which our lives are organised” (Scheffler 1992: 
123) and bestow our lives with meaning and significance; they “lend meaning and 
importance to the agent’s life, and it is under this description that they are 
perceived as important and authoritative” (Bagnoli: 5, see also Rivera: 71). As 
such, these commitments persist and play a functional role in shaping and 
constituting who we are and the values that we consider to be authoritative over 
our lives. With this qualification in mind, my claim is that in order to avoid the 
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worry of alienation, a theory of well-being must only prescribe prudential goods 
that fit with an agent’s deep normative commitments.  
In a theory that doesn’t posit this fit between an agent’s good and her 
deeply held normative commitments, what is thought to be prudentially good for 
that agent has the potential to conflict with her sense of self and conception of 
the good life. This tension is described by Railton as a form of alienation, “a kind 
of estrangement, distancing, or separateness (not necessarily consciously 
attended to) resulting in some sort of loss” (Railton 1984: 134). For the purposes 
of my argument, I suggest that we use the word ‘alienation’ as a term of art, to 
denote the negative implications of a lack of fit between an agent’s good and her 
deep normative commitments when it comes to developing her talents. To be 
alienated from one’s deep normative commitments just means that one will have 
to forgo and compromise something that is a significant and a meaningful part of 
one’s life. 
The loss that is experienced due to this lack of fit can be explained in 
various ways. For example, Brink explains this loss as grounded in the value of 
authenticity; he claims that authenticity requires acting on ideals that the agent 
accepts and in doing so means that she is ‘faithful’ to the values that form who 
she is and the kind of person that she wants to be (Brink: 215, 239). Chappell, on 
the other hand, refers to the value of integrity, understood as being honest about 
what one values and refusing to compromise those values (Chappell: 256),30 whilst 
Rosati explains the loss in terms of a reduction in autonomy, such that the agent 
is no longer guided by her own values and what she considers to be important in 
her life (Rosati 2006: 43-44).31 
                                                          
30 Dworkin too appeals to the notion of ‘integrity’: “A life lived with integrity is lived 
according to our own personal ethical conviction. When others intervene to induce us to 
live lives that we regret or fail to endorse, they intrude on the integrity of our lives” 
(Dworkin 2000: 244, see also 248-249 and 270-274). Bernard Williams also appeals to the 
value of integrity (see Williams 1981). 
31 Ben Colburn similarly appeals to the connection between endorsement and autonomy, 
as “a value which consists in an agent deciding for herself what is valuable, and living her 
life in accordance with that decision, where that amounts to an agent successfully 
pursuing values, which she endorses under conditions of judgemental independence. It is 
central to this conception of autonomy that it consists in individuals not just shaping their 
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 These three accounts appeal to different values to explain the loss 
experienced when an agent is alienated from what is considered to be prudentially 
good for her. What these accounts have in common is the claim that when a state 
of affairs does not fit with one’s deep normative commitments, then acting to 
bring about that state of affairs can conflict with one’s own ideals and compromise 
the values that determine who one is. So, when a person acts according to a 
conception of the good that she does not value as part of or complimentary to her 
deeply held ideals and commitments, this means that there is a conflict and 
tension with those significant and meaningful parts of her life. Acting contrary to 
one’s deeply held normative commitments will result in alienation, and this 
alienation counts as a loss in well-being; it is this loss of well-being that renders 
alienation problematic for a theory of well-being. It seems implausible that a 
theory of well-being will claim something to be a constitutive part of one’s 
prudential good, even though it has the potential to significantly reduce one’s 
level of well-being. I will now go on to explain how this alienation can occur with 
regards to the development of one’s talents. 
3.5.2. Internal and External Commitments 
Alasdair MacIntyre makes a distinction between the internal and external goods 
that come with certain practices. This distinction can be adapted to explain the 
way in which developing one’s talents may conflict with one’s deeply held 
normative commitments. I argue that the practice of developing a talent can 
result in a conflict with one’s deep normative commitments with regards to both 
the internal and external commitments that are necessarily required when 
bringing about the development of that talent. 
When we develop a talent there comes with it certain required 
commitments and standards that have to be met in order to successfully engage 
in the expression and cultivation of the skill that the talent is indexed to. Some 
of these commitments are external to the specific talent in question. As MacIntyre 
terms it, these external commitments are “contingently attached” to the practice 
                                                          
own lives through their actions and decision, but also having authority over what counts 
a success or failure in their lives, in the sense that it is their judgement about what is 
valuable which sets the relevant standard” (Colburn 2014: 258, see also 267, fn. 14). 
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“by the accidents of social circumstance” (MacIntyre: 188). For example, it might 
be that successfully developing one’s talent for acting also requires you to be able 
to cope with the pressures of maintaining a high-profile public life. This is not 
necessarily required by the specific development of your acting skills, but it may 
come as a contingent aspect of it, due to the way in which actors are currently 
given celebrity status. A talented philosopher, by contrast, may have to accept 
that if she continues to develop her talent then her career will unlikely offer great 
financial reward. Again, this is not unique to the development of philosophical 
talent, nor is it a necessary aspect of it, but it is contingently true given the time 
and place in which the talent is developed.  
Some of the practices and standards that come with the development of a 
talent, however, are unique and inherent to the specific talent that is being 
cultivated – they are ‘internal’ to that specific talent, and need to be committed 
to if one is to engage in its development. MacIntyre uses the example of chess: 
the internal commitments of the practice of chess are the ones relevant 
specifically to the game of chess (MacIntyre: 188). The internal commitments 
necessary for the development of that particular practice specify the “standards 
of excellence and obedience to rules” that are required to bring about the 
achievement of that development. When we develop a practice, we enter into 
this by “accept[ing] the authority of those standards” and “subject [our] own 
attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and 
partially define the practice” (MacIntyre: 190). 
When developing a talent, we will often need to align ourselves not just 
with the external commitments that come conditionally with the development, 
but also with the standards that the development of the specific skill requires. 
For example, when nurturing one’s talent for swimming, this will require one to 
be the kind of person that chooses to wake up early in the morning for practice 
sessions, change one’s diet and body shape, and refuse to engage in certain 
activities that will hinder one’s physical progress. These internal commitments 
are normative – they give you reasons to act in certain ways and to constrain the 
choices that you make, rendering you accountable to the standards and values set 
by those commitments. As such, bringing about the development of one’s talent 
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requires certain normative commitments that are both external and internal to 
the relevant necessary practices. 
If the internal and external commitments required for developing one’s 
talent do not fit with one’s deep normative commitments, a conflict will arise 
that has the potential to significantly reduce one’s well-being in the ways already 
described above. It might be that the requirement to maintain a high-profile in 
public life will conflict with one’s deeply held value for privacy; it may be that 
one’s personal project to climb Mount Everest creates friction with the internal 
time commitments necessary for developing one’s musical abilities; or it may be 
that the development of one’s talent will require the neglect of various aspects 
of one’s life that are of deep significance, such as spending time with loved ones 
and helping those in need. Thus, if the internal and external commitments 
necessary for bringing about the development of a talent hinder or cause an agent 
to neglect one’s own deep normative commitments, then the development of 
one’s talent is alienating, and will likely result in a loss of well-being. 
As it stands, perfectionism is subject to this alienation worry. It claims that 
developing one’s talents is objectively good for us, constitutive of an agent’s well-
being, even though doing so has the potential to cause an alienating conflict with 
that agent’s deep normative commitments. I will now go on to consider the ways 
in which perfectionists have attempted to respond to this worry of alienation. 
3.5.3. Hybrid Perfectionism 
The most successful attempt at avoiding the alienation worry for perfectionism 
has been to forego a commitment to pure perfectionism and adopt a hybrid view, 
claiming that an agent’s enjoyment or pleasure is necessary for perfectionist well-
being; that is, perfectionist activity is only perfect or excellent if it is also 
enjoyed. In this way, an agent’s pro-attitude towards a state of affairs is necessary 
for that state of affairs to be considered as a constitutive part of her well-being. 
For example, Robert Adams claims that “what is good for a person is a life 
characterized by enjoyment of the excellent” (Adams: 93), where what is 
‘excellent’ is determined objectively as a perfectionist good. Similarly, Kraut 
claims that well-being consists in the enjoyment of using and developing our 
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distinctive human powers, sometimes experienced as when the development of 
those capacities is “perceive[d] with pleasure” (Kraut: 161, 163). 
For both Adams and Kraut, pleasure and enjoyment are a necessary part of 
what makes something prudentially good for an agent, but are significant only 
when those pro-attitudes are directed towards, and are for the use of, objective 
perfectionist goods. As Haybron explains, enjoyment and pleasure are derivatively 
significant for the hybrid perfectionist, only insofar as they allow a perfectionist 
good to be realised (Haybron: 13). The hybrid perfectionist will thus maintain that 
we ought to enjoy what is deemed to be objectively good for us, and our 
enjoyment is merely in the service of promoting those already determined 
perfectionist goods.32 With regards to talent development, the claim would be 
that talent development is objectively valuable in its own right; however, without 
an agent’s pro-attitude toward the development of her talent, then that 
development doesn’t constitute a part of her well-being. This means that we can 
still claim developing talents is valuable simpliciter, but maintain that doing so is 
prudentially good for an agent only if that agent enjoys it in some way. 
This hybrid account would not be accepted by most perfectionists, who 
claim that well-being is constituted by the objective goodness of the development 
of one’s essential human capacities. This goodness is determined irrespective of 
any desire, feeling or attitudes that we have towards those goods: an agent’s pro-
attitude is not necessary for perfectionist activity to be good, but merely acts as 
a bonus or accompaniment to that activity (Hurka: 27; Haybron: 14; Wilkinson 
2003). However, the hybrid account does initially seem more considerate of 
potential alienation worries, because it considers an agent’s positive attitude 
towards the state of affairs in question to be necessary when determining whether 
or not talent development constitutes the agent’s prudential good. In this case, 
there is more likely to be a fit with the agent’s deep normative commitments. 
There is an initial objection to the hybrid perfectionist account as it stands: 
it is not clear why the enjoyment or pleasure that an agent has towards a state of 
                                                          
32 For further examples of similar hybrid accounts, see Kagan (2009), Darwall (1997); 
Parfit (1984), Griffin (1986), Raz (1988) and Sumner (1996). 
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affairs necessarily means that the state of affairs fits with her deep normative 
commitments. For example, there are many times when developing one’s talents 
is not very enjoyable or pleasurable. In fact, there are times when we detest 
having to develop our talents, and find engaging in the internal and external 
commitments frustrating or painful – think of athletes who constantly push their 
bodies to extreme levels of pain in order to reach maximum levels of fitness, 
writers who spend days trying to overcome writer’s block, and musicians 
practicing mind-numbingly boring scales and studies so that they master correct 
technique. It would be a welcome bonus if during these times we found pleasure 
in doing what we know we ought to, but it’s not clear why we have to consider 
that pleasure as a necessary part of what makes nurturing our talents good for us. 
This problem can’t be avoided just by stating that the agent must at least 
be disposed to take pleasure in such an activity in the right circumstances, for 
there is no need for the agent to be disposed to find something pleasurable or 
enjoyable for it to compliment her deep normative commitments. There is no 
reason why we should necessarily expect the athlete to be disposed to find 
pleasurable the extreme pain that he undergoes in order to push his body to the 
limit, or the writer to be disposed to enjoy the experience of her writer’s block, 
even if that pleasure is to occur only after the fact. As a result, enjoyment and 
pleasure are the not the right kind of pro-attitude to be included in the hybrid 
perfectionist view.  
Instead, I argue that if hybrid perfectionism is to successfully accommodate 
the prescription that an account of well-being must fit with an agent’s deep 
normative commitments, the perfectionist ought to include the agent’s 
‘endorsement’ of the perfectionist good as a necessary part of the agent’s well-
being, and not merely ‘enjoyment’. In order for something that is considered to 
have objective perfectionist value to be prudentially good for an agent, that agent 
must endorse it as part of, or complimentary to, her deep normative 
commitments. This means that for talent development to be prudentially good for 
an agent, the agent must endorse the internal and external commitments that are 
necessary for the realisation of that development. This endorsement is a necessary 
and constituent part of what makes the talent development prudentially good for 
the agent. As a result, even though we may accept, for sake of argument, the 
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perfectionist claim that there is intrinsic objective goodness in developing one’s 
talents, we nonetheless consider the prudential goodness in developing a talent 
to depend on an agent’s endorsement of it. In the next section I explain in more 
detail the nature of this endorsement and consider further objections to this 
modified hybrid perfectionist account. 
 
3.6. The Endorsement Constraint 
In the last section I suggested that in order for something that has perfectionist 
value to be prudentially good for an agent, that agent must endorse it as part of, 
or complimentary to, her deep normative commitments. Without this 
endorsement, perfectionism offers a theory of well-being that is potentially 
alienating. The importance of an agent’s endorsement when determining the 
prudential goodness of talent development can be included into a theory of well-
being as a constraint: 
Endorsement Constraint. Talent Development T is prudentially good for 
agent A if and only if A endorses the normative commitments that are 
necessarily required to bring about T, as part of or complimentary to A’s 
deeply held normative commitments. 
In this section I explain and argue for the endorsement constraint, as well as 
respond to objections that can be brought against it. In doing so, I am considering 
a possible amendment to welfare perfectionism that potentially allows the theory 
to deal with the worry of alienation. 
3.6.1. Endorsement 
An agent’s endorsement of what is good for her is a considered reflection about 
what that agent has reason to value as part of her deep normative commitments 
and conception of the good life. As such, endorsement is not merely an affective 
state, but also involves an evaluative judgement and a motivational component. 
If an agent endorses the development of her talent, she decides and accepts that 
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it is valuable to her, and also forms an intention to commit to developing her 
talent, making that development a part of her life. 
As Joseph Raz explains, an agent’s endorsement transforms what might 
have been an ‘impersonal’ value into a personal or prudential value. So, for 
example, if the perfectionist claims that developing one’s talent has positive 
value, without an agent’s endorsement this value is merely ‘impersonal’ and does 
not say anything about whether developing a talent is good for that particular 
agent. If an agent endorses the development of her talent, however, it means that 
she has reflected on the value of the impersonal goodness of doing so, and the 
way in which that good can be incorporated as part of her own life and her own 
deep personal commitments. Without this endorsement, what might be an 
impersonal good, with a positive value indexed to it in some way, is not 
incorporated into an agent’s own life and personal projects, and as such is not 
prudentially good. In this way, one’s endorsement makes the development of 
one’s talent prudentially good (see Raz 1986: 288-295; Raz 1999: 63-64). 
 One way we might amend a theory of well-being in order to incorporate the 
need for an agent’s endorsement, is to shift to a fully subjective theory, stating 
that what is prudentially good for an agent is completely determined as response-
dependent, so that there is no need to appeal to what might have objective 
impersonal value. In this way, what has prudential value is determined entirely by 
what an agent endorses. However, for perfectionism to accommodate the worry 
of alienation and to accommodate an agent’s endorsement as that which avoids 
this alienation, there is no need to adopt a fully subjectivist theory. After all, the 
endorsement constraint is merely a necessary constraint, rather than a full 
account of the nature of well-being. The endorsement constraint only requires us 
to accept the following claim: given that talent development has some initial 
positive value indexed to it, this does not necessarily entail that talent 
development is prudentially good for a particular agent unless that agent also 
endorses doing so as part of, or complimentary to, her deeply held normative 
commitments.  
 For an agent to endorse the development of her talent, her evaluative 
judgement must include reflection on whether the internal and external 
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commitments that come with the development of her talent fit with her deeply 
held normative commitments. For example, whether or not the development of 
Mandy’s artistic talent is prudentially good for her will be determined (at least in 
part) by whether Mandy endorses the development of that talent. To arrive at a 
decision on this, Mandy will reflect on whether the commitments that come with 
developing her talent fit with her own deep normative commitments and 
conception of the good life. 
 It might be that Mandy’s deep normative commitments clash. For example, 
perhaps the commitments that come with developing her artistic talent will 
require her to neglect aspects of her life that also have personal significance, such 
as spending time with her children. The endorsement constraint, however, does 
not need to prescribe a decision-making method for each agent to follow in order 
to resolve such a personal conflict. What the endorsement constraint does amount 
to is the claim that once the agent has resolved this conflict and decided whether 
or not developing her talent fits with her deeply held normative commitments, it 
is the agent’s endorsement that constitutes the prudential goodness of the 
development of her talent. As long as Mandy has good reasons for arriving at the 
endorsement of her talent development, therefore, it is this endorsement that 
makes the development of her talent prudentially good for her.  
3.6.2. The Correctness Objection 
There is one very obvious objection to the endorsement constraint I have just 
described. A person’s judgements about their deep normative commitments and 
what fits with them can be mistaken and ill-formed. This means that alienating 
an agent from her deep normative commitments might not be such a bad thing; 
sometimes alienation will have the good consequence of distancing an agent from 
a situation that is actually bad for her, highlighting the mistakes that she has made 
with regards to her own judgement of the situation (Railton 1986: 147). 
The beliefs and preferences that inform what we value and endorse can be 
adapted, distorted, and deformed in various ways. Wilkinson, for example, 
suggests that there are four categories of mistakes that an agent can make when 
deciding whether she endorses a particular good: mistakes of fact, value, 
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reasoning, and in the application of judgement (Wilkinson: 196). Even if this list 
is not exhaustive, the worry still holds; if an agent is mistaken about what is of 
value, then her well-being cannot plausibly be constituted in part by her own 
endorsement, as she may have just endorsed wrongly (Wall: 197). For ease, I will 
call this objection the ‘correctness objection’.33 
 To highlight the worry of mistaken endorsement, Wilkinson gives the 
example of a religious person, let’s call him John, who spends his time as part of 
a church congregation, worshipping and fundraising for a preacher who he finds 
to be enigmatic and trustworthy. However, in reality the preacher is fraudulent – 
he does not believe in the message he preaches and uses the money raised to fund 
an extravagant and self-indulgent lifestyle. Wilkinson claims that there has to be 
an objective and endorsement-independent fact of the matter with regards to 
whether or not being a follower of the preacher is part of John’s prudential good. 
In this case, John is mistaken about the facts of the situation because they have 
been hidden from him. Even though John actually does endorse being a committed 
follower of the preacher, and considers doing so to be fitting with his deep 
normative commitments, Wilkinson claims that it is not prudentially good for him 
because of these hidden facts (Wilkinson: 180). 
Consider an alternative example of a subdued and dominated house-
husband who is oppressed by his wife (Sumner: 156-170). Under these conditions, 
the husband accepts his identity as a submissive and abused partner, so does not 
consider his ill-treatment as conflicting with his deep normative commitments. In 
fact, due to the manipulation inflicted on him by his wife, the husband endorses 
this ill-treatment as fitting with his own convictions about what is good for him. 
In this case, we might think that alienating the husband from his normative 
convictions would be good for him, because he is fundamentally mistaken about 
the value of the situation and what constitutes proper treatment. The husband’s 
endorsement does not accurately track what is prudentially good for him. 
                                                          
33 For those who argue for the correctness objection or an objection very similar, see 
Brandt (1996), Lazenby (2016), Nussbaum (2001), Rosati (1995), Sen (1989), and Sumner 
(1996). 
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We can reply to the correctness objection by re-stating that the 
endorsement constraint is not a full theory of well-being, but is merely a necessary 
constraint on a theory of well-being. This constraint leaves room for the claim 
that some actions, objects or state of affairs may not have impersonal value, and 
one’s endorsement cannot miraculously transform something that is not 
impersonally valuable into something that has prudential value. With regards to 
the example of John, the endorsement constraint leaves space for the claim that 
in fact following a fraudulent preacher is not impersonally valuable, and so one’s 
endorsement of it does not make it a constitutive part of one’s well-being. As for 
the dominated house-husband, we could similarly deny that being manipulated is 
impersonally valuable, so that the husband’s manipulated endorsement of ill-
treatment does not make it a constitutive part of his well-being. This means that 
the endorsement constraint still leaves room for the possibility that one’s 
endorsement does not make something prudentially good if it is directed towards 
something that has no impersonal value. 
3.6.3. The Idealisation Clause 
The proponent of the correctness objection, however, might further reply that 
even if something does have impersonal value, it could still be the case than an 
agent is mistaken about whether or not it fits with her deeply held normative 
commitments. The agent might fail to endorse something that she may have 
endorsed if she was not mistaken, or endorse something that she would not have 
endorsed if she was not mistaken. To alleviate this worry of mistaken 
endorsement, I propose that we include a counter-factual idealisation clause as 
part of the endorsement constraint. This idealisation clause states that talent 
development is prudentially good for an agent if she would endorse it under 
idealised conditions that mitigate for mistaken beliefs and judgements. What 
constitutes these idealised conditions will differ according to how strong or weak 
we think the condition ought to be. 
 Strong idealisation conditions have usually been formulated in terms of full-
information and full-rationality. For example, Peter Railton’s idealisation clause 
claims that an agent’s prudential good consists in what he would pursue were he 
“to contemplate his present situation from a standpoint fully and vividly informed 
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about himself and his circumstances, and entirely free of cognitive error or lapses 
of instrumental rationality” (Railton 2003: 14). Robert Firth similarly claims that 
the ideal agent is “omniscient, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, 
consistent, and normal in other respects” (Firth 1952, cited in Enoch: 759, see 
also Rosati 1995: 297). What these strong idealisation accounts have in common is 
the fact that under ideal conditions, an agent will be fully informed about the 
facts of the situation, and will be fully rational so as to avoid cognitive error when 
making decisions about what is valuable to her. 
These strong accounts face two objections, the first raises a cognitive issue, 
and the second, a motivational concerns. First, it seems impossible that a person 
will ever be fully informed or rational in the way that is prescribed (Sobel 1994: 
784-810). A fully ideal person would have to be able to receive and understand all 
the various points of view that come with different states of affairs and 
experiences, and at the same time have the capacity to retain the information 
gathered from this in order to make effective decisions about what the actual 
agent ought to endorse. As Rosati has argued, for an agent to have these capacities 
she would need to be super-human, and this means that knowledge about an 
agent’s well-being will only be accessible to those who possess these super-human 
capacities. This is problematic because it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, that 
any human could ever attain such idealised capacities or be in an epistemic 
position to access the information that is accumulated whilst under these idealised 
conditions (Rosati 1995: 299, 315-317).34 
Second, if the ideal agent is one that is fully informed and fully rational, it 
seems as if that agent will be far removed in cognitive abilities and life experience 
from the actual agent whose well-being we are considering (Rosati 1995: 311; 
                                                          
34 Rosati gives a long and detailed list of the super-human qualities that this strongly ideal 
agent must possess: “At a minimum, she would have to have capacities of reason, 
memory, and imagination far surpassing those she actually has. She would have to be able 
to have all the necessary experiences and keep them clearly before her mind, 
remembering them as experienced in themselves and as experienced in relation to what 
comes before and after. In addition, she would have to retain features of her personality 
that enable her to experience her lives as she would as the persons living them, desiring 
and being motivated as he would be from within those lives, while losing all features of 
her personality that keep her from absorbing information” (Rosati 1995: 310). 
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Railton 2003: 21). As a result, what the ideal agent would endorse may be very 
different from what the actual agent would endorse. This means that the actual 
agent will find it difficult to accept and endorse that which the ideal agent claims 
to be prudentially good for her (Lazenby: 196). In this way, even if we do include 
the idealisation clause into the endorsement constraint, the actual agent may still 
be alienated from what is considered to constitute her well-being, and this was 
the exact problem that the endorsement constraint was trying to avoid.35  
 Given these two objections, the counterfactual idealisation clause that is 
to be incorporated into the endorsement constraint should not appeal to an agent 
being fully informed and fully rational. Instead, I propose that the agent should 
be under ‘optimal’ conditions, such that she is optimally informed and optimally 
rational. These conditions are ones that enable an actual agent to make an optimal 
decision about what is valuable to her and what fits with her deeply held 
normative commitments, as she is now. In order to be under these optimal 
conditions, the agent does not need to undergo drastic changes to her cognitive 
abilities, nor does she need to experience every point of view that comes with a 
potential way of life. Instead, the agent merely needs to be in conducive epistemic 
and cognitive conditions that are optimal for making good decisions and critically 
reflecting on her life as it is now. Rosati claims that these conditions are 
“whatever normally attainable conditions we ordinarily regard optimal for 
reflecting on judgements and making decisions about our own good. Such 
conditions include that a person is paying attention, that she be free from 
emotional distress or neurotic worries, and that she not be over-looking readily 
available information” (Rosati 1995: 300, 324; see also Dorsey 2012: 1). 
 There may be a danger that the way in which these optimal conditions are 
specified will be ad hoc and collapse into the kinds of fully idealised conditions 
that have just been argued against (Enoch: 766-769). As such, there needs to be 
a principled reason for why we limit what counts as improved counterfactual 
conditions to be optimal, rather than fully idealised. Given the objections to the 
full idealisation conditions described above, the desiderata for such a limit must 
be that (a) the counter-factual conditions are not impossible to attain, and (b) the 
                                                          
35 On this objection see also Tiffany (2003) and Sobel (2001, 2009). 
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actual agent is not alienated from what her counterfactual self would endorse. 
Therefore, I propose that the counterfactual conditions in question are no longer 
‘optimal’ but worryingly fully ideal, at the point at which we cease to regard the 
agent as the same agent as she is now; this would be when the counterfactual 
agent and the actual agent no longer hold the same deep normative commitments 
that shape who they are and determine their conception of the good life.36 
For example, when making a decision about whether I ought to develop my 
talent for playing the clarinet, I would not be expected to be fully informed about 
each alternative and the kind of person I would be when pursuing these 
alternatives, nor would I be expected to be completely rational, avoiding all bias 
or cognitive error; being fully idealised in this way would alter who I am. Instead, 
I will only be expected to be as informed and rational as I can be in order to make 
an optimal decision about whether developing my talent will fit with my deep 
normative commitments, as they are now. There is no reason why I need to be 
fully idealised to make this kind of optimal decision. 
It could be argued that without perfectly idealised epistemic and cognitive 
capacities, an agent will lack critical information or evaluative capacities that are 
necessary to judge whether a state of affairs or object does indeed fit with her 
deeply held normative commitments. However, an agent who is under optimal 
decision-making conditions and who cares about her well-being will be inclined to 
make as informed and rational a decision as possible. As a result, even if the agent 
does initially lack important information, being under optimal decision-making 
conditions will require that she compensates for this lack just enough to make a 
                                                          
36 There may be further worries about this specification of optimal conditions and the way 
in which they differ from fully idealised conditions. For example, it is not clear where the 
limit that I have specified will lie, and if it is possible to ever locate such a limit; this is 
because every new piece of information or change in cognitive abilities, even if they are 
small changes necessary for making good and optimal decisions, may potentially have an 
impact on an agent’s character and her deeply held normative commitments. The limit 
that I specify also requires an agent’s identity to be stable enough such that we can judge 
an agent to be the ‘same’ agent at different points in time. For sake of argument in this 
chapter, I accept that there is a burden of proof to specify what these optimal conditions 
are in such a way that is not vague or problematically ad hoc. Given the fact that fully 
idealised conditions are implausible in the way I have specified in this chapter, this is a 
burden I am willing to accept for sake of argument.  
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good decision about her well-being, either by educating herself further or by 
referring to expert testimony (Rosati 2006: 61, 43-44). Similarly, if an agent lacks 
important cognitive capacities, being under optimal decision-making conditions 
will require an agent to remedy for this in some way, for example, by not making 
decisions under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or ensuring that one’s decisions 
are as logically coherent as possible.  
 Importantly, these optimal conditions will be procedural, and not 
normatively laden with substantial claims about what is good for an agent, such 
that what counts as an ‘optimal’ condition for decision-making is that which makes 
an agent arrive at a particular answer about what she endorses. If this were the 
case, then we could sneak in our favoured objective theory of well-being, 
perfectionism for example, claiming that optimal decision-making conditions are 
those in which an agent just agrees with the commitments of perfectionism. 
Instead, what counts as an optimal condition can be determined quite 
independently from the reasons that we give for supporting a particular theory of 
well-being. For example, as already highlighted, Colburn and Rosati justify an 
appeal to optimal conditions with regards to the value of autonomy, and Dworkin, 
with regards to authenticity. 
I argue that the procedural optimisation clause is all that is needed to 
alleviate the worry of mistaken endorsement and alienation. This becomes clear 
when referring back to the examples of John the duped religious person and the 
subdued house-husband. The reason why we worried about those instances of 
mistaken and manipulated endorsement was not because the agents did not reach 
the right decision about what to endorse. This would just be to beg the question 
in favour of the objectivist, assuming that there is an account of what is good for 
a person independent of their endorsement. Instead, we worried about the 
mistaken and manipulated endorsement because of the way in which the agents 
made their decisions – the fact that they were in sub-optimal conditions and 
subject to cognitive impairment, and in the way in which this violated the values 
of integrity, authenticity and autonomy. These sub-optimal decision-making 
conditions are not conducive for making decisions about what is of value in one’s 
life. To be in the conditions that are conducive for making decisions about what 
is valuable, an agent does not need to be fully informed or rational. Instead, the 
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agent only needs to be optimally informed and rational in a way that arrives at 
conditions conducive to making decisions about what is valuable in her life, as she 
is now. Therefore, the inclusion of optimal conditions is not ad hoc, but is 
necessary for the practice of good decision-making. 
The endorsement constraint can now be restated to accommodate for the 
correctness objection, by including an idealisation clause that specifies optimal 
decision-making conditions rather than fully ideal conditions: 
Endorsement Constraint*. Talent Development T is prudentially good for an 
agent A if and only if A endorses (or would endorse if under optimal 
decision-making conditions) the internal and external normative 
commitments that are necessarily required to bring about T, as part of or 
complimentary to A’s deeply held normative commitments. 
I will now go on to discuss and respond to three objections that can be raised 
against this formulation of the endorsement constraint. 
3.6.4. Three Further Objections 
Objection One. It could be argued that acceptance of the endorsement constraint 
results in there being no fact of the matter about whether talent development is 
prudentially good for those who are unable to engage in the required optimal 
decision-making process. For example, children or those with cognitive 
impairments may be unable to arrive at an optimal decision about whether 
developing their talents fits with their deep normative commitments, and 
consequently, they will be unable to make judgements about their prudential 
good. 
This objection can be responded to by highlighting that the endorsement 
constraint’s idealisation condition is counter-factual. It does not state that the 
agent must actually be under optimal conditions, but only states that talent 
development is prudentially good for the agent if they would endorse it under 
optimal conditions. For an agent who is unable to form optimal decisions, it is her 
counterfactual endorsement that counts as a necessary constraint when 
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determining whether talent development is prudentially good for her. What makes 
talent development good for an agent is whether they would endorse it if they 
were in such a position to be able to do so. 
Objection Two. Wilkinson argues that the endorsement constraint is 
implausible because it implies that when an agent changes her mind about 
whether she endorses a state of affairs, then the prudential value of that state of 
affairs will also change accordingly. This is problematic because it means that a 
change of mind on one’s deathbed, for example, will drastically alter the value of 
one’s life. This is an unattractive consequence of the endorsement constraint, as 
it seems that one’s level of well-being could rest ultimately on one final change 
of mind irrespective of the positive value that one has accumulated throughout 
one’s life (Wilkinson: 184, 188). 
In response, it is not evident why it should be problematic that an agent 
changes her mind about whether she endorses the development of her talent. This 
is clear when considering the reasons why this change of mind might occur. First, 
it might be that an agent was not actually in optimal decision-making conditions 
when originally endorsing the development of her talent. This means that in fact 
her endorsement did not conform to the conditions set out by the endorsement 
constraint, and so developing her talent was not actually a constitutive part of 
her well-being. If the agent subsequently changes her mind under optimal 
decision-making conditions, her lack of endorsement will not have drastically 
altered the prudential value of that agent’s talent development in the way that 
Wilkinson suggests. 
Second, it could be that the agent decides that the commitments that come 
with the development of her talent no longer fit with her deeply held normative 
commitments. Either the agent’s deep normative commitments will have changed 
over time, or there will have been a change in the internal or external 
commitments that are necessary to bring about the development of her talent. 
For example, it might be that given the developments of a particular sport, the 
agent will have to change her body shape or strength requirements over time and 
in a way that changes the type of normative commitments that come with the 
development of her skill for that sport. If the agent changes her mind about what 
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she endorses as a result of these changes, she is merely re-evaluating the fit 
between the development of her talent and her deep normative commitments. As 
such, changes of mind are not a problem for those who accept the endorsement 
constraint. As long as the re-evaluation occurs under optimal decision-making 
conditions, the agent can consistently endorse the development of her talent at 
an earlier time, but not endorse the development of that same talent at a later 
time. This also means that whether or not developing one’s talent is a constitutive 
part of one’s well-being will depend on and alter according to this re-evaluation 
of endorsement.  
 It is not clear why this re-evaluation of one’s endorsement really is 
problematic in the way that Wilkinson describes. Accepting the endorsement 
constraint does entail that there is no objective and context-independent fact of 
the matter about whether developing one’s talents is prudentially good. And this 
means that whether or not talent development is a constitutive part of an agent’s 
well-being will depend on that agent’s endorsement at different times. We would 
only object to the plausibility of this claim if we already assumed or held a purely 
objective account of well-being, claiming that there is a context-independent and 
response-independent fact of the matter about whether talent development is 
prudentially good. Yet given the arguments that I have offered in this chapter, 
there is good reason to reject pure objectivist accounts of well-being, insofar as 
they are unable to avoid the alienation problem. At the very least, we have to 
hold a hybrid view that accommodates an agent’s endorsement as a necessary 
constraint on what counts as prudentially good for that agent. This means that the 
objection raised by Wilkinson about the implausibility of changes of mind is only 
problematic for my account of the endorsement constraint if we beg the question 
in favour of objectivism about well-being.37  Furthermore, it is not the case that 
accepting the endorsement constraint as a constraint on theories of well-being 
amounts to the claim that whether or not one’s life was, overall, a good life 
depends sufficiently on one’s endorsement of that life. The endorsement 
                                                          
37 It might also be the case that a response-independent account merely requires some 
kind of inter-subjectively acknowledged standard and this need not take the objectivist 
form. And so, the objection is only a problem if we beg the question, more generally in 
favour of response-independent theories of well-being, more generally defined. Thanks 
to Glen Pettigrove for highlighting this point. 
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constraint is merely a necessary constraint, and as mentioned above, the goodness 
of one’s life, or the truth about what constitutes one’s well-being, will also rely 
on other necessary conditions, such as the value of the pursuit in question.38 
 Objection Three. Wilkinson further argues that the endorsement constraint 
does not specify at what stage during the development of an agent’s talent her 
endorsement should count as determining whether her talent development is 
prudentially good. He claims that this detail is left unspecified because once it 
has been determined, it highlights that the endorsement constraint is implausible 
(Wilkinson: 181-188).  
 Wilkinson argues that ‘later endorsement’, endorsement that occurs after 
the development of the talent, is the most plausible candidate to be included into 
the endorsement constraint (Wilkinson: 182-183). This is because later 
endorsement offers a more privileged epistemological and phenomenological 
position from which to make judgements about the value of one’s talent 
development and whether that development fits with one’s deep normative 
commitments. As Wilkinson claims, later endorsement “is made in the light of a 
genuine engagement with an activity, whereas the earlier endorsement expresses 
a conviction not based on personal experience” (Wilkinson: 187; see also Dworkin 
2000: 269). 
However, if later endorsement really is what matters, then the 
endorsement constraint faces two problems which show that it is implausible. 
First, what the agent would later endorse may in fact be far removed from what 
the agent would endorse as she is now. In that case, the endorsement constraint 
                                                          
38 Wilkinson suggests that in order to respond to the changes of mind objection, one should 
claim that “the longer something is endorsed for, the greater the contribution to well-
being” (Wilkinson: 184). However, there is no indication that the length of endorsement 
has any substantial part to play in determining whether the endorsement is carried out 
under optimal decision-making conditions or really does represent a consideration of the 
agent’s deep normative commitments. And so, the length of time for which an agent 
endorses something does not determine whether talent development is constitutive of an 
agent’s well-being, and Wilkinson himself quickly rejects this as a plausible response for 
those who advocate the endorsement constraint. His conclusion, however, is that this is 
the only response and seeing as it is unsuccessful, the endorsement constraint is 
implausible as a result. 
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would not really be a solution to the alienation problem; what the agent later 
endorses may be alienating for the agent as she is prior to or during the 
development of her talent. Second, when making decisions about what we ought 
to do in order to live a life full of prudential goodness, we need to be able to 
determine whether a state of affairs is prudentially good before an agent engages 
with it and potentially subjects herself to something that may be bad for her and 
significantly reduces her level of well-being. Relying on later endorsement does 
not allow us to determine these important practical questions about whether or 
not an agent ought to develop her talents. 
We can respond to this objection by simply denying that later endorsement 
is indeed the kind of endorsement that ought to be included into the endorsement 
constraint. Wilkinson’s choice of later endorsement as being the most plausible 
relies on the assumption that we cannot assign a significant value to a future 
experience without a subjective experience of it. Although an agent’s 
endorsement before and during the development of her talent may be lacking in 
extensive personal experience of the development itself, there is nothing to say 
that this subjective experience is the only or most privileged way of making 
decisions about what we ought to do or what we ought to endorse. There are other 
ways to assign values to experiences without this subjective privilege. 
For example, Ruth Chang suggests that an all-things-considered 
endorsement need not rely on a full subjective experience of what is being 
endorsed. We can tell what a future action or state of affairs might be like by 
referring to other similar subjective experiences, reliable testimony from experts 
or those who know us well, as well as appealing to traditional rational choice 
theory that will give us the tools to assign predictive value to future outcomes 
based on probabilities (Chang 2015: 247-249, 253). This means that even though 
an agent may not have a full experience of what the development of her talent 
will involve, it is still possible that she is able to make a considered and rational 
judgement about whether the commitments that come with the development of 
her talent will fit with her deeply held normative commitments. For the agent to 
be in optimal decision-making conditions, we only need to state that she has 
enough information to make an informed decision about what is prudentially good 
for her. And this account of optimal-information does not necessarily need to 
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include a full subjective account of the epistemological and phenomenological 
experience of the development of one’s talents. 
Therefore, the endorsement constraint does specify at what stage one’s 
endorsement should count as determining whether the development of one’s 
talent is prudentially good. The constraint prescribes that one’s endorsement 
counts when made under optimal decision-making conditions, and this could 
conceivably occur at any stage of one’s talent development. This means that the 
endorsement constraint is not guilty of being implausible in the way that Wilkinson 
suggests; there is no problem of alienation, and an agent can make decisions about 
whether or not her talent development is prudentially good for her before fully 
engaging in that development.39 
 I have now responded to three of the most incriminating objections that 
could be raised against my formulation of the endorsement constraint, and it is 
plausible to conclude that for the development of an agent’s talent to count as 
prudentially good, that agent must endorse the development of her talent. This 
appeal to endorsement is a necessary constraint on all theories of well-being and 
is stated as follows: 
                                                          
39 There may be cases in which an agent is unsure about whether the development of her 
talent fits with her deep normative commitments. How does this impact the plausibility 
of the endorsement constraint? First, in situations of uncertainty about endorsement we 
could ask whether the agent really is under optimal conditions – she may not have all the 
relevant facts or the optimal cognitive abilities to reflect clearly and rationally. In this 
case, to determine whether developing her talents is good for her, we would consider 
whether the agent would endorse it if under optimal conditions. The apparent uncertainty 
is merely an instance of an agent not being under the right kind of decision-making 
conditions. Second, it might be that the agent is in fact under optimal decision-making 
conditions, but nevertheless is still unsure and unable to make a decision about whether 
she endorses the development of her talent. As Chang suggests, this means that the 
normative significance of the reasons both in favour of and against developing her talent 
are equal or on par (Chang 2002). What the agent should choose in these circumstances 
is a question for rational choice theory. For example, Chang’s theory of hybrid voluntarism 
claims that we should simply ‘plump’ for one of the normatively equal options (Chang 
2004; Chang 2013; Chang 2015). When it comes to assessing the plausibility of the 
endorsement constraint, however, we need only admit that once such a decision has been 
made, then that decision of endorsement – or lack thereof – determines whether 
developing one’s talents is prudentially good. 
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Endorsement Constraint*. Talent development T is prudentially good for an 
agent A if and only if A endorses (or would endorse if under optimal 
decision-making conditions) the normative commitments that are 
necessarily required to bring about T, as part of or complimentary to A’s 
deeply held normative commitments. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
Given that the endorsement constraint is a necessary condition for determining 
what constitutes an agent’s well-being, this means that the monist perfectionist’s 
claim, that developing one’s talents is objectively prudentially good, is 
implausible. The welfare perfectionist makes the claim that developing one’s 
talents is objectively prudentially good. However, this claim is subject to the 
worry of alienation, which highlights that the agent will potentially be alienated 
if the internal and external commitments that come with development of her 
talent do not fit with her own deep normative commitments. To avoid this lack of 
fit, I argued that we ought to adopt the endorsement constraint as part of a hybrid 
perfectionist account, which states that talent development is only prudentially 
good for an agent if and only if she endorses (or would endorse if under optimal 
decision-making conditions) the normative commitments that are necessarily 
required to bring about the development of her talent, as part of or 
complimentary to her deeply held normative commitments. 
The counterfactual idealisation clause was added to accommodate the 
correctness objection, that alienation is in fact not intrinsically bad, for example 
when an agent makes a mistake with regards to what she endorses. The 
idealisation clause that I argue for prescribes only optimal rather than ideal 
conditions for decision-making about one’s well-being, and makes no substantive 
normative claims about what an agent ought to endorse. 
It is important to remember that the endorsement constraint is only a 
necessary feature of an account of well-being, not a sufficient one. This means 
that perfectionism could quite plausibly accommodate the endorsement 
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constraint and still hold that there are some goods that are objectively valuable 
simpliciter. This kind of perfectionism would be a hybrid account, stating that in 
order for an object or state of affairs with positive objective value to be 
considered as prudentially good for an agent, that object or state of affairs also 
has to be endorsed by that agent. This allows the perfectionist to maintain that 
the endorsement of the agent does not by itself make something prudentially 
good, but only together with what already has perfectionist value. Consequently, 
endorsement cannot make prudentially good something that has no perfectionist 
value. 
 However, for this hybrid perfectionism to be plausible, the perfectionist 
also has to be able to prove that talent development does indeed have positive 
perfectionist value. Earlier in this chapter I also objected to both moral and 
welfare perfectionism precisely on these grounds. I argued for the ‘excellence 
objection’, which stated that perfectionism cannot generate the priority of 
developing specifically our talents over any other competency that we may have. 
This is because developing one’s talent may not in fact excellently and fully 
perfect one’s essential human capacities, and furthermore, the goodness of 
developing a particular talent is conditional on whether the particular skill in 
question is already deemed valuable or morally permissible. Therefore, even if 
perfectionists accept a hybrid account that incorporates endorsement and 
objective perfectionist value of certain goods and states of affairs, they are 
unable to claim that developing one’s talent is indeed an objective perfectionist 
value in this way. 
 As a result, moral perfectionism cannot successfully claim that developing 
one’s talents is objectively good and so morally required of us. This means that 
the moral duty to develop one’s talents is only prima facie, as it cannot be derived 
successfully from the claims made by moral perfectionism. Similarly, when it 
comes to one’s prudential good, welfare perfection cannot successfully claim that 
developing one’s talent is an objective pro tanto prudential good, insofar as 
welfare perfectionism cannot successfully derive those reasons from its 
commitments. 
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 This is not to say that a pro tanto prudential reason to develop one’s talent 
and a pro tanto moral duty to develop one’s talent cannot be derived from any 
theory of well-being or morality. It may be that there are theories that are able 
to respond to the objections that I have raised in both this and the previous 
chapter, and can thus successfully argue for a pro tanto duty or reason to develop 
one’s talents. In this chapter I have argued that with regards to well-being, 
however, whether or not there is a pro tanto prudential reason to develop one’s 
talents will always be conditional on accommodating the endorsement constraint. 
In the next chapter I argue that with regards to morality, whether or not there is 
a pro tanto moral duty to develop one’s talents will also be conditional on meeting 
the endorsement constraint. 
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Chapter Four 
Moral Demandingness and Talent Development 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Both Kant and moral perfectionists explicitly claim that there is a moral obligation 
to develop one’s talents. In the previous two chapters I have explained why we 
ought to reject the arguments that these theories give in support of their claims 
that there is a strong connection between talent development and morality. This 
does not mean, however, that a moral obligation to develop one’s talents can 
never be formulated by a moral theory. Even though other moral theories may not 
explicitly argue for the necessary connection between morality and talent 
development, nor claim that the moral obligation to develop one’s talents is a 
fundamental commitment of the theory itself, it still might be the case that a 
moral theory will demand that an agent develops her talents. Such a demand 
would arise either because failing to develop one’s talents results in acting against 
the particular principles of the moral theory, or that developing one’s talents will 
promote adherence to the principles of the moral theory. For example, whether 
or not consequentialism requires an agent to develop her talents will depend on 
the various calculations that determine what consequentialism requires – that is, 
if doing so would promote, over-all, the best state of affairs (see Hurley 2009: 1; 
Scanlon: 81). To give another example, care ethics, would presumably require one 
to develop one’s talents if failing to do so undermines the guiding principle that 
“we act rightly or permissibly if our actions express or exhibit an attitude/motive 
of caring toward others” (Slote 2007: 10). 
 There are two ways we can assess a moral theory’s demand that one ought 
to develop one’s talents. First, we can reject the idea that the theory, properly 
understood, does generate the moral obligation to develop one’s talents. For 
example, we might question whether the consequentialist calculation really does 
imply that one ought to develop one’s talents, or in the case of care ethics, that 
doing so really does promote a caring attitude towards others. This was the 
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strategy that I adopted in the previous two chapters of this dissertation; I argued 
that the commitments of both perfectionism and Kant’s moral theory do not 
successfully give rise to a moral duty to develop one’s talents. I focussed 
particularly on these two theories because of their explicit claims that we do 
indeed have such an obligation. 
The second way to assess the plausibility of the moral demand to develop 
one’s talents does not require an analysis of the commitments of each particular 
theory. Even if a moral theory can derive an obligation to develop one’s talents 
from its commitments and principles, we can still object to the obligation by 
referring to external reasons that can be raised, irrespective of the specific 
features of each moral theory. 
It is this second strategy that I adopt in this chapter by appealing to a 
particular form of the demandingness objection. More generally, the 
demandingness objection states that if a moral theory requires of one to 
unreasonably sacrifice one’s non-moral commitments, then that moral theory and 
its moral demands are implausibly demanding: we ought to reject an account of 
morality that prescribes over-demanding obligations. Specifically in relation to 
talent development, I argue that irrespective of how a particular moral theory 
formulates its claim that we have a moral obligation to develop our talents, this 
obligation has the potential to be unreasonably demanding because an agent will 
be required to unreasonably sacrifice her non-moral commitments. If this is the 
case, then the obligation can be overridden by one’s non-moral concerns, and the 
moral obligation to develop one’s talents can be classed as overly demanding. As 
such, I specify a negative condition on any moral theory that claims one has a 
moral obligation to develop one’s talents, namely, that talent development 
cannot be overly demanding. This condition holds no matter which moral theory 
one adopts.  
In what follows, I argue that the demandingness objection that is relevant 
to the moral obligation to develop one’s talents should be understood in terms of 
the endorsement constraint that I presented in the previous chapter. I claim that 
the obligation to develop one’s talent is only reasonably demanding insofar as an 
agent endorses the normative commitments that are necessary for bringing about 
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the development of her talent. If one does have a pro tanto obligation to develop 
one’s talent, it will thus be conditional on one’s endorsement of that 
development; lack of this endorsement rules that the moral obligation to develop 
one’s talents is too demanding. 
To argue for this claim, I need to explain and defend an account of what 
over-demandingness is when it comes to the moral obligation to develop one’s 
talents. I begin by stating the demandingness objection in its most general form, 
before considering two specific versions – the objection from overridingness, and 
the content-based objection. In Section Three I argue that we should not 
understand over-demandingness in terms of overridingness, and in Section Four I 
argue for my own content-based interpretation of the demandingness objection, 
appealing to the endorsement constraint. In Section Five I respond to three 
objections that can be raised against my formulation of the demandingness 
objection, and in Section Six I conclude by highlighting the implications that my 
account of demandingness raises for the relationship between morality and talent 
development. 
 
4.2. The Demandingness Objection 
The most general formulation of the demandingness objection is stated as follows: 
a particular moral theory or moral requirement is overly demanding if it asks of 
an agent to unreasonably sacrifice her non-moral commitments. If morality is 
over-demanding, it will require us to do things that we have good reason to think 
should not be demanded of us. Any moral theory that claims we have these 
requirements is mistaken, because they are in fact not actually required – 
something has gone wrong with the commitments of a theory that claims we ought 
to do something that we are not in fact required to do. 
There are three initial qualifications to make regarding this statement of 
the demandingness objection. First, my focus in this chapter is not on the 
demandingness of morality more generally, or a specific moral theory, but with 
the particular moral requirement to develop one’s talents. This means that any 
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moral theory that claims we have a moral obligation to develop our talents is 
potentially subject to the demandingness objection that I propose. From this it 
follows that I am not concerned with cases where developing one’s talents is 
merely seen as morally permissible, such that a moral theory merely allows us to 
develop our talents. Instead, the particular case that I focus on in this chapter is 
the plausibility of when morality specifically requires of us that we ought to 
develop our talents. 
Second, it is important to qualify that whether or not a moral requirement 
is unreasonably demanding will be determined by the demands that morality 
makes on our non-moral commitments, not our moral ones. This is because the 
demandingness objection assumes, for the sake of argument, that if a moral 
theory claims we have a moral obligation to do X, then doing X will be consistent 
with the other commitments of that moral theory (Goodin: 2). I take it for granted, 
therefore, that if a theory prescribes that there is a moral obligation to develop 
one’s talents, then that obligation does not problematically conflict with any 
other moral obligation that is prescribed by that same theory. Given that, the 
demandingness objection claims that the moral requirement to develop one’s 
talents is too non-morally demanding, implausibly conflicting with our own 
personal commitments.  
Finally, the focus of this chapter is not merely whether the moral obligation 
to develop one’s talents counts as demanding simpliciter. The very nature of 
talent development often results in the fact that doing so will be somewhat 
demanding; developing one’s skills for a musical instrument or training to be an 
athlete, for example, can be extremely strenuous and challenging tasks. However, 
we do not necessarily judge this demandingness to be unjustified or problematic, 
but a reasonable part of what it is to develop one’s talents. That morality requires 
this reasonable demandingness is not the point of contention here; instead, the 
demandingness objection I propose focuses on the extent to which the moral 
obligation to develop one’s talents counts as unreasonably or overly demanding. 
Given these qualifications, the demandingness objection that I will be 
discussing in this chapter can be stated more accurately as follows: the particular 
moral obligation to develop one’s talents is overly demanding if it asks of an agent 
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to unreasonably sacrifice her non-moral commitments. In order to assess the 
plausibility of this demandingness objection, it is necessary to understand the way 
in which the moral obligation to develop one’s talents could be considered as 
overly demanding. 
First, it could be argued that the moral obligation to develop one’s talents 
is over demanding due to morality’s ‘overridingness’ over non-moral concerns. 
The claim is that once we have decided what counts as a moral obligation given 
by the commitments of a particular moral theory, morality is then deemed to be 
authoritative over one’s other non-moral concerns, and prescribes what we have 
most reason to do (Scheffler 1992: 52-71; Van Ackeren & Sticker: 78). This means 
that in order to fulfil one’s moral duty, one is expected to give up various deeply 
held and significant personal commitments. As a result of this overridingness, 
morality is seen to be unreasonably over-demanding. In the next section, I will 
argue that in fact this interpretation of the demandingness objection does not 
capture the reasons why the moral obligation to develop one’s talents may be 
considered as over-demanding. This is because the moral obligation may still be 
unreasonably demanding even when the worry of morality’s purported 
overridingness over non-moral concerns has been responded to.  
Instead, I argue that the demandingness objection, when focussed on the 
moral obligation to develop one’s talents, should be interpreted as a claim about 
the substantive values and commitments that come with the particular content of 
the moral demand itself (Scheffler 1992: 98-109; Van Ackeren & Sticker: 78). I 
claim that the moral demand to develop one’s talents is over-demanding insofar 
as the commitments required to comply with the obligation asks an agent to 
unreasonably neglect her non-moral commitments. In Section Four, I will argue 
that what counts as an unreasonable neglect of one’s non-moral commitments is 
grounded in a failure to meet the endorsement constraint, such that an agent does 
not endorse the normative commitments that are necessary to bring about the 
development of her talent as fitting with her own deeply held personal concerns. 
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For now, however, I will go on to argue that we ought to reject the interpretation 
of the demandingness objection as grounded in morality’s overridingness.40 
 
4.3. Demandingness and Overridingness 
The requirements of morality are often considered to be over-demanding in virtue 
of the fact that they are able to override all other non-moral concerns. This is to 
say, morality is rationally authoritative when deciding what we have an all-things-
considered reason to do. The idea that morality is normative and gives us reasons 
for what we ought to do is not what is in contention here; instead, it is the claim 
that morality gives us a “definitive and decisive” reason, an authoritative reason 
to perform what is morally required (Dorsey 2012: 6). This rational authority may 
be problematic, however, in cases where we consider our non-moral concerns to 
be at least equally as weighty as our moral concerns. It would be wrong, therefore, 
to allow morality to override these weighty non-moral concerns, neglecting or 
ignoring significant non-moral concerns when determining what we should do, all-
things-considered. 
 The claim that morality should override all other non-moral concerns in this 
way is most explicitly argued for in some Kantian accounts of morality. Kant argues 
that morality should always have authority over our non-moral concerns – if 
morality requires us to do something then this is what we must do, even if it 
conflicts with other non-moral commitments that we may have. As such, one’s 
non-moral reasons lose their rational force when deciding what we ought to do 
(Walla: 737; Van Ackeren & Sticker: 84, 81). Because Kant’s position here 
considers morality to be rationality authoritative over one’s non-moral concerns, 
let’s call this position a version of ‘strong moral rationalism’. 
                                                          
40 Scheffler differentiates two further types of demandingness objection – the objection 
from scope and a procedural objection. However, for the purposes of this chapter, I 
assume that both the scope and procedural objections can be accommodated by the two 
versions of demandingness that I discuss – the overridingness and content-based 
objections (see Scheffler 1992: 18-51; Van Ackeren & Sticker: 7, 78).  
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 However, we need not adopt such a strong claim in order to maintain that 
morality is overriding. Instead of asserting that all non-moral concerns lose their 
normative force in the face of moral reasons, we could accept that some non-
moral concerns retain their normative pull when deciding what we ought to do. 
This weaker claim allows the moral rationalist to explain why one often feels 
sadness or regret when one neglects one’s non-moral commitments. Even so, 
‘weak moral rationalism’ will still advocate the position that morality is able to 
outweigh these normatively weighty non-moral concerns when deciding what we 
ought to do all-things-considered. 
 This weaker form of moral rationalism is still subject to the worry that it 
may result in an over-demanding conception of what morality requires from moral 
agents. The concern is that there are often times in which our non-moral concerns 
do give us normatively strong reasons for action, such that our moral reasons do 
not seem normatively powerful enough to be legitimately authoritative (Sobel 
2007: 14). In these circumstances, where our normatively weighty non-moral 
considerations conflict with what is morally required of us, we might think that 
what morality demands of us is unreasonable, as it will automatically override the 
significant normative weight of our own personal commitments. 
 There are, however, some cases in which there seem to be good reasons 
why the requirements of morality ought to normatively outweigh our non-moral 
concerns. For example, we might think that a personal desire to enjoy a beer with 
friends or to buy the latest Taylor Swift album should not dictate what we ought 
to do all things considered, nor should those commitments legitimately trump 
what morality requires us to do. It is not the case that the demandingness 
objection claims that our moral obligation to help those in need should always be 
trumped by a personal desire to indulge in my desire to grow my music library. 
Because of this, when we worry about morality overriding one’s non-moral 
concerns, those concerns relate to the personal commitments that have significant 
value for one’s life and bestow it with meaning. These are the types of 
commitments that in Chapter Three I termed ‘deep normative commitments’ – 
they are constitutive of our conception of the good life and sense of self, and as 
such give us reasons for choosing and acting in a particular way (see again Bagnoli: 
5; Moseley: 60; Rivera: 71; Scheffler 1992: 123). 
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The demandingness objection, when it is understood in terms of 
overridingness, is therefore concerned with instances of when one’s deeply held 
normative commitments are outweighed by moral requirements due to the fact 
that morality is considered to be rationally authoritative. This is argued to be 
problematic because sacrificing these deep normative commitments can be 
unreasonably costly – these commitments are extremely valuable to us, they give 
our lives meaning, as well as shape our character and conception of who we are.  
Therefore, in some cases at least, due to morality’s overridingness, what morality 
requires will demand that one neglects one’s own character and sense of self.  
Having explained the demandingness objection understood in terms of 
overridingness, I will now argue that this formulation of the objection does not 
capture the reasons why the moral obligation to develop one’s talents ought to be 
considered as over-demanding. This is because it is conceptually possible that 
talent development can be implausibly demanding in ways that the overridingness 
objection does not accommodate for. This is shown by the fact that even when 
the worry of morality’s purported overridingness over non-moral concerns has 
been responded to, such that morality is no longer considered to be over-
demanding, the moral obligation to develop one’s talents can still be determined 
as over-demanding. That is, even if we have responded successfully to the 
overridingness objection, there is still a problem of over-demandingness, and as 
such, over-demandingness should not be understood in terms of overridingness. In 
order to argue for this claim, I will now discuss the two ways in which we can 
respond to the worry of overridingness, and show that no matter which of the two 
responses is taken, we can still argue that the moral obligation to develop one’s 
talents could be over-demanding. Both responses or strategies still leave 
conceptual space for talent development to be over-demanding, and so there must 
be reasons to think that talent development is overly demanding that is not 
comprehensively captured by the overridingness version of the demandingness 
objection. 
 First Response. To ensure that moral requirements are not too demanding 
for an agent, some moral rationalists keep their commitment to morality’s 
overridingness over non-moral concerns, but adjust the content of morality so that 
significant non-moral concerns are incorporated into the moral sphere. This means 
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that what counts as a moral concern includes these normatively weighty personal 
commitments that the demandingness objection claimed to be too costly to 
outweigh; these deeply held commitments are now classed as moral commitments 
(Sobel 2007: 14). In this way, these non-moral concerns are thought to genuinely 
belong in the moral sphere and as a result, whether or not the moral obligation to 
develop our talents is considered to be too demanding will be determined by 
weighing up all the moral reasons that count for or against doing so; these moral 
reasons will include the deeply held personal commitments that were originally 
considered to be non-moral. In this way, the moral rationalist still accepts that 
morality is overriding, but claims that there is no longer a worry of morality 
unreasonably demanding of an agent to neglect her deeply held personal 
commitments.   
 Samuel Scheffler makes such a move, claiming that even though morality is 
rationally authoritative, it ought to make room for our non-moral concerns by 
accommodating them as part of the moral outlook (Scheffler 1992: 122-123; 
Scheffler 1994: 41-78; see also Berkey: 3026-3029; Dorsey 2012: 17). Other 
consequentialists have similarly opted to include agent-relative concerns in their 
conception of morality, so that what morality requires of us is just what we have 
most reason to do in pursuit of one overarching value – Peter Railton calls this 
value ‘The Good’ (Railton 1984; see also Portmore 2012).  Railton claims that “it 
becomes artificial to impose a dichotomy between what is done for the self and 
what is done for the other. We cannot decompose such relationship into a vector 
of self-concern and a vector of other-concern” (Railton 1984: 166). In this way, 
morality would not be subject to the demandingness objection due to the fact 
that what morality requires does not demand an agent to unreasonably sacrifice 
her deeply held personal commitments. These personal commitments are instead 
incorporated into morality.41 
                                                          
41 Ruth Chang has argued for her own account of this overarching value, in which both 
moral concerns and non-moral concerns figure as constituent parts of the decision-making 
process about what we ought to do all-things-considered. When determining the right 
balance between morality and prudence, Chang claims that we appeal to a more 
comprehensive value that she considers to be ‘nameless’; however, just because we do 
not have a name for this comprehensive value this does not mean that our appeal to it is 
any less warranted (Chang 2004). 
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 Adopting this first strategy, however, does not help to determine whether 
a moral obligation, such as the obligation to develop one’s talents, counts as 
‘overly’ demanding. In fact, we can still claim that an obligation is overly-
demanding even if we do incorporate our personal commitments into the moral 
sphere. This is because the kind of move that Railton and Scheffler make only 
shifts the deliberation about demandingness into the moral sphere; within this 
sphere however, we would still need to determine whether or not our deep 
normative commitments unreasonably conflict with other moral concerns. If one’s 
personal commitments were in fact included within the sphere of morality, in 
order to determine whether an obligation was overly demanding we would now 
weigh up the competing moral concerns, and consider whether they are 
normatively weighty enough to override the obligation. 
Merely re-labelling our personal concerns as ‘moral’ does not help locate 
the potential demandingness of a moral requirement – we are still left asking 
whether one moral requirement conflicts with another moral requirement, and 
whether that conflict counts as unreasonable. Consequently, this first strategy at 
resolving the worry of overridingness does not provide a plausible way to resolve 
the worry of overdemandingness. This is because we are still left with the question 
of how to determine whether one’s moral concerns will unreasonably demand too 
much of us with regards to another moral concern. As such, there may still be 
reasons why the moral obligation to develop one’s talents counts as over-
demanding that the overridingness objection does not capture.42 
Second Response. The second way to ensure that moral requirements are 
not too demanding in terms of overridingness is just to reject altogether the notion 
that morality is overriding, and claim that morality need not be authoritative over 
                                                          
42 Bernard Williams rejects the strategy of incorporating our non-moral concerns into the 
moral sphere, because he claims that this will force us to make decisions about our own 
well-being in the same impartial and impersonal way that we do when making moral 
decisions. This is problematic, Williams claims, because this type of impartial decision-
making alienates an agent from her own sense of self and her deep normative 
commitments (Williams 2006: 20, 31; Dorsey 2012: 6). For sake of argument I leave 
Williams’ impartiality objection aside here. For a response to the objection see Fairbanks 
and Dorsey, who both argue that the objection fails to distinguish between second-order 
and first-order impartiality (Fairbanks: 6; Dorsey 2102: 19).  
127 
 
 
 
our non-moral concerns when deciding what we have an all-things-considered 
reason to do. As such, our non-moral considerations will be able to trump our 
moral concerns when they are significantly normatively weighty. By rejecting 
morality’s rational authority over non-moral concerns we do not need to adjust 
the content of morality, but instead admit that what morality requires of us is not 
what we always and necessarily have most reason to do. This is due to the fact 
that our non-moral considerations may also have strong normative weight that can 
in some circumstances overrule our moral considerations (see Dorsey 2012: 8; 
Sobel 20007: 14). 
There are stronger and weaker versions of the rejection of morality’s 
overridingness. Susan Wolf, for example, has claimed that in some instances our 
non-moral concerns outweigh moral considerations to such an extent that 
adhering to the demands of morality would count as irrational. This means that 
the non-moral consideration is so normatively weighty that when deciding what 
we ought to do, the conflicting moral consideration loses its rational force, such 
that adhering to what morality requires of us would be the wrong thing to do (Wolf 
1982; Singer 1993: 320-32; Dorsey 2012: 10). 
Dale Dorsey adopts a weaker version of this position, accepting that 
morality will always act as a ‘constraint’ on our actions when deciding what we 
ought to do, which means that adhering to a moral requirement will never be 
‘irrational’ or ‘wrong’ in the way that Wolf suggests. Instead, Dorsey merely claims 
that in some circumstances we will have good reasons to act contrary to what 
morality demands of us, due to the fact that our non-moral considerations are 
significantly normatively weighty (Dorsey 2012: 12-13; Stroud: 176). In this way, 
the reasons that we have to be moral are always sufficient for action, but in some 
cases this reason to act morally will not amount to an all-things-considered reason 
to do what is morally required. As a result, the demandingness of morality is 
mitigated due to the fact that morality is not considered as rationally 
authoritative over one’s normatively weighty, deeply held non-moral 
commitments. 
However, even if this response to the purported demandingness of 
morality’s overridingness was successful, I argue that a moral obligation could still 
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be determined as over-demanding, and as such, the overridingness objection does 
not capture the reasons why a moral obligation ought to be considered as over-
demanding. This is because even if morality is not rationally authoritative over 
one’s non-moral concerns, we still have to determine which non-moral concerns 
are normatively weighty enough to trump one’s moral obligations. As Dorsey 
himself claims, in order to determine when a moral consideration can be 
overridden by one’s non-moral concerns, we have to determine when “morality 
requires significant prudential sacrifice on part of the agents”, and this means 
that “the project of determining when moral requirements fail to be dispositive 
[rationally authoritative], just is the project of determining when moral 
obligations become too demanding” (Dorsey 2012: 14, emphasis added). In other 
words, even though Dorsey has provided justification for why it is plausible for 
moral requirements to sometimes be overridden by non-moral concerns, he does 
not provide a case for when or why one’s non-moral concerns may legitimately 
trump one’s moral requirements. To provide such a case, we need to have an 
account of when one’s non-moral concerns are normatively weighty enough to 
trump one’s moral requirements, and this is determined by examining what counts 
as an unreasonable sacrifice of one’s non-moral commitments.  
To assess whether a moral requirement is over-demanding, such as the 
moral obligation to develop one’s talents, we need to determine when doing so 
would require unreasonable prudential sacrifice. Even though we have responded 
to the worry of morality’s overridingness, this has not helped us to determine 
whether the obligation to develop one’s talents is too demanding, because we are 
still left with the question of when such an obligation would require an 
unreasonable sacrifice of our personal commitments. To do this, we need to 
provide an explanation of what counts as a significant prudential sacrifice, and to 
assess whether such a sacrifice will arise when an agent fulfils her moral obligation 
to develop her talents. Rejecting moral rationalism cannot help us to provide such 
an account. 
Therefore, it cannot be that the overridingness objection really captures 
the reasons why we consider a moral obligation to be over-demanding. This is 
because it is a conceptual possibility that an obligation could be over-demanding 
in a way that the overridingness objection does not accommodate for. Even after 
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considering both responses to the overridingness objection, by rejecting 
morality’s overridingness or incorporating one’s non-moral commitments into the 
moral sphere, we can still question whether one’s non-moral concerns justifiably 
override one’s moral concerns. Consequently, if the moral obligation to develop 
one’s talents is over-demanding, this demandingness should not be understood in 
terms of overridingness. Instead, I argue that we need a demandingness objection 
that helps us to determine when one’s deeply held normative commitments are 
weighty enough to trump the moral concerns in favour of developing one’s talent. 
To provide such an account we have to look to the substantive normative 
commitments that come with one’s talent development, and the way in which 
these commitments fit with one’s non-moral concerns. I will go on to argue for 
such an account in the next section. 
 
4.4. Demandingness and Endorsement 
The content-based demandingness objection that I propose against the moral 
obligation to develop one’s talents is stated as follows: moral obligation T is 
unreasonably demanding for agent A if and only if compliance with the normative 
commitments necessary to bring about T requires the unreasonable sacrifice of at 
least one of A’s morally permissible deep normative commitments.43 This 
demandingness objection can hold irrespective of the commitments of a particular 
moral theory, and irrespective of whether morality is deemed to be rationally 
authoritative over one’s non-moral concerns. I have already explained the nature 
                                                          
43 This formulation of the demandingness objection is a version of Braddock’s objection 
from ‘cost’: “Moral view V is mistaken because it is too demanding in the sense that 
compliance with its implied obligations would require that we (as compliant agents) 
sacrifice G, where G consists of a set of goods such as: (i) a significant level of our well-
being, (ii) our well-being to the point of view where we fall below the threshold of a 
minimally decent life, (iii) our central projects, and (iv) highly important objective goods” 
(Braddock: 170-171). My account of the demandingness objection differs slightly from 
Braddock’s, as I will go on to argue that the moral obligation to develop one’s talents is 
overly demanding insofar as it requires one to sacrifice one’s deep normative 
commitments. These commitments could potentially be classed as ‘central projects’, 
consist of important objective goods, and significantly reduce an agent’s well-being if not 
acknowledged, in the way that Braddock proposes. 
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of one’s deep normative commitments: they are one’s and personal commitments 
that bestow meaning and significance to one’s life. I now go on to explain when 
sacrificing these deeply held normative commitments, in favour of fulfilling one’s 
moral obligation to develop one’s talents, counts as unreasonable. In doing so, I 
refer to the endorsement constraint I presented in the previous Chapter.  
4.4.1. Well-Being and Demandingness 
To determine whether adhering to a particular moral requirement counts as 
unreasonably demanding for an agent, the strategy that most commonly appears 
in the literature is to determine how such adherence will affect an agent’s level 
of well-being. If an agent’s level of well-being falls below a certain threshold, 
then the sacrifice in well-being is deemed overly demanding. Murphy, for 
example, offers his account of the ‘factual status-quo’; he claims that in order to 
determine the level of demandingness that is required by a moral requirement, 
we ought to compare a person’s level of well-being before complying with the 
requirement, with the agent’s level of well-being during and after complying with 
the requirement. In this account, we take “an agent’s actual situation as given” 
and then compare “how far his well-being is affected from the time he begins to 
fully comply with the moral [requirement]” (Murphy: 35, 164-165). When applying 
this factual status-quo to the potential demandingness of the moral obligation to 
develop one’s talents, we would need to determine how developing one’s talents 
may result in a reduction in one’s level of well-being. 
In the last Chapter I argued that developing one’s talents can conflict with 
our deep normative commitments. When we develop a talent, there come with it 
certain required standards and commitments that have to be met in order to 
successfully bring about that development. These commitments can either be 
internal or external to the process of developing a particular talent, and they are 
normative, giving an agent reasons for acting in a particular way. If these 
commitments do not fit with one’s deeply held personal commitments, a conflict 
will arise that has the potential to significantly reduce one’s well-being. 
This reduction in well-being can be understood in terms of what Railton has 
called ‘alienation’, referring to the reduction in well-being that arises due to a 
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lack of fit between a certain state of affairs (in this case, talent development) 
and an agent’s deep normative commitments (Railton 1984: 134). As previously 
explained in Chapter Three, the loss that is experienced due to a conflict with 
one’s deeply help personal concerns can be explained by appeal to different 
values, for example, in terms of autonomy, integrity or authenticity. Whatever 
value we appeal to, however, being alienated from one’s deep normative 
commitments just means that the agent has to compromise a significant and 
meaningful part of her life, a part which defines who she is and shapes her 
conception of the good life. If the development of an agent’s talents conflicts with 
her deeply held normative commitments, then this development will compromise 
something that is part of the agent that authoritatively provides significance and 
meaning to her life. This compromise is demanding, resulting in a reduction of an 
agent’s level of well-being. 
Just because developing one’s talents may conflict with one’s deep 
normative commitments and is as such considered to be personally demanding, 
this does not mean that the resulting demandingness caused by this alienation is 
unreasonable. As discussed in the previous chapter, it might be that the alienation 
an agent feels when acting contrary to her deep normative commitments is in fact 
a good thing, such that the agent should be alienated from her deeply held 
personal commitments. It might be the case, for instance, that an agent’s personal 
commitments encourage her to act in a way that is morally impermissible, or that 
the agent is mistaken about what she really does value as part of her deeply held 
convictions (Moseley: 66; Railton 1984: 147). This means that any resulting 
alienation from these personal commitments would be in the service of avoiding 
immoral and imprudent behaviour, and would not be considered as over-
demanding.  
In this way, the ‘factual status-quo’ that is offered by Murphy, to help 
determine when a reduction in well-being counts as an unreasonable reduction, 
fails to capture those instances when people’s actual level of well-being before 
complying with a moral obligation is constituted by personal commitments that 
are deemed as immoral or imprudent. If someone’s commitments give rise to 
immoral or imprudent behaviour, then a reduction in well-being that arises from 
refraining from this behaviour should not count as unreasonably costly or over-
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demanding. For example, it may be that fully complying with a particular moral 
demand will require slave-owner Michael to sell his slaves. If this causes a 
reduction in Michael’s well-being, this reduction should not count as unreasonably 
costly for Michael: he should not have owned slaves in the first place given that 
doing so is morally impermissible. Instead, it should be specified that alienation 
causes unreasonable coasts only if our deeply held commitments are legitimate. 
This is to adopt a ‘normative status-quo’, whereby a loss in well-being caused by 
foregoing immoral and imprudent behaviour does not count as an unreasonable 
loss (Sin: 166; Hooker 2009). 
It could be objected that this normatively loaded way of determining what 
counts as an unreasonable sacrifice potentially begs the question. The normative 
status-quo is meant to determine when an agent’s compromise of her deep 
normative commitments is unreasonable. However, if we adopt the normative 
status-quo then what counts as unreasonably demanding will depend on the 
various commitments of the particular moral theory that we are appealing to. This 
is because some non-moral commitments will have to be classed as morally 
impermissible and in order for this to be determined, we need to already know 
what counts as reasonably demanding. In order to determine whether an agent’s 
non-moral commitments are morally permissible, we already need to have an 
account of which moral requirements involve an unreasonable sacrifice of our 
deep normative commitments, because these are the moral requirements that are 
meant to tell us whether the non-moral concerns counts as morally permissible. 
But this is exactly what the normative status-quo account is meant to tell us (Sin: 
167; Hooker 2009). 
To explain further, take the example of Genghis Khan, whose deep 
normative commitments involve the development of his talent for killing innocent 
people. Khan’s level of well-being is determined by his deep normative 
commitments that are morally impermissible, and so we do not want to say that 
a reduction in his well-being caused by him giving up these morally impermissible 
commitments is unreasonably costly for him. However, in order to arrive at the 
claim that alienation from Khan’s personal commitments does not count as an 
unreasonable sacrifice, we have to be able to claim that Khan’s non-moral 
commitments are not normatively weighty enough to trump the moral demand to 
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refrain from killing innocent people. The normative status-quo was meant to 
provide a way to make such an assessment, that the non-moral concerns are not 
normatively weighty or whether or not the relevant moral concerns are not 
normatively weighty. But by providing a normative threshold which excludes 
certain non-moral concerns due to their being morally unacceptable, there may 
be a worry that we are already assuming what we are meant to be arguing for. It 
seems like we might have in place an idea about which moral concerns are too 
demanding or which non-moral concerns are weight enough to trump certain moral 
concerns, and this is just to assume what the normative status-quo was meant to 
determine. 
We can respond to this worry, however, by highlighting that we expect Khan 
to refrain from developing his talent for killing innocent people because doing so 
was not considered to be morally permissible. This means that the obligation to 
develop his talent conflicted with other moral requirements of the moral theory. 
As a result, there would in fact be no prima facie moral obligation for Khan to 
develop his talents in the first place, and the reason why Khan’s alienation counts 
as a reasonable sacrifice is because there is in fact no requirement for him to 
develop his talents; morality places no such demand on him. The point is that the 
development of Khan’s talent is not morally permissible, let alone morally 
required. 
 If a moral theory does require a person to develop their talents, given the 
fact that doing so does not conflict with the other moral commitments of that 
theory, then we have to assume that the moral theory is internally consistent in 
prescribing such an obligation, otherwise, there would be no such moral 
requirement to do so. In this way, we would always have a moral reason to develop 
our talents if doing so was morally required of us, and there is nothing suspicious 
about prescribing that one’s deeply held normative commitments ought to be 
morally permissible if their sacrifice counts as unreasonably costly; it is up to the 
particular moral theory in question to provide an account of what is morally 
permissible in each case. Our concern with demandingness does not touch on what 
a morally theory allows, but only what a moral theory demands, and presumably, 
if a moral theory demands something, then it necessarily also has to be allowed  
in the first place. 
134 
 
 
 
Given that an agent’s deeply held normative commitments are morally 
permissible, and given that they conflict with her moral obligation to develop her 
talents, the question now stands how we determine whether that conflict counts 
as an unreasonable sacrifice in well-being. I propose that this can be determined 
by referring to the endorsement constraint, stated as follows: 
Demandingness Endorsement Constraint. The moral obligation to develop 
one’s talent T is reasonably demanding for agent A if and only if A endorses 
(or would endorse if under optimal decision-making conditions) the 
normative requirements necessary to bring about T, as part of or 
complimentary to A’s (morally permissibly) deeply held normative 
commitments. 
If the endorsement constraint is not met, then the moral obligation to develop 
one’s talents is overly demanding. For the remainder of this chapter, I will argue 
for my claim that the endorsement constraint is necessary for determining 
whether the moral requirement to develop one’s talents constitutes an 
unreasonable sacrifice of well-being. 
4.4.2. The Endorsement Constraint Revisited 
So far I have argued that if the normative commitments required to bring about 
the development of one’s talent conflict with one’s deeply held personal 
commitments, then this will result in alienation, and a reduction of one’s well-
being. This alienation occurs because one’s personal commitments are significant 
enough to bestow one’s life with meaning and shape one’s sense of who one is and 
the values one holds. Having to act contrary to these commitments would be 
highly costly in terms of well-being. The question remains, however, as to whether 
this cost in well-being counts as unreasonably demanding. 
In the last chapter I argued for the endorsement constraint, claiming that 
for talent development to be a constitutive part of one’s well-being, the agent 
must endorse the commitments that are necessarily required to bring about the 
development of her talent as complimentary to or part of her deeply held personal 
commitments. The agent’s endorsement is a necessary part of what makes talent 
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development prudentially good, and without the agent’s endorsement, doing so 
would not be prudentially good for her. 
I also argue that the endorsement constraint is necessary when determining 
whether the moral obligation to develop one’s talents is overly demanding. This 
is because the demandingness objection that I have been advocating thus far 
understands demandingness in terms of an agent’s level of well-being. Given the 
endorsement constraint, developing one’s talent does not contribute to one’s 
well-being unless one also endorses the requirements that are necessary to bring 
about the development of one’s talent. As such, developing a talent, the 
commitments of which you do not endorse, is not good for you and will result in a 
lack of fit with one’s own deeply held personal commitments. That is to say, this 
lack of endorsement will result in a significant reduction in one’s well-being. This 
reduction in well-being is a result of the alienation that is caused when an agent 
acts contrary to the commitments in her life that give her meaning and define her 
sense of who she is. Disregarding these personal commitments will always be 
unreasonably costly in terms of well-being. As such, the agent’s endorsement of 
the normative commitments that come with the development of her talent is 
necessary for that development to count as reasonably demanding.  
 It could be objected, however, that endorsement cannot play such a 
significant role in determining whether the moral obligation to develop one’s 
talents is unreasonably demanding. Take this case as an example. Tom has a talent 
for scientific research, and given an outbreak of a deadly disease X, Tom is asked 
by the World Health Organisation to leave his family behind and give up his career 
as a gardener to help find the cure for X. Furthermore, according to the moral 
theory that Tom, and for the sake of this example, we all adhere to, Tom is 
morally required to do what the World Health Organisation asks of him. Tom 
decides, however, that developing his scientific talent does not fit with his own 
deep normative commitments. As a result, after considered reflection under the 
optimal conditions that are conducive to making good decisions about his well-
being and conception of the good, Tom does not endorse the normative 
commitments that come with the further development of his talent. Under my 
account of the demandingness objection, this means that the moral obligation for 
Tom to develop his talent is unreasonably demanding. 
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However, morality sometimes requires us to do things that aren’t always 
prudentially beneficial. For example, I may be morally required to give my friend 
the money that I owe her and I may be required to donate a percentage of my 
salary or volunteer some of my time to helping those who are in need, even though 
this means I have to neglect some other prudential commitments. The fact that 
what morality requires may be contrary to what I endorse, does not necessarily 
give me an authoritative reason to act contrary to what morality requires. This 
means that Tom’s lack of endorsement of his talent development does not mean 
that the moral obligation to do so is unreasonably demanding; the demandingness 
may in fact be reasonable. The objection, therefore, claims that a lack of 
endorsement cannot tell us that demandingness is unreasonable, as opposed to 
the reasonable kind that is accepted of morality more generally.  
To respond to this objection, it is important to stress that one’s 
endorsement does not appeal to mere ‘wants’ or ‘likes’ or ‘desires’. The 
endorsement constraint does not justify Tom deciding to act against his moral 
obligation to develop his talent merely on a whim, or because he preferred 
spending time with his family or continuing his career as a gardener rather than 
acting to prevent the spread of disease X. Endorsement is a considered reflection 
about the fit of the normative commitments that are necessary for the 
development of one’s talent, with one’s own deeply held personal commitments. 
These personal commitments are normative and give value and meaning to one’s 
life, provide reasons for action and shape one’s conception of the good life. Acting 
contrary to these deeply held commitments is just to take away one’s meaning, 
one’s reasons for actions, and to impose central projects that go against one’s 
conception of the good life. This kind of personal imposition does not necessarily 
arise when morality merely asks of an agent to give up material goods, for 
example, by giving more money to charity or paying more taxes in order to fund a 
social welfare system. One does not necessarily have to compromise one’s 
character or sense of who one is in order to make material sacrifices. 
If an action or state of affairs conflicts with one’s deep normative 
commitments, then something has gone prima facie wrong – an agent’s sense of 
self and meaning in her life should not be compromised lightly. Such a violation 
has serious normative consequences. For example, a caring and loving parent 
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would find it extremely painful to act in such a way that hindered and neglected 
the well-being of her children; this is because as a parent, one’s deeply held 
normative commitments include the conviction to care for the welfare of one’s 
child. If developing one’s talent meant that this would harm one’s child in some 
way, or hinder the parental relationship with one’s child, then this would count 
as a conflict with one’s deeply held normative commitments. This conflict would 
have to be taken very seriously when deciding what one has an all-things-
considered reason to do. 
As such, the reduction in Tom’s well-being if he developed his talent would 
be significantly costly to his well-being – it would be an imposition on his character 
and his ability to determine and live by his own conception of what is meaningful 
in his life. This cost and imposition is therefore only reasonable if he endorses the 
normative commitments that are necessary for the development of his talent as 
fitting with his deeply held personal commitments. 
It could still be argued that there may be cases in which even this costly 
sacrifice to one’s well-being does not override the moral requirement to develop 
one’s talents. It may the case, therefore, that Tom should compromise his deeply 
held personal commitments by neglecting his career and his family, and instead 
develop his scientific talents so as to prevent the spread of the deadly disease. 
For example, in emergency situations such as war-time or severe health 
epidemics, what is morally required of us is expected to be extreme and highly-
demanding. Under these circumstances there may times in which we would expect 
that a person ought to change who they are and neglect their deeply held 
commitments; for example, during the Second World War, British citizens were 
expected to forgo family and career commitments in order to help with the war 
effort. 
I do not necessarily deny this; in these emergency situations morality may 
be extremely demanding, and this demandingness may be reasonable irrespective 
of agent’s lack of endorsement of the commitments that come with the moral 
requirements. For the purposes of the arguments that I have presented thus far, I 
have been assuming that the normal moral situation we find ourselves in every 
day is not an emergency in this way. Some consequentialists have argued contrary 
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to this assumption, claiming that the world in which we currently live does require 
extreme morality, such that we ought to consider ourselves as living in emergency-
like situations given the severe inequality of resources and welfare that is 
apparent in different parts of the world (Singer 1972). However, not all 
consequentialists argue in this strong way (see for example Railton 1984), and 
furthermore, there have been recent real-life cases that mitigate such a strong 
claim. For example, the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa was considered to 
be an emergency situation by the World Health Organisation, and nurses and 
doctors from all countries were encouraged to donate their time to volunteer in 
support of the relief efforts. However, it is one thing to say that these nurses and 
doctors were doing something morally praiseworthy, and quite another to say that 
they were morally obligated to neglect their meaningful personal commitments to 
risk their lives to stop the spread of Ebola. As such, even in emergency situations, 
we can still consider these acts to be supererogatory, rather than morally 
demanded of us.44 
Therefore, the endorsement constraint is applicable in all but the most 
severe emergency situations in which normal moral and societal conventions are 
disrupted. Under these conditions, the moral obligation to develop one’s talents 
will only be classed as reasonably demanding insofar as an agent endorses the 
normative commitments that are necessarily required in order to bring about her 
compliance with that obligation. With that said, it is important to highlight that 
the endorsement constraint is a condition specifically on the reasonableness of 
the moral demand to develop one’s talents, and does not specify a constraint on 
all moral requirements. My view, therefore, leaves room for the fact that there 
may be some moral obligations that are not constrained by an agent’s 
endorsement of the normative commitments necessarily required to comply with 
that obligation. The endorsement constraint does however constrain what 
morality can demand of an agent with regards to the development of her talents. 
As a result, the demandingness objection with regards to the moral obligation to 
develop one’s talents is plausibly grounded in the endorsement constraint. In the 
                                                          
44 I will leave for further research the question of the role that the endorsement constraint 
plays in determining what is required of us all-things-considered in emergency situations 
like the ones that I have just described. In the meantime, for an interesting discussion of 
emergency morality see Sorrell (2003). 
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next section I respond to three further objections that can be raised against my 
formulation of demandingness objection, understood in terms of the endorsement 
constraint. 
 
4.5. Three Further Objections 
Objection One. It has been argued that the demandingness objection mistakenly 
assumes a clear distinction between moral reasons and non-moral reasons. Such a 
distinction is argued to be implausible given the fact the moral and non-moral 
spheres do not involve distinct points of view or appeal to a distinct and unique 
set of reasons (Crisp 1997; Raz 1986, 2000; Bagnoli: 3). However, my formulation 
of the demandingness objection does not rely on carving up moral and non-moral 
considerations into distinct domains. As I have argued, the demandingness 
objection with regards to the moral obligation to develop one’s talents is still 
conceivable even if we incorporate our non-moral concerns into the moral sphere, 
or even if we consider our non-moral and moral commitments as distinct. If the 
moral obligation to develop one’s talents is over-demanding, it is because it 
involves an unreasonable reduction in an agent’s well-being. Whether this 
reduction is considered part of the moral sphere or the non-moral sphere, a 
combination of both, or even if such a distinction cannot be made, this does not 
affect the plausibility of the arguments offered in this chapter. The 
demandingness objection still holds irrespective of how we name or categorise the 
sphere in which one’s deeply held personal commitments belong. 
Objection Two. The demandingness objection has been objected to based 
on the fact that it is thought to merely rely on intuitions about what counts as 
reasonable for an agent to sacrifice. The problem with this is that our intuitions 
are often unreliable and grounded on a socialisation process that is indexed to the 
way in which we have been brought up and influenced by those around us 
(Braddock: 175). This means that the demandingness objection is based on highly 
contingent intuitions that are unstable, unreliable, and often distorted (Berkey: 
3018-3023). However, the demandingness objection that I raise with regards to 
the moral obligation to develop one’s talents is not grounded on an appeal to 
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intuition, but on the endorsement constraint which, as I have argued, relies on an 
agent’s considered judgement regarding the fit of her personal commitments with 
the development of her talent. 
Objection Three. David Sobel has further argued against the demandingness 
objection on the grounds that by itself, the objection does not do any substantial 
work in rejecting a particular moral theory. Focussing on consequentialism, Sobel 
argues that the demandingness objection already assumes various anti-
consequentialist intuitions in order to get off the ground, and so cannot by itself 
be a rejection of consequentialism. This means that if we are at all persuaded by 
the demandingness objection, it is because we have already rejected the 
substantive claims of consequentialism, the theory that we were trying to argue 
was over-demanding. Sobel claims that to formulate the demandingness objection 
we would, for example, already have had to normatively distinguish between the 
costs to the person who is required to perform the action, and the cost to the 
person who is meant to benefit from the action. But consequentialism does not 
make this substantive distinction and is committed to the claim that in fact such 
a distinction cannot be made (Sobel 2007: 4). 
Sobel’s objection is not a problem for the demandingness objection that I 
present with regards to the moral obligation to develop one’s talents. This is for 
two reasons. First, it is not clear that all consequentialists do not distinguish 
between the cost to the giver and the cost to the receiver, such that there is no 
significant weight given to the personal cost involved for the agent who is required 
to act. This is evident in those variations of consequentialism that incorporate 
one’s non-moral concerns in the moral sphere (Railton 1984; Scheffler 1994). 
Sobel’s objection is thus only relevant to a very small group of moral theories. 
Furthermore, my iteration of the demandingness objection does not focus on one 
particular moral theory, but the content of the moral obligation to develop one’s 
talents. This means my demandingness objection holds no matter which moral 
theory is being scrutinised. 
Second, the demandingness objection that I propose does not merely 
assume that an agent’s sacrifice when carrying out the moral obligation to develop 
her talents is unreasonably costly – it argues for this and explains why the 
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demandingness objection should hold. I have argued why we should consider as 
problematic the reduction in well-being that occurs when developing one’s talents 
conflicts with one’s deep normative commitments, and why this reduction is 
enough to render the moral obligation to develop one’s talents as unreasonably 
demanding. As such, Sobel’s objection does not hold against the demandingness 
objection that I have argued for in this chapter.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that if a moral theory is to plausibly claim that an 
agent has a moral obligation to develop her talents, then that obligation will be 
conditional on the agent’s endorsement of the normative commitments that are 
required to bring about the development of her talents. Without this 
endorsement, the development of one’s talent is unreasonably demanding. 
 There are two different ways in which to understand how this endorsement 
constraint places a condition on whether or not one has a moral obligation to 
develop one’s talents. This difference depends on whether or not we accept 
morality as overriding. On the one hand, we might be moral rationalists and accept 
that morality overrides one’s non-moral concerns when deciding what we ought 
to do all-things-considered. In trying to avoid the over-demandingness objection, 
we would attempt to incorporate deeply held non-moral concerns into the moral 
sphere. If this is the case, and the agent does not endorse the development of her 
talent, then the moral obligation to do so will only be prima facie, as no such 
obligation would be generated from the moral theory in the first place. 
On the other hand, we might deny the fact that morality is authoritative 
over our non-moral concerns and, for example, follow Dorsey’s view that non-
moral concerns can trump moral ones on the occasions when they are sufficiently 
normatively weighty. If this is the case, and a moral theory requires that an agent 
ought to develop her talents, then this obligation will be pro tanto; the agent’s 
endorsement is relevant here when determining whether she ought to comply with 
this obligation all-things-considered. As such, if an agent does not endorse the 
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commitments necessary to bring about the development of her talent, the pro 
tanto moral obligation can be overridden insofar as it is overly demanding. 
Therefore, the demandingness objection that I propose will place conditions on 
either the pro tanto obligation or the all-things-considered obligation to develop 
one’s talents, depending on whether or not we accept morality’s purported 
overridingness over one’s non-moral concerns.  
 At this point there are a few general conclusions that can be drawn from 
the last three chapters, regarding the potential obligation and reasons that one 
may have to develop one’s talents. First, both Kant and moral perfectionists 
explicitly claim that there is a moral duty to develop one’s talents; this is because 
doing so was considered to be necessary for the development of one’s moral 
agency. However, in Chapters Two and Three I argued that these two theories 
cannot in fact generate from their commitments the moral obligation to develop 
one’s talents – it is not true that talent development is necessary for the 
preservation and perfection of one’s moral agency. In Chapter Three I further 
argued that welfare perfectionists cannot plausibly claim that developing one’s 
talent is objectively prudentially good and constitutive of an agent’s flourishing. 
This is because the claim that we have good prudential reasons to develop our 
talents is conditional on meeting the endorsement constraint. Welfare 
perfectionism as it stands does not meet this condition. (But a plausible version 
of hybrid perfectionism might). 
In this chapter I argued that endorsement also acts as a constraint on the 
reasonable demandingness of the potential moral obligation to develop one’s 
talents. Without an agent’s endorsement, the moral obligation to develop her 
talents is unreasonably demanding. This means that whether or not an agent has 
a moral obligation to develop her talent is conditional on the agent’s endorsement 
of that development. If we are moral rationalists then the endorsement constraint 
places a condition on whether or not the obligation is pro tanto, and if we reject 
moral rationalism then the endorsement constraint places a condition on whether 
the obligation is one we ought to comply with all-things-considered. In the next 
chapter I move on to focus on the relationship between talent development and 
the value of equality, and how we ought to respond to the problem of unequal 
talents. 
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Chapter Five 
Talents and Equality 
 
5.1. Introduction 
So far I have argued that for talent development to be a constitutive part of one’s 
well-being, or morally required, then one has to endorse the normative 
commitments that are necessary to bring about the development of one’s talent, 
as specified by the endorsement constraint. If there is no such endorsement, the 
development of one’s talent is not prudentially good, and the moral obligation to 
develop one’s talents is unreasonably demanding.  
 In this chapter I turn to the social and political questions that arise when 
considering the role that talents play in our lives. The resources produced and 
consumed by identifying and utilising our talents will often impact on how 
resources are distributed and social institutions are organised. Given that a talent 
allows a person to more efficiently and uniquely develop a particular set of skills, 
this social impact is often thought to be positive, in a way that talent development 
is considered to be beneficial for society, allowing social institutions to function 
more productively and efficiently. 
There is widespread consensus, therefore, that the state has good reason 
to identify talents in its citizens and to encourage their development, either 
directly or indirectly. This is illustrated by the increasingly commonplace talent 
development programmes within commercial and social institutions; for example, 
the government-funded ‘UK Sport’ now boasts their “biggest ever” talent 
identification and development programme (UK Sport 2015), the national arts 
bodies of both England and Scotland have stated that talent development 
programmes are of primary importance,45 and in the commercial sector, the 
                                                          
45 See Arts Council England’s latest ‘10-Year Strategic Framework’, in which it is claimed 
that “[t]alent is our primary resource”, and that they aim to “[i]nvest in arts organisations 
that are committed to the development of artistic talent” (Arts Council England 2017). 
144 
 
 
 
debate surrounding how best to attract and manage talent has become 
increasingly fashionable, with consulting firms such as McKinsey & Company and 
PwC offering services that claim to aid clients in their attempt to ‘win the war for 
talent’.46 As such, institutionalised talent programmes are a commonplace feature 
of most contemporary western societies, thought to garner widespread positive 
benefits. 
 Institutionalised talent identification and development may give rise to 
positive benefits. However, egalitarians worry that it may also unjustly disrupt 
levels of social equality, because recognising some levels of ability specifically as 
‘talents’, and encouraging their further development, is just to identify unfair 
inequalities in ability and to further propagate the arising unequal advantages. 
When the state becomes involved, the acknowledgement and proliferation of 
unequal talents is institutionally accepted, endorsed and acted upon. Even though 
we may endorse the commitments that come with the development of our talents, 
and even if doing so is morally required or a constitutive part of our well-being, 
egalitarianism thus tells us that we ought to be sensitive to the fact that talents 
are unequally distributed in society – it is just a brute fact that some people are 
more talented than others. This egalitarian concern gives rise to an axiological 
tension; on the one hand, we recognise the value in identifying and developing 
our talents, but on the other hand, doing so potentially gives rise to inequalities 
that are unjust. 
Given the fact of unequal talents and the egalitarian challenge that this 
poses, in this chapter I examine how we ought to answer to this egalitarian 
challenge and how best to counteract the problem of unequal talents. To do so I 
focus on the debate between two prominent, yet contrasting accounts of 
egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism on the one hand, and relational egalitarianism 
on the other, adjudicating which theory best argues for how we ought to 
                                                          
See also Creative Scotland’s 10-year plan, ‘Unlocking Potential, Embracing Ambition’, 
which sets out as a priority the “support [of] emerging talent” and to encourage 
organisations to “develop talent and skills” (Creative Scotland 2014). 
46 See for example McKinsey & Company’s ‘Human Capital’ department, which aims to 
help clients “turn talent into a source of competitive advantage” (McKinsey & Company 
2017), and PwC’s talent management program which claims to provide clients with the 
means to “attract and retain talented people” (PwC 2017). 
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counteract the disadvantages caused by unequal levels of talent. The theory that 
offers the best response, I claim, will be the theory that most plausibly frames 
why unequal talents disrupt levels of equality, and why any arising inequalities 
count as unjust.  
Luck egalitarians claim that inequalities in talent are unjust when they are 
a matter of bad brute luck and disrupt a person’s comparative level of advantage, 
whilst relational egalitarians claim that these inequalities are unjust when they 
disrupt the equality of ‘relational’ goods. I argue that even though some unequal 
advantages arising from unequal talents may be ‘relational’, this does not mean 
that we ought to adopt the theory of relational egalitarianism in order to explain 
why inequalities in talent are unjust, or how we ought to counteract these 
inequalities. This is because relational egalitarianism is misguided when it comes 
to assessing why we value talents and the advantages that developing our talents 
can give us. In light of this, I propose that luck egalitarianism provides a more 
plausible account of how to respond to the problem of unequal talents, a response 
which is informed by the luck egalitarian account of why unequal talents are 
unjust.  
The structure of the chapter will be as follows. In the next section I analyse 
why talents matter for egalitarian justice, and what grounds the egalitarian 
challenge posed by unequal talents. In doing so I refer back to the account of the 
nature and value of talent that I developed in Chapter One. In Section Three I 
outline the luck egalitarian position regarding the distribution of unequal talents, 
and in Section Four I discuss the relational egalitarian position, illustrating two 
ways in which relational inequalities may arise from unequal levels of talent. In 
Section Five I argue that luck egalitarians can in fact successfully accommodate 
these relational inequalities into their own view, and in some respects do so more 
effectively than relational egalitarians themselves. As a result, in Section Six I 
make a case for my claim that luck egalitarianism, rather than relational 
egalitarianism, offers a more plausible account of how to counteract the injustices 
that arise from unequal talents. Luck egalitarians advocate a neutralisation 
approach, which I argue most plausibly captures the reasons for why unequal 
talents disrupt levels of equality, and why the arising inequalities count as unjust. 
In Section Seven I conclude. 
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5.2. Why Unequal Talents Matter 
Given that some people are more talented than others, levels of talent are 
distributed unequally in society. In the literature on egalitarian justice, discussion 
of unequal talents has centred on the question of the nature of this inequality, 
and the extent to which these inequalities are considered to be unjust. However, 
despite the fact that this debate has been ongoing for some time now, it is often 
not clear what is meant by the notion of a talent, why talents are considered to 
be valuable, and as such, why talents matter for concerns of egalitarian justice. 
Before going on to present my case for luck egalitarianism, it is therefore 
important to resolve this ambiguity and clearly state why unequal talents are 
thought to disrupt equality.  
There are two ways in which this ambiguity about the nature and value of 
talent presents itself in the existing literature. First, there is a conceptual 
incoherence; as I highlighted in Chapter One, the word ‘talent’ is often used as 
synonymous with the words ‘ability’, ‘endowment’ and ‘capacity’. Dworkin and 
Rawls, for example, use the words ‘talent’, ‘ability’ and ‘skill’ interchangeably 
(Dworkin 2000: 92, 97; Rawls 1999: 63, 73), Cohen refers synonymously to a talent 
as a ‘capacity’, and Anderson considers a talent to be an ‘endowment’ (Cohen 
2011: 30; Anderson 1999: 302). Although these differences could be interpreted 
as a mere terminological oversight, there is in fact a substantive issue at stake. 
Abilities and skills, on the one hand, are usually considered to be personal 
competencies that have already been nurtured or developed to some extent. 
Capacities and endowments, on the other hand, are considered to be dispositional 
potential for a skill or ability that has yet to be expressed or cultivated. Both ways 
of referring to a talent highlight an attractive or significant aspect of what a talent 
might be. However, whichever definition we adopt will have different implications 
for how we understand the nature of the inequalities that arise from unequal 
talents. 
In Chapter One I argued for an account of talent understood as a 
dispositional quality, a high level of potential for a particular skill that is 
manifested and expressed in the excellent acquisition of that skill. A talent is 
potential that is expressed as an excellence in skill acquisition, and as such, it 
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gives rise to or opens up an opportunity that when nurtured and utilised can give 
a person access to various kinds of valuable advantages. The fact that talents give 
rise to valuable opportunities appears to come across as the primary 
understanding of a ‘talent’ in the literature on egalitarian justice, although this 
is far from explicit or obvious. For example, Anderson states that talents are 
valuable insofar as they are developed into a valuable acquisition of certain skills, 
and similarly Dworkin claims that talents offer the potential for future success 
once they have been nurtured (Anderson 2007: 615; Dworkin 2000: 92). As such, 
talents are valued due to the fact that they can be advantageously developed. 
This does not rule out that the talent may already have been developed to some 
extent, but only specifies that the value of a talent is indexed to the fact that 
they can be developed and nurtured, and that this development is advantageous. 
 It is important to emphasise that talents are not only valued as the potential 
to develop any skill. Instead, as Dworkin claims, we value talents for the 
opportunities that they give us to develop a skill that proves to be advantageous 
for the individual who possesses it, allowing them to flourish and succeed (Dworkin 
2000: 92). Rawls too considers a talent to be an ‘asset’, suggesting that talents 
have the potential to offer some kind of useful benefit if developed, both for the 
talented individual and for those around her; in this way, Rawls claims that talents 
have ‘exchange value’ (Rawls 1999: 63). This value can be explained by the 
account of talents I presented in Chapter One: talents allow a person to more 
efficiently, productively and uniquely develop a particular set of skills, and the 
way in which a person benefits from their talent will in part depend on contingent 
facts about the type of skill that is developed, the way in which one’s society 
values that skill, and how the comparison thresholds are set for calculating what 
counts as a ‘superior’ ability. As a result, the value of a talent is sensitive to the 
axiological commitments of one’s society. 
 Talents therefore give a person access to various kinds of personal and 
social advantages when they are developed, and this value often rests on already 
existing social arrangements and commitments. It is because talents are valued in 
this way that they are significant for accounts of egalitarian justice; we worry 
about unequal levels of talent in society as being prima facie unjust because it 
signals a social inequality in something that matters to us, something that may 
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give us valuable and advantageous opportunities that are important for the way 
in which we successfully live our lives. 
 The second ambiguity that arises in the literature regarding the nature and 
value of talents is based on an assumption about how talents emerge in the first 
place. It is widely assumed by most egalitarians that talents are something 
‘genetic’, ‘natural’, or ‘inborn’, and that these ‘native’ qualities are merely 
expressed by the relevant social environments in which a person finds herself (see 
Kymlicka 1990: 61-80; Dworkin 2000: 65-119; Cohen 2011: 19, 30; Anderson 1999: 
302). Given this, the question that is often asked in the literature is how society 
ought to deal with arising inequalities in ‘natural’ talents once they have already 
emerged. Seeing as talents are ‘natural’, there is nothing that society can do but 
mitigate any negative social effects that materialise from unequal levels of talent. 
 However, as I argued in Chapter One, the scientific evidence makes it clear 
that this ‘naturalist’ way of understanding the emergence of talents is incorrect. 
It is not the case that talents are natural, but instead one’s genetic make-up and 
social environment dynamically interact to play a constitutive role in the way that 
talents are formed (Fishkin: 115). One’s genes are not merely expressed, but are 
also constructed in response to one’s surrounding social environment. This means 
that social structures can directly shape one’s genetic predisposition, and 
therefore, one’s level of talent. Therefore, talents are not merely ‘natural’ or 
‘inborn’ but are in part a direct product of one’s social environment. 
 This means that one’s social opportunities can affect a person’s level of 
talent before and after they are born, and by the time we come to initially identify 
and assess levels of talent there will have already been normatively significant 
social interactions that have shaped one’s level of potential for a particular skill. 
The focus in the egalitarian debate with regards to how ‘natural’ talents are to 
be mitigated is therefore misguided. It is not the fact that a person is born with a 
level of talent and only after this fact is society asked to deal with the arising 
inequalities. Instead, the mere fact that there are unequal levels of talent also 
points to the fact that people have experienced unequal levels of formative and 
developmental experiences in their social environment; a person’s level of talent 
is as much a symptom of both natural and social factors. The egalitarian debate 
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should not only ask how society ought to be organised given unequal levels of 
talent, but how society ought to be organised so as to respond to unequal levels 
of talent in the first place. 
 By making clear the way in which we should understand the notion of a 
talent and why talents are valuable, this has made explicit why unequal levels of 
talent should matter for egalitarian justice – talents give rise to inequalities in 
advantageous opportunities for development. Arriving at this claim has been 
important, not just to provide clarity for what follows, but also because the 
arguments I present later in the chapter to support luck egalitarianism rest on an 
account of why talents are valuable and how unequal levels of talent disrupt levels 
of social equality. In the next section I begin by explaining the basic commitments 
of luck egalitarianism, and why it considers levels of talent to be something that 
ought to be distributed equally in society. 
 
5.3. Luck Egalitarianism and Unequal Talents 
The version of luck egalitarianism that I adopt and argue for in this chapter can 
be stated as follows: it is unjust for one to be comparatively disadvantaged with 
respect to what is valuable in one’s life, to the extent that this level of 
disadvantage is a matter of bad brute luck, both natural and social (Segall: 6). 
Underlying this claim is the intuition that people should not be disadvantaged 
through no fault of their own. Because of this, luck egalitarians consider instances 
of brute luck – luck that arises due to a person’s circumstances over which she has 
no control – to be morally arbitrary, because a person could not have reasonably 
avoided the effects of this luck and so are not at fault for the arising 
disadvantages. As Cohen states, the purpose of egalitarian justice is “to eliminate 
involuntary disadvantage, by which I (stipulatively) mean disadvantage for which 
the sufferer cannot be held responsible, since it does not appropriately reflect 
the choices that he has made or is making or would make” (Cohen 2011: 13). In 
150 
 
 
 
light of this, luck egalitarianism considers the fair and equal organisation of 
society and allocation of resources to be sensitive to brute luck.47 
At this point, it is important to make four qualifications to the luck 
egalitarian position I have just outlined. First, luck egalitarians judge states of 
affairs and levels of disadvantage comparatively; luck and choice only matter if 
they disrupt levels of distributive equality across members of society. Second, the 
luck egalitarian concern about inequalities is not triggered by any instance of 
inequality tout court, but only by comparative disadvantages. It is only when 
someone is comparatively disadvantaged by their level of talent, for example, 
that the luck egalitarian begins to assess whether this disadvantage counts as 
unjust.48 
Third, the most attractive luck egalitarian position is one that only kicks in 
after a basic humanitarian threshold, so that those who are comparatively 
disadvantaged in such a way that hinders their opportunity to lead a minimally 
decent life, are given the necessary assistance, irrespective of whether these 
disadvantages arise as a matter of brute luck (Tan: 100). By including into the 
theory a minimal threshold only after which the sensitivity to brute luck is 
relevant, this allows the luck egalitarian to respond to the worry that their theory 
                                                          
47 Some versions of luck egalitarianism focus on whether or not a person is responsible for 
the arising comparative disadvantages (see for example Dworkin 2000). However, for the 
purposes of this chapter, I need only focus on the fact that luck egalitarians are sensitive 
to bad brute luck – this allows me to leave aside the question of what counts as 
responsibility, and whether there is a robust distinction between luck on the one hand, 
and responsibility on the other.  
48 Luck egalitarians are often criticised for worrying about luck tout court on the effect 
of distributive justice, even when that effect is a relative advantage rather than merely 
a disadvantage (Schwartz: 253). However, the most plausible and attractive account of 
luck egalitarianism will only consider as normatively salient the disadvantages caused by 
differential luck, that is, when the luck in question is bad luck. To present an argument 
for this claim is beyond the scope of this chapter; for an already existing discussion in the 
literature see Shlomi Segall (2013): 40-42; Hirose & Segall (2016): 18; Lippert-Rasmussen 
(2005): 262. 
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is unattractively harsh, allowing those who are left destitute due to factors that 
are not a matter of brute luck, to suffer without assistance (Anderson 1999: 295).49 
Finally, it also important to qualify that the most attractive version of luck 
egalitarianism will not make any substantive presuppositions or presumptions 
about what counts as brute luck. In this sense, the theory is ‘thin’ rather than 
‘thick’, merely claiming that what counts as an unjust inequality is one that gives 
rise to a comparative disadvantage that is caused by brute luck. For example, 
according to Cohen, the luck egalitarian position merely states that “all innate 
and otherwise (in the broadest sense) inherited differences of advantage are, 
accordingly unjust” (Cohen 2011: 117), and that “if there is no such thing [as 
genuine choice] – because, for example “hard determinism” is true – then all 
differential advantage is unjust” (Cohen 2011: 60). This leaves open the 
substantial question about what actually counts as matter of brute luck.50 
When it comes to assessing whether unequal levels of talent count as 
unjust, the luck egalitarian will therefore appeal to the principle that a person’s 
                                                          
49 It will, of course, need to be determined what counts as a minimally decent life and 
what counts as the minimal threshold below which the luck egalitarian position is not 
relevant. 
50 It has been objected that appealing to a ‘thin’ notion of luck might leave the luck 
egalitarian having to admit that everything is a result of brute luck, because the way in 
which we make choices may in fact be a result of factors that are a matter of brute luck 
and so beyond our control. If this is the case, then this would contradict the common-
sense belief that we can hold people morally responsible for their actions when they have 
chosen to do something morally wrong (for a version of this objection see for example 
Scheffler 2005; Colburn 2010; Rawls 1999: 178, 197; Rawls 1993: 13, 19-20; Sher: 410; 
Dworkin 2000: 7, 323; Mason 2006: 92). However, if it really is true that all choices are 
made in a way that depends entirely on bad brute luck, then it is strange to think that 
given this metaphysical truth, we would consider someone in control, and thus 
responsible, for their choices. Advocates of luck egalitarianism have also responded to 
this worry by noting that even if it is metaphysically true that the way in which we make 
choices in entirely a result of bad brute luck, our notion of moral responsibility need not 
be grounded in this metaphysical claim. Rather, our notion of moral responsibility can be 
socially determined and prescribed in whatever way is amenable to account for moral 
blame and praise. This normative account of moral responsibility does not, however, 
affect the luck egalitarian claim that metaphysically speaking, there may be instances of 
choice-making that are entirely determined by one’s bad brute luck; see for example Kok-
Char Tan (2012: 93, 137) and McTernan (2016). Carl Knight (2009; 2013) argues against 
this kind of move made by advocates of luck egalitarianism. 
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relative level of advantage should not depend on what is a matter of brute luck. 
However, there are good reasons to think that a person’s level of talent is in fact 
a result of brute luck and factors over which one has control. As I argued in 
Chapter One, one’s talents emerge partly as a result of one’s environment, and 
this environment is also shaped by the way in which one chooses to interact with 
it. As such, most egalitarians accept that one’s level of talent is partly shaped by 
one’s choices and is not merely a result of brute luck.51 Considering that luck 
egalitarianism should be understood as a ‘thin’ theory in the way that I described 
above, it is not up to the luck egalitarian to determine exactly which part of one’s 
talent is and is not a matter of brute luck. Rather, the luck egalitarian claim is 
only that given the fact that there is some part of a person’s level of talent that 
is a result of brute luck, any arising comparative disadvantages that are a matter 
of this brute luck will count as unjust.52 
Having outlined the luck egalitarian position with regards to unequal 
talents, in the next section I explain the way in which relational egalitarians 
account for the injustice of unequal talents. As I will go on to show, even though 
unequal talents may give rise to an injustice that is relational in nature, this does 
not mean that relational egalitarianism is the best theory to plausibly frame why 
                                                          
51 On this point regarding the intertwining nature between brute luck and choice when it 
comes to talents, see Anderson: 300; Arneson 1989; Sher: 402; Hurley 2002; Rawls 1999: 
312; Cohen 2011: 222; Dworkin 2000: 91. It is also important to note that I am treating 
Dworkin as a luck-egalitarian for the purposes of this chapter, even though he denies such 
a label (Dworkin 2003). However, I consider this label as pertinent for sake of argument 
here, because Dworkin is also sensitive to brute luck when it comes to egalitarian justice 
and talents, and it is just this sensitivity that I mean to analyse with regards to talent and 
equality. 
52 It could be argued that because talents emerge as a dynamic and close interaction 
between one’s circumstances (which counts as brute luck) and one’s choices, it is 
epistemologically impossible to actually locate which part of one’s talents is and is not a 
result of brute luck. This would make it impossible for luck egalitarianism to provide a 
successful account of how to counteract unjust inequalities in talent. However, luck 
egalitarians just deny that it is epistemologically impossible to do so. Dworkin, for 
example, offers his hypothetical insurance model and Roemer offers his own ‘pragmatic’ 
solution (Dworkin 2000; Roemer 1993). Although these attempts at locating instances of 
brute luck in the emergence of one’s talents can be objected to in their own right (see 
Cohen 2011: 29 and Fishkin: 61), this does not mean that no such attempt will be 
successful. The burden of proof is thus on those who make the strong claim that it is 
impossible to successfully locate instances of brute luck.  
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unequal talents matter to levels of equality, and how we subsequently ought to 
counteract these inequalities. 
 
5.4. Relational Egalitarianism and Unequal Talents 
Relational egalitarians reject the main commitments of luck egalitarianism, 
claiming that justice should not be thought of in terms of disadvantages caused 
by bad brute luck. Instead, egalitarian justice ought to measure the way in which 
citizens and social institutions treat each other (Anderson 2010: 23). Equality is 
thus understood as a measure of social norms and behaviour, as a “social relation 
between persons – an equality of authority, status or standing” (Anderson 2010: 
1). Relational egalitarians consider the demands of egalitarian justice to be met 
when people are able to stand in equal relations to each other and participate as 
equals in political and social institutions. Relational equality is disrupted, 
therefore, when hierarchical power relations emerge, such as domination, 
marginalisation and oppression, hindering the equal treatment of citizens 
(Schemmel: 366). Insofar as the distribution of individual holdings and advantages 
is important for equality, it is only to serve as a means to construct a society that 
allows people to engage in relationships that embody equal respect and 
treatment. 
When it comes to talents and their development, the relational egalitarian 
will therefore claim that the mere fact of an unequal distribution of talent is not 
in itself unjust, but only insofar as it means that people in society are unable to 
relate to each other as equals, unable to engage in relationships that express 
equal concern and respect. Unlike the luck egalitarian, who worries about unequal 
talents to the extent that they hinder someone’s relative access to advantage, 
the relational egalitarian only worries about unequal talents insofar as they 
disrupt the equality of relational goods – goods that are created or constituted by 
the way people treat and behave towards each other. 
Relational egalitarians reject the luck egalitarian account of talent and 
equality, because it apparently ignores and does not give grounds for eliminating 
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these relational goods. By focussing on how a person’s level of talent affects their 
individual comparative level of advantage, luck egalitarianism is thought to 
account merely for goods that can be distributed. Relational goods, however are 
not these kinds of goods; the reason why someone feels humiliated or inferior is 
not due to “something that is measurable in individual holdings (something that 
can be had)”, but is rather “internal to a relation” and cannot be attached to one 
person’s comparative level of material wealth or advantage (Axelsen & 
Bidadanure: 9). Relational inequalities are assessed by considering how people are 
treated and not what people receive as part of their fair shares of goods (Anderson 
2010: 6-12). And so, even if there is society in which a distribution of goods has 
been set up in keeping with the commitments of luck egalitarianism, the relational 
egalitarian will claim that there are still instances of unjust relational inequalities 
caused by unequal talents that luck egalitarianism fails to capture, even if the 
luck egalitarian distribution is implemented. 
There are at least two ways in which relational inequalities may arise from 
unequal talents, and I will discuss each in turn; through (i) the way in which talents 
are identified, and (ii) the act of institutions acting on and expressing differences 
in levels of talent. This list need not be exhaustive for the relational egalitarian’s 
account of talent and inequality to hold. However, in the next section I will argue 
that the luck egalitarian can also accommodate for these kinds of relational 
inequalities within their theory, sometimes more successfully than relational 
egalitarianism. 
5.4.1. Talent Identification 
To organise a society in a way that takes account of people’s different levels of 
talent, and the way in which those talents give rise to unequal advantages, we 
would be required to differentiate between those who are talented and those who 
are not. However, this process of identification may give rise to relational 
inequalities in the way that it requires those who are untalented to ‘reveal’ 
themselves or be ‘revealed’ (Wolff 1998). This kind of revelation can occur in two 
ways. First, if those who considered themselves to be unfairly disadvantaged due 
to their lack of talent wanted compensation or help to overcome the 
disadvantage, they might be required to reveal their lack of talent and prove that 
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they really are untalented and disadvantaged. Second, if the state needs to assess 
levels of talent, for education or health reasons for example, comparisons would 
need to be made that brought out and revealed differences in ability. 
Being revealed or having to reveal oneself as untalented has potentially 
hurtful and humiliating effects for the untalented person, damaging their self-
esteem and sense of worth, which in turn may lead to feelings of inferiority. As 
Wolff claims, “where a particular trait is valued within an agent’s culture, to 
admit that one does not have it can lead one to believe that one will, as a 
consequence, acquire a lower respect-standing” (Wolff: 110). Anderson similarly 
argues that relying on the requirement to distinguish a person’s level of talent 
when measuring levels of disadvantage is intrusive and insulting, because it 
“makes the basis of citizens’ claims on one another the fact that some are inferior 
to others in the worth of their lives, talents, and personal qualities” (Anderson 
1999: 289).53  
Feelings of inferiority, such as a lack of self-respect and self-worth, are 
considered as highly problematic from the standpoint of relational equality. This 
is because these emotions play an important part in the way that people gain 
confidence with regards to their standing in society, and this in turn influences 
the way that people conduct themselves as equal members of society; Rawls, for 
example, considered self-respect as the “most important” primary social good 
                                                          
53 Similarly to Wolff and Anderson, Ian Carter has argued that evaluating people’s varying 
levels of talent in the political sphere is disrespectful and unnecessarily delves into a 
person’s personal and private life. However, Carter explicitly claims that the internal 
evaluation in question is only disrespectful with regards to determining how we treat 
people as political agents. He does admit that when it comes to more substantial “thick” 
human relationships, such as the one between professor and student, treating people at 
an evaluative distance “will often be an inappropriate attitude”. It is not incoherent, 
then, for the professor to assess a student’s academic ability, but refrain from doing so 
when treating her as a mutual political agent (Carter: 557). This may be true, but if it is, 
then there arises a tension when it comes to deciding what to do with regards to talented 
people in an institutional setting. In one respect we have to ask people to reveal their 
levels of ability in order to determine what resources will best enable them to flourish, 
but at the same time, policy decisions about the distribution of resources for talented 
people are made at the level of impartial, political institutions. It would be interesting 
to determine whether this tension is damaging for Carter’s view, and the extent to which 
considering people as ‘thin’ political agents is compatible with the relational egalitarian 
project of ensuring that people are treated as equals. 
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(Rawls 1999: 386). As a result, any state of affairs that damages a person’s self-
worth has the potential to hinder their ability to equally participate as a 
worthwhile member of society, harming civic friendship and social trust (Fourie: 
87, 95). These negative emotions may not arise in every individual who is revealed 
as ‘untalented’, or it might be the case that an individual’s feelings of inferiority 
are considered to be irrational. However, as Wolff asserts, “[e]ven if there is no 
good reason why a particular trait should lower your respect-standing, the fact is 
that it can, or, at least, may lead one to believe that it will. So even if a source 
of shame is contingent and irrational, it can still be experienced as a source of 
shame” (Wolff: 115). And this shame, if it does arise, will result in relational 
inequalities, rather than inequalities in individual levels of advantage. 
Because the inequalities that arise from the identification of talents is 
relational, in order to counteract these inequalities the relational egalitarian will 
suggest that instead of assessing whether a person’s talent is a result of bad brute 
luck and re-organising resources to compensate for any personal disadvantages 
that arise, we ought instead to organise society in such a way that respects each 
person’s level of ability and the various social roles we adopt.54 
 5.4.2. Expressive Acts 
It is not only the act of talent identification itself that might cause relational 
inequalities, but also the expressive act of institutions publically proclaiming 
differences in levels of talent. This expressive act could correlate to distributive 
concerns whereby an institution might publically declare that a talented person is 
more worthy of resources, or more deserving of the power to control shares of 
resources in society than an untalented person. Although this expressive act and 
the distributive act will be closely related, and perhaps occur simultaneously, they 
are distinct. Being told by the state that you are less worthy of resources does not 
guarantee that you will actually receive less resources or opportunities, or 
                                                          
54 Michael Slote, for example, offers his own way in which to avoid relational inequalities 
that arise from the identification of talents. He recommends implementing his care 
ethical approach to moral education in order to increase levels of empathy in students 
(Slote 2010). As another example, Fishkin recommends that we widen opportunities and 
lessen the effects of debilitating and unnecessary stop-gaps in society that limit a person’s 
development and set of opportunities (Fishkin 2014). 
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actually have less power to control those resources. Furthermore, it may be 
possible for those who are talented to receive an extra distribution of resources, 
or the power to control those resources, without the fact that they are identified 
as ‘talented’ being expressed in public. 
The expressive act could also correlate with concerns about talent 
identification, whereby an institution might publically express that a talented 
person’s level of ability has been identified as superior to an untalented person’s 
level of ability. The declaration of such an identification officially and publically 
exposes people’s comparative level of talent, which means that not only does the 
untalented person lack self-worth, but that the state also expresses their belief 
that the untalented person’s lack of talent renders them less valuable to the 
productive functioning of society. 
Additionally, the state does not need to explicitly express their judgements 
for feelings of inferiority to occur. Redistribution and identification itself can be 
interpreted as an implicit act of expression that is just as worrying for the 
relational egalitarian. All that needs to be in place for relational inequalities to 
arises is a social structure that makes room for the state to endorse certain social 
norms underlying the encouragement of unequal power relations. The reasons for 
the state’s actions would be acknowledged and internalised by citizens as 
legitimate forms of behaviour, and as such, it is the “general knowledge” of the 
way social institutions act and the way in which they make their judgements that 
would be particularly demoralising (Anderson 1999: 306; Garrau & Laborde: 60). 
These expressive acts, whether they are explicit or implicit, can be seen as a 
state’s social failure to treat citizens with equal concern and respect, singling out 
a certain group of people as less valuable and inferior just in virtue of their level 
of talent (Anderson 1999: 305-6; Fourie: 101; Slote: 15). 
These two examples of how relational inequalities can emerge due to 
unequal levels of talent are used by relational egalitarians to argue that luck 
egalitarianism’s reliance on bad brute luck is implausible when determining how 
unequal talents disrupt levels of equality. This is because doing so fails to 
comprehensively accommodate for all arising inequalities that are deemed to be 
unjust, specifically relational ones. In the next section I will demonstrate that in 
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fact luck egalitarianism can accommodate for these relational inequalities, and in 
a way that more successfully understands the reasons why inequalities in talent 
matter to us. As I will argue, this means that luck egalitarianism provides a more 
successful account of how to counteract unequal levels of talent.  
 
5.5. Relational Inequalities and Luck Egalitarianism 
For sake of argument I will not object to the fact that unequal talents can cause 
the relational inequalities discussed in the two examples above. However, 
assuming that these relational inequalities do arise from unequal levels of talent, 
relational egalitarians claim that luck egalitarians cannot successfully capture 
these inequalities as part of their account of egalitarian justice. As a result, this 
would mean that luck egalitarianism does not offer a plausible account of how 
unequal talents disrupt levels of equality. 
 However, I argue that luck egalitarianism is adequately equipped to 
accommodate for relational inequalities. Whilst it is the case that relational goods 
occur interpersonally, this does not mean that they are neglected by a 
consideration of how to distribute resources in a way that aims to eradicate 
comparative disadvantages arising because of bad brute luck. The most attractive 
versions of luck egalitarianism are committed to correcting relational inequalities 
insofar as they affect levels of comparative advantage, understood personally and 
interpersonally. Cohen, for example, considers the currency of equality (that is, 
what we are aiming to equalise) to be “access to advantage”, where advantage is 
a broad notion that includes, among other things, a person’s level of welfare, 
personal capacities, material wealth and interpersonal relationships with others 
(Cohen 2011: 13-14). 
Cohen’s account of luck egalitarianism makes room for the fact that a 
person’s access to advantage can be disrupted by unequal standings with others 
in society and by being part of certain kinds of relationships. If someone is made 
to feel inferior by the revelation that they are untalented, and as a result are 
marginalised or dominated by others, then this has the potential to put them at a 
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disadvantage, or indeed constitute a disadvantage in itself that arises due to bad 
brute luck, at least in part. In this way, luck egalitarians should be concerned with 
levels of relational equality – those accounts of luck egalitarianism that do not 
accommodate for this are implausible. 
Furthermore, it seems as if luck egalitarianism can accommodate for 
relational inequalities caused by unequal talents more successfully than relational 
egalitarianism itself. This is evident when determining how the two theories assess 
what counts as an unjust talent inequality, and why talents are valuable to us in 
the first place. On the one hand, relational egalitarians consider talent 
inequalities to be unjust only if they affect a person’s ability to interact as an 
equal in society. As Anderson states, “the proper egalitarian aim is to ensure, to 
the extent feasible, that everyone has sufficient capital to function as an equal in 
civil society – to avoid oppression by others, to enjoy standing as an equal, to 
participate in productive life, and so forth” (Anderson 2007: 618). For example, if 
someone feels inferior due to their low level of talent, this is only problematic if 
it affects their ability to interact in society as an equal citizen; not all instances 
of inferiority will have this effect. In fact, Anderson argues that relational 
egalitarianism will often find “no injustice” with regards to feelings of admiration 
and inferiority that may come with unequal levels of talents, due to the fact that 
“one doesn’t need to be admired to be able to function as an equal citizen” 
(Anderson 2010: 335). 
On the other hand, luck egalitarianism considers inequalities of relational 
goods to be unjust if they hinder one’s access to advantage and give rise to a 
comparative disadvantage. In this way, if someone is comparatively disadvantaged 
as a result of the inferiority that is caused by one’s low level of talent, then the 
luck egalitarian will consider the part of this disadvantage caused by bad brute 
luck to be unjust. And what counts as an advantage and disadvantage is 
determined by what is valuable and matters to us. 
Therefore, the difference between relational and luck egalitarianism is that 
when it comes to talent inequalities, they matter for the former only insofar as 
they hinder relational equality, whereas they matter for luck egalitarianism 
insofar as they comparatively disadvantage someone with regards to something 
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that matters and is valuable simpliciter, even if it does not disrupt relational 
equality as prescribed by relational egalitarianism (Mason: 219). As such, the luck 
egalitarian can, in theory, accommodate relational goods more comprehensively 
than the relational egalitarian, who focuses merely on their own benchmark of 
what counts as relational equality in terms of equal participation and respect, 
rather on value and disadvantage more broadly. If the equality of relational goods 
is valuable, then the luck egalitarian will include it as part of the commitments of 
their theory.  
It is one thing for the luck egalitarian to successfully argue that relational 
goods can be incorporated into their theory of justice. It is another thing 
altogether, however, for the luck egalitarian to be able to successfully account 
for how they might counteract the inequalities that arise from these relational 
goods. Luck egalitarianism has been objected to on the basis that it is concerned 
merely with distributing material goods. If this was the case, then it is unclear 
how we would be able to ‘distribute’ relational goods such as self-respect and 
power relations – these are the kinds of goods that cannot be materially quantified 
and individually held.  
However, there is nothing in luck egalitarianism that prevents it from 
counteracting relational inequalities that arise from unequal talents in the same 
way that relational egalitarians would. For example, Chiara Cordelli has proposed 
that even if we cannot distribute and measure levels of relational goods 
themselves, we can distribute the social bases of these goods (Cordelli: 100; see 
also Baker: 68). The idea of a ‘social basis’ refers to Rawls’s account of the 
“features of the basic structure that may reasonably be expected to affect 
people’s self-respect” (Rawls 1999: 254-266). Ensuring that people have equal 
access to the parts of society that affect someone’s self-respect, for example, 
might include distributing material goods so that each person has enough wealth 
in order to feel secure, but it might also include reforming moral education to 
ensure that people are taught to respect and value each other despite their 
differences. It might also include some other kind of social re-structuring, perhaps 
changing the way in which talents are identified or resource allocations handed 
out (see Hirose & Segall: 22; Tan: 104, 130). 
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Anderson claims that relational egalitarians would prefer to alter social 
structures and norms rather than redistribute material resources (Anderson: 336), 
there is, however, nothing to prevent the luck egalitarian from also opting for this 
relational mode of social restructuring, if indeed it was shown to most effectively 
and productively counteract arising unjust inequalities. In fact, when it comes to 
counteracting relational inequalities, the luck egalitarian and the relational 
egalitarian are left with the same options; there is nothing that egalitarians of any 
variety can do apart from restructure, reform or redistribute the social bases of 
these relational goods. For example, Anderson claims that in order to achieve 
relational equality, the relational egalitarian “requires that each person have 
sufficient internal capacities and external resources to enjoy security against 
oppression” and that “each person have enough to function as an equal in society” 
(Anderson 2007: 620). But luck egalitarianism would require this too, given that a 
person’s oppression and unequal position in society would count as a comparative 
disadvantage. Even though relational inequalities are innately relational rather 
than an individual disadvantage, and given the way that society is structured, 
attending to the social bases of how people treat each other is the only way to 
socially mitigate for these inequalities (Fishkin: 131-156). 
Therefore, even though unequal levels of talent in society may cause 
relational inequalities, this does not mean that relational egalitarianism is the 
only or most successful theory to correctly capture the reasons why these 
relational inequalities are unjust, and how they should be counteracted. Instead, 
luck egalitarianism is able to accommodate for the worry of relational inequalities 
caused by unequal talents, and is also able to suggest ways in which to counteract 
for these relational disadvantages. In the next section I argue that luck 
egalitarianism is able to offer an account of how to counteract unjust inequalities 
of talent that is more successful than relational egalitarianism. This is because 
luck egalitarianism more plausibly understands they reasons why talents are 
valuable and why unequal talents disrupt levels of equality.55 
                                                          
55 Anderson has argued that one of the substantial demarcations between luck and 
relational egalitarianism is that the focus on social equality for the latter means that 
what we owe each other depends on interpersonal justification (Anderson 2010; see also 
Tan: 97). This means that something can only count as a disadvantage for an agent if she 
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5.6. How to Counteract Unequal Talents 
 5.6.1. Talents and Opportunity 
Unequal levels of talent in society do not only cause relational inequalities. Even 
if everyone is able to relate to each other and function as equals in society, we 
still have good reason to be concerned about the unequal levels of talent that 
remain. This is because the unequal levels of talent that are left over still matter; 
we value talents not only because they allow us to interact as equals in a 
participatory society, but because, as I explained in Section Two, talents also give 
us opportunities for advantage more broadly construed. One of these advantages 
might very well be the opportunity to interact in society as an equal citizen; 
developing one’s talents may allow us to use a particular skill that can aid one in 
playing an important and valued role in society. Another advantage of being 
talented might also be the opportunity for material wealth, with excellent skill 
acquisition for particular skills often being rewarded by society through economic 
means. 
                                                          
can reasonably make a claim of injustice that others will accept as legitimate (Anderson 
2010: 5). In light of this, Anderson writes that “if God does not exist, then there is no one 
accountable for the unequal distribution of natural endowments, no injury from this, and 
hence no injustice” (Anderson 2010: 10). There is no injustice, Anderson argues, because 
there can be no reasonable claim of injustice made on others. However, assuming that 
interpersonal justification of justice claims are necessary for a theory of egalitarian 
justice (and we should not automatically accept that they are), it is not clear why luck 
egalitarianism cannot accommodate this. There is someone whose interests have been 
hurt, they are disadvantaged, and there is someone or an institution that they can hold 
accountable for this disadvantage due to the failure in “preventing or remedying the 
injury” (Anderson 2010: 9). We do not expect the disadvantaged untalented person to ask 
for the talented pianist’s arm to be chopped off so as to equalise their levels of talent, 
as Anderson suggests. But we would expect them to complain about the fact that their 
social environment was not structured so as to either (a) give them the opportunity to 
develop musical talents that they may have but are so far neglected, unidentified or 
undeveloped, or (b) engender the right kind of conditions for a talent to emerge in the 
first place. In this way, this person’s claim is justifiable in terms of the interpersonal 
commitments and obligations that we owe to each other – there is no reason why luck 
egalitarianism cannot accommodate this. 
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However, the advantages that come with being talented are not exhausted 
by relational or material instrumental benefits. Being talented is also valuable 
because of the non-instrumental developmental opportunities it can bestow upon 
an individual. And, as I have argued in Chapter Three, this developmental 
experience can uniquely contribute to one’s well-being, with the potential to 
shape one’s deeply held commitments and convictions about the good life. 
Because society is structured to give further developmental opportunities to those 
who are talented, and provides the environment for certain talents to emerge in 
the first place, merely having a talent means that you have already been 
advantaged with a greater opportunity set; this impacts on your life prospects and 
alters your level of access to advantage. The mere fact that there is an unequal 
level of talent in society is in part a result of your brute luck in the way that social 
institutions are structured. 
Therefore, we also worry about unequal levels of talent because talents 
widen a person’s opportunity set with regards to one of the most fundamentally 
important aspects of a person’s life – the opportunity for one’s own personal 
development. Because talents are non-instrumentally valuable in this way, as an 
opportunity for all kinds of advantages, including the opportunity for 
development, this means that the mere fact that one is not talented counts as a 
disadvantage; it reduces one’s set of advantageous opportunities. As such, luck 
egalitarians aim to counteract comparative levels of unequal talents in 
themselves, to the extent that the unequal levels of talent have been caused by 
bad brute luck, irrespective of the arising disadvantageous or advantageous 
consequences of this inequality (Segall: 20; Schwartz: 253-7). 
By contrast, relational egalitarians claim that unequal differences in talent 
are not worrying because we value them as advantageous opportunities, but only 
if they disrupt relational equality. The reason relational egalitarians do not 
consider the value of talents to matter non-instrumentally for egalitarian justice 
in and of itself can be traced back to Rawls’s claim, that what matters for justice 
is “the way the basic structure of society makes use of these natural differences 
and permits them to affect the social fortune of citizens, their opportunities in 
life, and the actual terms of cooperation between them” (Rawls, 1999: 337; 
Anderson 1999: 336; see also Tan: 92, 103). On Rawls’s picture, talents are 
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considered ‘natural’ endowments, and inequalities in talent are only unjust with 
regards to how social institutions respond to these natural inequalities, rather 
than the fact that there are unequal levels of talents themselves. This means that 
the unequal distribution of talents is normatively neutral; we should only aim to 
counteract the disadvantageous consequences of the inequalities that arise as a 
result of unequal levels of talent, rather than counteract the unequal levels of 
talent by themselves, as the luck egalitarian proposes.  
 Luck egalitarians do admit that there are some cases in which natural facts 
are normatively neutral in the way that relational egalitarians suggest. As Cohen 
states, “[l]uck might cause one person to have more freckles than another: that 
is (in itself) neither an equality nor an inequality” (Cohen 2011: 117). But talents 
are different to freckles in one important respect: we value talents for the way in 
which they can advantageously affect a person’s life. That is, the reality of 
unequal talents is not normatively neutral because they matter to us. And the 
reason talents matters to us and why we find unequal levels of talent worrying, is 
not merely because of the instrumental advantages of developing our talents, or 
the fact that talents can disrupt relational equality. Talents are valuable also due 
to the non-instrumental value that being talented bestows on us – talents 
determine a person’s advantageous developmental experience. 
Furthermore, as I have already argued in Chapter One, talents are not 
‘natural’ as Rawls and most other egalitarians suggest. Instead, they emerge as a 
dynamic interaction between one’s social and natural environment. This means 
that one’s level of talent is in part defined by the social structures and 
opportunities that are in place in one’s society, and already an indication of one’s 
level of social advantage. As a result, someone who is untalented will always be 
worse off in terms of opportunities than someone who is talented, and will always 
be worse off than they might otherwise have been, all other things being equal 
(Segall: 75, 81).56 The mere fact that there are unequal levels of talent in society 
                                                          
56 This is why Nozick’s entitlement theory does not work when it comes to the equal 
distribution of talents and their development. The entitlement theory that Nozick’s Wilt 
Chamberlain example is meant to illustrate is not persuasive as an account of how 
distributive justice should deal with the problem of unequal talents, because it assumes 
a normatively neutral position regarding the status quo and starting point with regards to 
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demonstrates that there are unjust levels of inequalities that ought to be 
counteracted; merely having a comparatively lower level of talent disadvantages 
and limits one’s access to valuable opportunities, and this disadvantage occurs, 
at least in part, as a result of both natural and social brute luck. Therefore, it is 
the luck egalitarian, and not the relational egalitarian, that successfully 
understands the way in which we ought to respond to unequal talents. The luck 
egalitarian claims that insofar as one’s level of talent is matter of bad brute luck, 
we ought to counteract the unequal levels of talent in themselves and not just the 
disadvantageous consequences that arise due to these unequal levels of talent. 
5.6.2. Mitigation and Neutralisation 
Given the fact that we also value talents non-instrumentally, as an advantage for 
all kinds of opportunities, the luck egalitarian further claims that we should not 
only mitigate the disadvantageous effects of unequal talents, but that we ought 
to neutralise the unjust inequalities in the distribution of talents itself. As Cohen 
claims, “the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the influence of brute 
luck on distribution” (Cohen 2011: 391, see also Tan: 127). This luck egalitarian 
neutralisation approach considers the level of one’s talent to be valuable 
simpliciter, and so aims to neutralise any unjust inequalities in levels of talent 
before they arise.57 
                                                          
people’s talents and abilities. Chamberlain is allowed to keep his higher earnings because 
people are free and able to pay to see him perform, so the problem of material 
inequalities is not unjust in this situation, according to Nozick. However, as we know, the 
emergence of Chamberlain’s talent is in part a result of bad brute luck. This means that 
Chamberlain’s talent has advantaged him unfairly. Chamberlain is not necessarily 
‘entitled’ to his talent, even if he is entitled to the fruits of his talent. When on a level 
playing field, people would be entitled to any success that arises from their effort to 
develop their talent; but we are not on a level playing field. The truth is that 
Chamberlain’s talent is the result of unfair social and natural advantages, and so even if 
people freely chose to give him money, we ought to find a way to make the social 
structure fairer, before the question of redistribution arises (see Nozick 1974). 
57 Note that luck egalitarianism is concerned with neutralising the disadvantageous 
effects of luck and not neutralising luck itself. This is important, as the bad effects of 
one instance of luck can plausibly be eliminated by another. Luck merely triggers the 
luck egalitarian concern that something is potentially unjust, and it is the comparative 
disadvantage caused by that luck that signals the injustice. 
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By contrast, relational egalitarians merely aim to mitigate the negative 
effects of unequal talents, rather than completely neutralising the unjust level of 
inequality in the first place. This means that some differences in levels of talent 
are allowed to remain, insofar as these differences do not unreasonably hinder a 
person’s access to relational equality (Mason: 10, 94). As Anderson states, 
inequalities are only considered to be unjust by relational egalitarians when the 
inequality “reflects, embodies, or causes inequality of authority, status or 
standing” (Anderson 2010: 2). Once these criteria have been met, however, 
relational egalitarians do not worry about unequal levels of talent. In fact, at 
times it seems that Anderson doubts altogether whether unequal talents really do 
disrupt relational equality, and as such, the inequalities that arise from 
differential talents would not be deemed as unjust, and so would not need to be 
mitigated (Anderson 2007: 620). 
The difference between the relational egalitarian’s mitigation approach, 
and the luck egalitarian’s neutralisation approach can be summarised as follows: 
the mitigation approach considers the disadvantageous effects of unequal talents 
as unjust, after the distribution of talents has already occurred (ex post), whereas 
the neutralisation approach considers the mere fact of an unequal distribution of 
talents to be unjust in itself (to the extent that it arises due to bad brute luck), 
and aims to counteract this injustice before it arises (ex ante). 
I argue that we ought to adopt the luck egalitarian’s neutralisation 
approach, because the mitigation approach does not successfully account for how 
to compensate for the deficiency of opportunities that are lost through a lack of 
talent (see Dworkin 2013: 359). If someone is not talented, it is not only 
compensation for the lack of instrumental resources or relational goods that they 
require, but also compensation for the non-instrumental disadvantage accrued 
due to the lack of developmental opportunities – for not being the kind of person 
who is given the various developmental and educational experiences that come 
with being talented. We want our account of how to counteract unequal talents 
to accommodate the value of these developmental opportunities, because the 
value that is received from one’s formative developmental experiences turn us 
into the people that we are. 
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However, the mitigation approach only counteracts the negative effects of 
a lack of talent after the fact, and leaves the actual unequal distribution of talents 
intact. This is unattractive, because we cannot merely compensate for or 
remediate a lack of developmental experiences after the fact. This is because we 
value the developmental process not just for the arising beneficial consequences, 
but also for the experience of the formative process in and of itself. It is this 
experience that shapes who we are and the values that we hold. If we merely 
mitigate for this after the fact, then the developmental experience itself will be 
lost and the disadvantages arising from this left untouched (Fishkin: 22). 
Therefore, we ought not to merely mitigate ex post for the arising disadvantages 
caused by unequal talents, but to adopt the luck egalitarian approach of 
neutralising the unjust talent inequalities in themselves.  
 There are two objections that can be brought against the neutralisation 
approach. First, it can be argued that neutralisation is impractical, and that we 
will never be able to successfully eradicate differences in unequal talents before 
they occur. For example, in order to neutralise differences in musical ability, we 
might be required to chop off the fingers of those who are talented or carry out 
invasive brain surgery (Mason: 98). However, to begin with, this objection assumes 
that in order to neutralise we would have to level down, reducing everyone’s level 
of talent to the lowest common denominator. However, there is nothing to say 
that we ought to do this, and the most attractive account of neutralisation will 
level up rather than level down, so that developmental opportunities and 
experiences are in fact widened for everyone (see for example Fishkin 2014). 
Furthermore, the objection misunderstands the commitments of egalitarian 
justice, which determine only what we are required to do in terms of equality, 
not what should be done all-things-considered. In other words, equality is only 
thought of as one value that can be trumped by others, and what we ought to do 
in the name of equality need only be pro tanto. In this way, the requirement of 
neutralisation is only pro tanto; it does not specify what we ought to do all-things-
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considered and can be overridden by other reasons that appeal to some important 
values (Cohen 2003: 244).58 
Second, Mason argues that the neutralisation approach results in counter-
intuitive implications, claiming that it “is so at odds with our ordinary moral 
experience” that we should reject it “from the point of view of justice” (Mason: 
99, 105). He uses the example of parents choosing to read bedtime stories to their 
children, which can be seen to advantage children significantly, and consequently 
cause unjust inequalities in developmental opportunities and experiences. If we 
follow the luck egalitarian neutralisation approach, then we would have to ensure 
that any advantages arising from this activity were completely eradicated before 
they occurred, presumably by requiring parents to refrain from reading to their 
children in the first place. The point is that if the neutralisation approach were 
correct, then there would be a pro tanto reason of justice to ask parents not to 
read bedtime stories to their children. Mason claims that this is an unattractive 
consequence of the neutralisation approach, and goes against what common-sense 
justice would demand (Mason: 101). 
 However, in support of the neutralisation approach, Mason’s claim can be 
responded to in two ways. First, as already highlighted above, just because there 
is a reason not to read to our children in the name of egalitarian justice, this does 
not mean that, all-things-considered, there aren’t other values that might trump 
this pro tanto reason, such as the fostering of intimate relations between parent 
and child (Brighouse & Swift: 120). This overriding reason, whatever it might be, 
does not however negate the pro tanto reason of equality. Instead, all it 
demonstrates is that equality is not the only value that we ought to consider when 
weighing up what should be done overall, and it certainly does not mean we should 
reject the aim of equality altogether. 
Second, Mason’s objection can be responded to by highlighting why we 
value bedtime reading. Bedtime stories are valuable not just because they will 
bring advantageous benefits to one’s children after the experience is over, but 
                                                          
58 Of course, it is another matter what counts as a value that can legitimately trump 
equality, and how to distinguish what we ought to do overall given these competing 
values. 
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also because of the non-instrumental goodness of the experience itself at the 
time. By mitigating the negative effects of that experience, as Mason suggests we 
should, we would only be counteracting for the arising unequal consequences. 
This, however, fails to account for the non-instrumental reasons why we value the 
opportunity and experience itself. As such, we ought to neutralise and eradicate 
the mere fact that some children are being read to at bedtime and some are not; 
this does not necessarily require levelling down, so that we ought to refrain 
completely from all bedtime reading, but would more plausibly require that social 
structures are in place so that all children could benefit from such a positive 
experience. 
There will, however, be some cases in which ex ante neutralisation is not 
possible, in part because there will always be an element of natural luck involved 
in talent formation that social re-structuring cannot counteract, and in part 
because there are other values, such as autonomy, self-entitlement, efficiency, 
and family partiality, that will always disrupt levels of equality in talents and their 
development. Even though there will still be ex post inequalities in the levels of 
talent, I argue that the luck egalitarian neutralisation approach is still the best 
way to counteract for these inequalities. This is because the fact that there are 
ex post inequalities in talents means that there is a comparative disadvantage in 
someone’s access to advantage, and this disadvantage was in part caused by bad 
brute luck. Once it has been determined that these inequalities are unjust, then 
there is no reason to merely mitigate the disadvantageous effects of these 
inequalities. As I have already argued, this would fail to recognise the non-
instrumental value of talent and the experiences it offers. Instead, if someone is 
comparatively disadvantaged due to their level of talent – whether this 
disadvantage is relational, material, or developmental – then as egalitarians we 
ought to aim to eradicate the inequality in the level of talents altogether, both 
ex ante and ex post. 
Therefore, egalitarian justice demands that we counteract arising 
inequalities in levels of talent through neutralisation. It is luck egalitarianism, 
rather than relational egalitarianism, that has the resources to successfully 
capture this demand, due to the fact that luck egalitarians give a more inclusive 
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account regarding the reasons why we value talents and the advantages that occur 
from them. 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that when it comes to the relationship between 
unequal talents and egalitarian justice, it is the theory of luck egalitarianism that 
is most successful in (a) accounting for why inequalities in talents are considered 
to be unjust, and (b) prescribing the correct way in which we ought to counteract 
these inequalities, through neutralisation. Whilst relational egalitarianism has 
been important in picking out the ways in which unjust relational inequalities can 
arise from unequal talents, it is not the case that luck egalitarianism cannot 
accommodate for these. In fact, when it comes to unequal talents it seems as if 
luck egalitarianism is more comprehensive in addressing these relational 
inequalities. Furthermore, given the fact that talents emerge in part due to 
advantageous social structures, it is not the case that talents are by themselves 
normatively neutral. The mere fact that there are unequal levels of talent 
distributed in society means that there has already been an instance of unequal 
social structures. 
However, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the correct account of egalitarian 
justice ought to be pluralist, including commitments held by both luck and 
relational egalitarianism. He writes that “pluralist egalitarians think that luck and 
relational egalitarians each articulate a component in a pluralistic account of 
egalitarian justice”, and in this pluralistic conception both components “must be 
satisfied in order for egalitarian justice to fully obtain” (Lippert-Rasmussen 2005: 
220-1). The luck egalitarian component would claim that a “state of affairs where 
people’s distributive positions reflect something other than their comparative 
exercise of responsibility is unjust”, whilst the relational component would state 
that “a just society is one where the norms regulating social interactions are 
suitably egalitarian, universally accepted and complied with” (Lippert-Rasmussen 
2015: 222; see also Voorhoeve: 5). 
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As I have made explicit in this chapter, it is not clear why relational 
egalitarianism has the monopoly over the second component that Lippert-
Rasmussen mentions, regarding equal social norms and interactions. Luck 
egalitarians can also accommodate the claim that society ought to be structured 
in a way that secures the equality of relational goods in insofar as these goods will 
count as advantages. I have also argued that if we accept a decent and attractive 
theory of luck egalitarianism, that theory can accommodate the relational 
inequalities that arise from unequal talents, and provide a more convincing 
account of how we ought to neutralise any injustice that may arise from these 
inequalities. As a result, we do not need to be relational egalitarians or pluralist 
about egalitarian justice when it comes to the relationship between talent and 
equality; luck egalitarianism can capture everything that relational egalitarianism 
has told us is unjust about unequal talents, and do so more successfully. 
Therefore, the way in which we ought to counteract for unequal talents is best 
understood by referring to the theory of luck egalitarianism, which advocates a 
neutralisation approach that is successfully grounded in a plausible account of why 
we value talents and their development and how they disrupt levels of equality.  
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Conclusion 
In this dissertation I have offered an analysis of the nature and value of talent by 
focussing on three central issues that arise when examining the role that talents 
play in our lives. To begin with, I focussed on proposing an account of the nature 
of talent. In Chapter One I argued that a talent is a high level of potential for a 
particular skill which is expressed in the excellent acquisition of that skill. By 
making a case for understanding potential as a dispositional quality that results 
from a dynamic interaction between one’s genetic code and one’s environment, I 
objected to the environmentalist account of talent. I then proposed that a talent 
is an expressive and comparative phenomenon, dependent on the evaluative 
judgements regarding the value of the skill itself and the various thresholds of 
comparison classes. 
 Second, I focussed on whether or not we have good prudential reasons or a 
moral obligation to develop our talents. In Chapter Two I concentrated on the 
relationship between talent development and morality, analysing Kant’s claim 
that there is a positive, imperfect moral duty to develop one’s talents. I argued 
that Kant is unsuccessful in providing plausible arguments for this claim, because 
he cannot generate the moral priority of developing one’s talents over one’s mere 
competencies or non-talent abilities. 
In Chapter Three I argued that moral perfectionism is similarly unable to 
generate the claim that there is a moral obligation to develop one’s talents. This 
is because moral perfectionism is subject to what I call the ‘excellence objection’, 
showing that developing one’s talents is not objectively good or excellent in the 
way that moral perfectionists advocate. I also argued in Chapter Three that 
welfare perfectionists cannot successfully claim that there are good prudential 
reasons to develop one’s talents. Not only is welfare perfectionism also subject to 
the excellence objection, but it also violates the endorsement constraint. This 
constraint claims that whether or not the development of one’s talents is to be 
regarded as a constituent part of an agent’s well-being is conditional on the 
agent’s endorsement of that development, under optimal decision-making 
conditions. This endorsement appeals to the fit between an agent’s deeply held 
normative commitments and the commitments that are required to bring about 
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the development of her talents. Without this endorsement, the development of 
one’s talents will be alienating, and thus cannot be prudentially good. As such, 
the endorsement constraint places conditions on any theory of well-being that 
claims one has a pro tanto prudential reason to develop one’s talents. 
In Chapter Four I argued that the endorsement constraint does not only 
place conditions on theories of well-being, but also on any moral theory that 
claims one has a pro tanto moral obligation to develop one’s talents. Without an 
agent’s endorsement, as specified by the endorsement constraint, the obligation 
to develop one’s talents will count as unreasonably demanding and thus can be 
overridden by one’s deeply held normative commitments. This means that 
whether or not one has a pro tanto prudential reason or a pro tatno moral 
obligation to develop one’s talents, will be conditional on meeting the 
endorsement constraint. 
Finally, I turned my focus to the relationship between talent and equality, 
and what we ought to do given the fact of unequal talents. I argued that luck 
egalitarianism, rather than relational egalitarianism, most successfully (a) 
accounts for why inequalities in talent matter for egalitarian justice and should 
be considered as unjust, and (b) prescribes the way in which we ought to 
counteract inequalities in levels of talent, through neutralisation, both ex ante 
and ex post. 
For reasons of scope, I have had to leave some interesting questions 
unanswered, and these questions highlight potential avenues for further research. 
With regards to my discussion of the nature of talent in Chapter One, I had to 
leave aside the issue of how my own account of talent, which answered the 
conceptual question about what a talent is, fits with what Sternberg and Davidson 
call ‘explicit’ theories of talent. This latter type of theory aims to understand the 
cognitive traits and processes that are present in a person who is already labelled 
as being talented (Sternberg & Davidson 1986: 10). In order to offer a fully 
comprehensive account of the nature of talent, it will be important to analyse 
more extensively the way in which those who are talented use certain cognitive 
traits and processes to express the excellent manifestation of their skill. For 
example, Renzulli offers his “three-ring” conception of talent, claiming that 
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talented individuals show a higher level of ability, creativity, and task 
development (Renzulli 2005). In order to determine which explicit theory is most 
plausible, more empirical work will need to be undertaken, as well as a theoretical 
analysis of what is meant by the concepts being used to describe these epistemic 
and cognitive attributes.  
When it came to my discussion of how talent development contributes to 
one’s well-being, in Chapter Three I employed the endorsement constraint to 
argue that whether or not talent development is prudentially good depends on 
whether or not an agent endorses (under optimal decision-making conditions) the 
commitments that are required to bring about the development of her talent. In 
order to avoid the ‘correctness objection’, I included as part of this constraint a 
counter-factual idealisation clause, highlighting that the prudential goodness of 
talent development does not just rest on an agent’s endorsement simpliciter, but 
on what an agent would endorse if she were under optimal decision-making 
conditions. 
However, when arguing for this counter-factual clause, I admitted that 
there was a burden of proof to specify what these optimal conditions are, and how 
they differ from full idealisation conditions in a way that is not problematically 
vague or ad hoc. As such, it will be important to undertake further research into 
articulating an account of counter-factual optimal conditions for the endorsement 
constraint that does not give rise to the objections raised against full idealisation 
conditions. One way in which to approach formulating such an account will be to 
examine the literature on decision theory and the extent to which these theories 
are plausibly applicable to decisions about endorsement and well-being (see for 
example Peterson 2017). 
In Chapter Four, I had to leave aside the question of the role that 
endorsement plays when determining what is morally required of us in emergency 
situations, such as in war-time, in the face of humanitarian crises, or in severe 
health epidemics. In these situations it is thought that what is legimitely required 
of us by morality will be more extreme and demanding, given the circumstances. 
In order to provide a comprehensive account of the extent to which talent 
development is morally required, it will be important to examine in more detail 
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the relationship between endorsement and emergency morality. It might be the 
case that the endorsement constraint only kicks in after a certain normative 
humanitarian threshold is met, in which case, we might have a moral obligation 
to develop talents that we don’t endorse. However, if this were true, then where 
that threshold lies and what counts as ‘emergency’ morality would need to be 
plausibly determined (see for example Viens & Selgelid 2012). 
Another topic for further research would be an analysis of whether the 
development of one’s talents is morally required not just in secular morality, but 
also in religious accounts of morality. For example, in Christian ethics, the Parable 
of the Talents, as it appears in the books of Matthew and Luke, seems to suggest 
that developing one’s talents is morally required, given that one’s talents are a 
gift from God. Presumably, given that such an obligation will be a result of divine 
command, appeal to the endorsement constraint will not be relevant in 
determining the grounds for this moral obligation. However, further research 
would be required to arrive at a plausible interpretation of the parables, and an 
account of the way in which the moral obligation to develop one’s talents is 
generated from the relevant religious commitments (see for example Boucher 
1981; Crossan 2013; Hultgren 2000; Snodgrass 2008). 
Finally, when it comes to the relationship between talent and equality, I 
argued that in order to counteract the unequal distribution of levels of talent in 
society, we ought to adopt the luck egalitarian neutralisation approach. For the 
sake of discussion in that Chapter, I had to leave aside the interesting practical 
question about how such a neutralisation approach could be appropriated into 
public policy and put into practice so as to successfully counteract the injustice 
caused by unequal talents. One obstacle to this that I initially raised was the 
assumption that neutralisation would require levelling down, so that we reduce 
all levels of talent to the lowest common denominator. I argued that 
neutralisation does not require this, and that we could instead level up so that we 
maximise levels of talent for everyone as far as possible. However, it would be for 
further research to examine exactly how this levelling up approach would work in 
practice, and how other competing values that may conflict with what equality 
requires will limit the extent to which this approach could be fully implemented. 
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In the Introduction of this dissertation I noted that despite the fact that 
talents and their development are considered to play a positive and central role 
in our lives, the philosophical literature is seriously lacking in its discussion on the 
nature and value of talents. The literature seems to assume that developing one’s 
talents is good, without an analysis of what talents are and of the value of talent 
development for one’s well-being or moral agency. This dissertation aimed to 
provide such an analysis, and to demonstrate how this can inform and help us to 
assess some of the arguments made in the existing philosophical literature. In 
doing so, I did not aim to provide an exhaustive overview of all the philosophical 
issues that could be raised in relation to talent and talent development. Instead, 
by focussing on the central issues of morality, well-being and equality, as well 
providing an account of the nature of talent and outlining a number of areas for 
future research, I hope to have at least stimulated a philosophical discussion on 
the nature and value of talent, and the extent to which talents shape the way 
that we live our lives.  
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